Terminal Evaluation
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) project
Macaya Grand Sud Phase I (PIMS ID 01870)

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This Terminal Evaluation was prepared for UNEP by Yves Renard as an independent consultant, with additional in-country data collection carried out by Wasmith François and Lenève Julien, independent consultants.

The evaluators would like to express their gratitude to past and current members of the project team and to all other persons met and interviewed, as listed in Annex II.

The evaluation consultants hope that the findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in this report will contribute to the successful finalisation of the current project, to the formulation of an eventual next phase and to the continuous improvement of similar projects in other countries and regions.

BRIEF CONSULTANT BIOGRAPHIES

Yves Renard is a professional evaluator and an independent consultant in sustainable development policy and participatory natural resource management. He served as Executive Director (1992-2001) of the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI), a non-governmental organisation fostering the development and adoption of policies and programmes in support of effective and equitable participation and collaboration in natural resource management, and then moved on to invest himself in a range of activities that reflect his particular interest and by now extensive experience in linking natural resource governance, poverty reduction and social development, and in the design of institutions that foster participation and empowerment. His work has covered projects at a national or local level in countries as far apart as Botswana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda and Saint Lucia, as well as consultation and facilitation work for international institutions and cooperation agreements, such as the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean Large Marine Ecosystem (CLME+) Project. Yves Renard has served and continues to serve on the governing bodies of a number of international, national and community-based organisations and is currently a Director and Interim Coordinator of Panos Caribbean.

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ABOUT THE EVALUATION

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Brief Description: This report is a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of a UNEP project implemented between 2015 and 2018. The project "Macaya Grand Sud" Phase I (MGS1) was part of the third phase of implementation of UNEP's Haiti Grand Sud (HGS) Strategy, which is structured around five main areas: biodiversity and protected areas; green economy and value chains; natural protection and risk reduction; sustainable energy and renewable energy; and, regional planning and decentralisation. The project's overall development goal was to support the Government of Haiti in promoting the use of ecosystem management approaches in the Southern region of the country (*Départements* du Sud, Grande Anse and Nippes) and to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems while improving the livelihoods of local communities. The evaluation sought to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability.

Key words: Ecosystem Management;[1] Protected Areas. Haiti. Caribbean.

Primary data collection period: February - April 2021

Field mission dates: 26 March – 19 April 2021

[1] This data is used to aid the internet search of this report on the Evaluation Office of UNEP Website

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFD	*Agence française de développement*
ANAP	*Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées*
AVSF	*Agronomes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières*
AUC	American University of the Caribbean
CAEPA	*Comité d'Approvisonnement en Eau Potable et d'Assainissement*
CaMPAM	Caribbean Marine Protected Area Management Network and Forum
CBC	Caribbean Biological Corridor
CEP	Caribbean Environment Programme
CIAT	*Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire*
CMB	Crisis Management Branch
CSI	Côte Sud Initiative
DDAS	*Direction Départmentale de l'Agriculture du Sud*
DDE	*Dirction Départementale de l'Environnement*
DINEPA	*Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement*
EOU	Evaluation Office of UNEP
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFEM	*Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial*
FHB	*Fonds Haïtien pour la Biodiversité*
FNGA	*Fondation Nouvelle Grand'Anse*
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoH	Government of Haiti
HGS	Haiti Grand Sud
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KPP	*Konbit pou Potapiman*
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MARNDR	*Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural*
MdE	*Ministère de l'Environnement*
MGS	Macaya Grand Sud
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MNNP	Macaya National Nature Park
MPA	Marine Protected Area
MTS	Medium-term Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
ORE	*Organisation pour la Réhabilitation de l'Environnement*
PA	Protected Area
PADI	*Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré*
PCDMB	Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch
PIMS	Programme Information and Management System
PoW	Programme of Work
PRC	Project Review Committee

ProDoc	Project Document
ROLAC	Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SNAP	*Système National des Aires Protégées*
SPAW	(Protocol on) Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife
TE	Terminal evaluation
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UEPLM	*Un Enfant Par La Main*
UGP	*Unité de Gestion de Projet / Parc*
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

Table 1: Project Identification Table

UNEP PIMS ID	01870	UMOJA ID	SB-001015
Implementing Partners	UNOPS, FAO, MdE / DDE, MARNDR / DDAS, CIAT, ORE, PADI, ReefCheck, SOS Enfants sans Frontières, AVSF		
Relevant SDGs	SDG1, SDG 14, SDG 15 and SDG 17		
Sub-programmes	2014 – 2015 and 2016 – 2017: Ecosystem management 2018 – 2019: Healthy and productive ecosystems (as per ProDoc and Revision of December 2017) Also: 2014 – 2015 and 2016 – 2017: Disasters and conflicts 2018 – 2019: Resilience to Disasters and conflicts (as per this evaluation)	Expected Accomplishments (as per ProDoc and Revision of December 2017)	The use of ecosystem management approaches in countries to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems is increased (PoW 2014 – 2015 and 2016 – 2017) The health and productivity of marine, freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems are institutionalized in education, monitoring and cross-sector and transboundary collaboration frameworks at the national and international levels (PoW 2018 – 2019)
Programme of Work Outputs (as per ProDoc and Revision of December 2017)	**PoW 2014-15 and 2016-17** Methodologies, partnerships and tools to maintain or restore ecosystem services and integrate the ecosystem management approach with the conservation and management of ecosystems Tools, technical support and partnerships to improve food security and sustainable productivity in agricultural landscapes through the integration of the ecosystem approach Methodologies, tools and global and regional policy frameworks that apply the ecosystem approach to sustain coastal and marine ecosystem services and productivity in particular food provisioning are developed and tested. Technical and capacity building support to: exchange knowledge, assess the impacts of alternative development options; and make science usable for effective management of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Biodiversity and ecosystem service values are assessed, demonstrated and communicated to strengthen decision-making by governments, businesses and consumers **PoW 2018 – 2019**		

UNEP PIMS ID	01870	UMOJA ID	SB-001015
	Technical assistance and partnerships on effective conservation measures and monitoring thereof (ecosystem management, ecological representativeness, and connectivity) Development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for integrated ecosystem management Support to cross-sectoral institutional frameworks and agreements for ecosystem management		
UNEP approval date	23 March 2015		
Expected start date:	1 March 2015	Actual start date:	23 March 2015
Planned completion date:	31 December 2018	Actual operational completion date:	31 December 2018
Planned project budget at approval:	at approval: USD 7,989,969 revised 2017: USD 9,755,505	Actual total expenditures reported as of 28 February 2021:	USD 10,236,111.91
Planned Environment Fund allocation:	0	Actual Environment Fund expenditures reported as of 28 February 2021:	Not applicable
Planned Extra-Budgetary Financing:	0	Secured Extra-Budgetary Financing:	Not applicable
Other income	Transfer from previous project: 29,995	Actual Extra-Budgetary Financing expenditures:	Not applicable
First disbursement:	August 2014	Planned date of financial closure:	June 2021
No. of formal project revisions:	One	Date of last approved project revision:	December 2017
No. of Steering Committee meetings:	None	Date of last/next Steering Committee meeting:	Not applicable
Mid-term Review/ Evaluation (planned date):	June 2016	Mid-term Review/ Evaluation (actual date):	No Mid-term Review[2]
Terminal Evaluation (planned date):	June 2017	Terminal Evaluation (actual date):	January – June 2021
Coverage - Country:	Haiti	Coverage - Region:	Caribbean
Dates of previous project phases:	Not applicable	Status of future project phases:	Macaya Grand Sud Phase 2 extended September 2021

[2] No MTR was required as the project duration was under the 4-year threshold for a mid-point performance assessment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project background

1. The project "Macaya Grand Sud" Phase I (MGS1) project was managed by UNEP's Crisis Management Branch[3] (CMB) and it was part of the third phase of implementation of the United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) Haiti Grand Sud (HGS) Strategy, which is structured around five main areas: biodiversity and protected areas; green economy and value chains; natural protection and risk reduction; sustainable energy and renewable energy; and, regional planning and decentralisation. This Strategy is implemented through the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), which is delivered through a coalition of United Nations (UN) agencies and associated partners that aim to promote the resilient development and economic growth of this coastal region. The MGS1 project was funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Norway, the primary financing partner of CSI, which sees this initiative as a flagship project. The project's overall development goal was to support the Government of Haiti in promoting the use of ecosystem management approaches in the Southern region of the country (*Départements* du Sud, Grande Anse and Nippes) and to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems while improving the livelihoods of local communities. The MGS1 project was approved and initiated in March 2015, originally for a period of 33 months, and was extended in December 2017 for an additional period of 12 months (project timeframe March 2015 – December 2018). The initial approved budget was USD 7,989,969, which was increased in December 2017 with an additional contribution of USD 1,765,536, also from the Government of Norway, bringing the budget to a total of USD 9,755,505. A successor project (Macaya Grand Sud 2 – MGS2) began before the completion of MGS1, is now well underway and was actually due for completion in December 2020, but has been extended for an additional nine months.

This evaluation

2. This evaluation began in January 2021, and was originally due for completion by the end of April, but the process was extended for a period of two months to allow for the conduct of field visits and interviews under suitable conditions. Following a preliminary review of documents and a first round of interviews with key informants, including members of the team responsible for the coordination or project execution, an inception report was prepared in February 2021. This report contained, *inter alia*: a proposed reformulation of the results statements (long-term impact, intermediate states, objective, outcomes and outputs); a review of project design; a stakeholder analysis; and the elements of a proposed revised Theory of Change (ToC). The purpose of this evaluation is to: (a) comply with the accountability requirements of all development initiatives, in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Evaluation Office of UNEP (EOU); and (b) identify and document issues, lessons and recommendations that may be useful in the design and implementation of the successor projects, as well as of other projects with similar objectives. The inception report proposed that the evaluation would be conducted by a team of two consultants, with Yves Renard, the team leader, conducting the online interviews, reviewing the project documentation and coordinating the analysis of data and the preparation of the evaluation

[3] Note that from 02/02/2021 the name of the Branch is "Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts Global Support Branch" under Ecosystems Division

report, while a local consultant would lead on-site data collection and conduct additional interviews in the field. For health and logistical reasons, the person who had been identified was unable to participate, and a team of two local consultants, Wasmith François and Lenève Julien, was subsequently identified and recruited. Their field observations and interview notes have proven very useful to this evaluation.

Key findings

3. Overall, the project performance is rated as *Moderately Satisfactory*, see full summary in Table 18: Summary of project findings and ratings

4. *Relevance*: the project was well aligned to UNEP's Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) and its Programme of Work (PoW), actually contributing to two subprogrammes of the PoW. It was fully aligned to the strategic priorities of the main donor (Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which sees it as a flagship project in a priority country for development cooperation, working in some the main focus areas of Norwegian development policy. The project was also highly relevant to the needs and priorities of the Grand Sud region and of that region's communities and ecosystems, and it contributed to all relevant national policies as well as regional and international agreements.

5. *Quality of project design*: the assessment of Project Design Quality that was conducted at inception stage resulted in a satisfactory rating of 4.4, and the evaluation has confirmed this assessment.

6. *External context*: the context in which the project was executed was Moderately Unfavourable because it presented a number of challenges, notably recurrent political instability, insecurity, institutional weaknesses and the devastation of a major hurricane in October 2016. These factors were however well mitigated thanks to the project team's in-depth knowledge and understanding of local realities and its ability to cope with the disruptions caused by the natural disaster.

7. *Effectiveness*: the overall effectiveness has been assessed as Moderately Satisfactory because the project produced many of its expected outputs, especially under Component / Outcome 2, but the project did not achieve most of what it intended to deliver under Outcomes 1 and 3, particularly with respect to the management of protected areas and to the formulation of a regional development plan.

8. *Financial management*: the evidence made available to this evaluation indicates that financial management by the UNEP Haiti Country Office, the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON), the Crisis Management Branch (CMB) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) followed UNEP policies and procedures and was efficient and suited to the needs of the project.

9. *Efficiency*: while financial management has been satisfactory, some of the procedures have resulted in reduced efficiency, notably with delays in fund transfers and resulting impacts on the ability of the project and its partners to deliver outputs within agreed time frames.

10. *Monitoring and reporting*: monitoring design was complete and adequate, but there were significant weaknesses in the design of the logical framework and in the selection of its indicators, and the lack of baseline data made monitoring of targets and indicators difficult; the budget available allowed the UNEP Country Office to strengthen significantly its M&E capacity and systems; monitoring of project implementation was satisfactory, especially as this project helped the UNEP Haiti Country Office to design and introduce a robust system

to monitor its activities and outputs; reporting was good, but the formats and coverage of the reports produced did not always make it possible to distinguish activities, inputs and outputs between the various projects implemented concurrently.

11. *Sustainability*: external factors impact negatively on the sustainability of project interventions, and it is highly unlikely that the socio-political context will improve substantially, but given the commitment of local partners and the capacity of the UNEP Country Office to cope with these factors and adapt, socio-political sustainability is considered likely. Financial sustainability is moderately likely, thanks in part to the long-term commitment of the Government of Norway and to the involvement of other development partners in the same sectors and geographic area. The key institutions upon which the sustainability of interventions depends are generally weak, and institutional sustainability is unlikely, with the continuity of ongoing processes remaining dependent on UNEP's direct and substantial engagement.

12. *Equity, Factors Affecting Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues*: the evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that the project was sensitive to equity issues and to the gender dimension of the issues being addressed and its own interventions, but that it has not done enough to measure and document its performance in this regard. The project, its activities and the execution partnerships were well managed and properly supervised. There was however a short period during which the type and style of supervision required for a project of this kind and for the local conditions may not have been available. Project performance was enhanced by the fact that it was part of an ongoing initiative and that the majority of its activities built on earlier work and existing partnerships, with adequate preparation. Due diligence exercises conducted prior to the contracting of partners have guaranteed compliance with safeguards, and a number of quality communication activities have been implemented, including some targeted at the communities potentially impacted by development interventions.

Conclusions

13. The overall picture that emerges from this assessment is one of a project that was part of a Country Programme that had become larger and more complex than what the Country Office could reasonably manage, implemented in a challenging political and institutional context, with senior management positions that remained vacant or inadequately filled for long periods, with blurred boundaries between projects, with projects often running behind schedules (requiring no-cost extensions, typically with personnel costs covered, in part or in full, by another project during such extensions), with management systems and procedures unsuited to the tasks performed, and yet with significant achievements on the ground, thanks to a dedicated and competent (and usually overloaded and overworked) team of technical personnel and local civil society partners.

14. With this project, the work of UNEP in Haiti lost some of the strategic coherence that characterised the design of the CSI and its early stages of implementation, particularly in Phase 2 during which UNEP focused on three main areas of work (governance and regional planning, ecosystem and watershed management, and energy) organised around four complementary projects. With the expansion of work in green value chains and sustainable agriculture, with new activities in waste management and with more engagement in field activities and operational support to protected area management, UNEP increased the scope of its work and somehow weakened the coherence of the work programme, as well as the perception of that coherence.

15. With this and the other projects implemented in the South of Haiti over the past decade, UNEP has built a unique and valuable capital of experiences, competencies, partnerships and methodologies, and its future role, programming and mode of operation in Haiti should make optimal use of this important capital.

16. While this is clearly beyond the scope of this evaluation, as it focuses on a project that ended over 2 years ago, programming and management decisions regarding the legacy and the future of UNEP's work in Haiti must be informed, in part, by the lessons from this project, and from all the other projects that UNEP has been involved in in that country since 2008.

17. Indeed, this and the other projects implemented by UNEP in Haiti have benefited from strong, well-grounded, long-term local partnerships, and there is a need to strengthen them further and to help the civil society partners to become less dependent on occasional project funding.

18. While the original vision of the Haiti Regeneration Initiative[4] (HRI) and CSI was to engage all relevant UN agencies and to provide a platform for synergies and cooperation, the period of implementation of the MGS1 project was marked by the absence, or at least the weakness, of such linkages.

19. This project, like most of the other projects executed by and with UNEP in the South of Haiti, was expected to establish linkages with a number of relevant regional frameworks in the Caribbean, but it has achieved very little in this regard.

20. The protected area planning processes piloted by this project have been rigorous and scientifically sound, but they have paid insufficient attention to governance arrangements, and they have not created the conditions required for implementation.

21. The form, scope and level of stakeholder engagement, especially with respect to protected area planning and management, have been insufficient to generate local buy-in and to create the conditions required for the sustainability of interventions.

22. Post-scriptum: on 14 August 2021, the southwestern peninsula of Haiti was devastated by an earthquake, with Tropical Grace sweeping over the same area only two days later, and these traumatic experiences have confirmed the relevance and usefulness of UNEP's capacities, as well as the relevance of the "Grand Sud" approach that UNEP has promoted since the start of its engagement in the South of Haiti. Indeed, the work done by UNEP in supporting rural livelihoods through meaningful partnerships with civil society and producers' organisations is made even more relevant by disasters such as these, because UNEP is able, together with those partners, to reach and support even the most remote communities. A recent article in the Haitian media mentions a post-disaster assessment done by CIAT (one of UNEP's partners), which notes that the villages and small towns located in higher elevations along the Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault zone were more badly hit by the earthquake (landslides, destruction of buildings) and that future planning should take this into account. This also highlights the need for a regional development plan (one of the weaknesses of the MGS1 project is that it did not make much progress towards this output) and it serves to validate further the landscape approach that the UNEP Country Office would like to adopt in future initiatives.

[4] The Haiti Regeneration Initiative was a project designed by UNEP to be implemented during 2010-13, but which was disrupted by the earthquake in 2010.

Lessons Learnt

23. *Lesson 1*: It is important to formulate and use methodologies and instruments that are adapted to local realities and meet local needs, particularly with respect to protect area planning, management and governance.

24. *Lesson 2:* Land use and protected area management planning require consultation and participation of all relevant stakeholders, including those who are likely to benefit from, or be affected by, the new management regimes

25. *Lesson 3:* The effective establishment and operation of a network of protected areas require effective networking activities and systems, with an adequate institutional arrangement, and must be based on a clear ecological and institutional rationale for networking.

Recommendations

26. *Recommendation 1:* Develop a new country strategy that defines a new role for UNEP. The strategy should incorporate the key lessons from this and previous, project evaluations of work in Haiti, and it should pursue the original idea of facilitating collaboration among UN agencies. The strategy should also provide an integrated framework for monitoring, evaluation and learning that can be applied to specific projects.

27. *Recommendation 2:* Take advantage of the Haiti Country Programme's and Office's transition to oversight by the UNEP Regional Office to build and strengthen linkages between institutions, programmes and professionals in Haiti and in the rest of the region, reflected in a position paper and in concept note and full proposals for regional projects.

28. *Recommendation 3:* Develop and make publicly available an explicit strategy for engagement of and provision of support of civil society partners in Haiti, for the purpose of building their capacity and enhancing their institutional sustainability, with clear and transparent procedures for the selection of project partners.

29. *Recommendation 4:* Review the projects executed by UNEP in Haiti between 2018 and 2021 as a portfolio of projects, looking in particular at complementarity and synergies between projects, and ensure that lessons learnt from this review are documented and applied to the design of UNEP's Country Programme and of future projects. As part of this review, identify and document the costs and benefits of the partnership between UNEP and UNOPS in Haiti, and formulate recommendations regarding the future of this partnership.

30. *Recommendation 5:* Produce a short brochure for internal, online use by UNEP with descriptive detail on the ways in which gender and equity dimensions have been incorporated in this, and if relevant other, UNEP projects in Haiti.

I. INTRODUCTION

31. This evaluation focuses on the project "Macaya Grand Sud" Phase I (MGS1). Building on the first two phases of implementation of the CSI, this MGS1 project focused on two areas in which significant results had been obtained, namely: (1) the establishment, planning and management of protected areas (following in particular the declaration of new marine protected areas in the *Département du Sud* in 2013), and (2) the promotion of sustainable livelihoods and green value chains in communities near those protected areas. In addition, the project added a new dimension to the Haiti Grand Sud Strategy by including regional planning activities for the entire Grand Sud region, therefore expanding its scope thematically (regional planning) and geographically (to the three *Départements* of the Grand Sud region). With the revision that, thanks to additional funding from the Government of Norway, extended the project until December 2018, the scope of programming was further expanded to focus on waste management in the Municipality of Les Cayes, as well as in or near some of the marine and coastal protected areas being established with support from the project.

32. This project, as indeed the entire Haiti Grand Sud Strategy, is justified by a number of important considerations and factors, including: the extreme vulnerability of the area; the benefits to be gained from concentrating investments and actions in one geographic zone, in light of the challenges in, and complexities of, project execution in Haiti; the high value of the area's terrestrial, coastal and marine biodiversity; and, the fact that Haiti's largest and possibly most emblematic protected area, the *Parc Naturel National Macaya* (Macaya National Natural Park - MNNP), is located at the heart of the Southern peninsula.

33. During the first two years after its initiation in 2010, UNEP's contribution to CSI was managed by UNEP's Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean[5] (ROLAC). It has since been managed by UNEP's Crisis Management Branch (CMB), formerly known as the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB). Despite having its organisational home under CMB and its origins as a response to natural disasters (specifically the devastating hurricanes of 2008 and the earthquake of 2010), the Haiti country programme and CSI are thematically linked to many other UNEP fields of expertise and the sum of the activities implemented under this project make it relevant to the priority areas of UNEP's Mid-term Strategy and to its Programme of Work for the biennial periods 2016 – 2017 and 2018 – 2019.

34. Approved by UNEP in March 2015, the MSG1 project was implemented between March 2015 and December 2018, including one 12-month extension and records expenditure of USD 10.2 million. When it was designed, the MGS1 project was part of the Ecosystem Management sub-programme, and was expected to contribute to the following accomplishment: "Use of ecosystem management approaches in countries to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems is increased". In effect, the project was directly relevant to two sub-programmes: Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts and Healthy and Productive Ecosystems (as formulated in UNEP's current Medium-term Strategy).

[5] Since 2017 this UNEP regional office has been called Latin America and Caribbean Office.

II. EVALUATION METHODS

35. This evaluation began in January 2021, and was originally due for completion by the end of April 2021, but the process was extended to allow for the conduct of field visits and interviews under suitable conditions, given the COVID-19 pandemic and other challenges. Following a preliminary review of documents and a first round of interviews with key informants, including members of the team responsible for the coordination or the project execution, an inception report was prepared in February 2021. The purpose of this evaluation is twofold: on the one hand, it is to comply with the accountability requirements of all development initiatives, in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Evaluation Office of UNEP (EOU); and, on the other hand, it aims to identify and document issues, lessons and recommendations that may be useful in the design and implementation of the successor projects, as well as of other projects with similar objectives. In addition to the EOU, the main target audiences of the evaluation are therefore: Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; key institutional partners of UNEP in Haiti, both in government and in civil society; past and current members of the UNEP Office; UNEP's CMB and concerned UNEP units and colleagues at Headquarters; and other agencies and development partners involved in conservation, natural resource management and rural development in Haiti. The evaluation focuses exclusively on the MGS1 project, but this report also provides background information on UNEP's engagement in the South of Haiti, as this is highly relevant to the context within which the project should be assessed.

36. This review was guided by standard evaluation criteria (relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability), to which the criterion of equity was added, in order to assess how power relations, gender, age, language and other factors may have resulted in differentiated rights, responsibilities, benefits and forms of engagement. The nine criteria provided in the terms of reference for this evaluation were also used to assess and rate project performance: (a) strategic relevance; (b) quality of project design; (c) nature of external context; (d) effectiveness, which comprises assessments of the provision of outputs, achievement of outcomes and likelihood of impact; (e) financial management; (f) efficiency; (g) monitoring and reporting; (h) sustainability; and, (i) factors affecting project performance.

37. On the basis of the initial round of interviews and the preliminary review of available documents, and taking into account the requirements of the terms of reference, five strategic questions were identified at inception stage, namely:

- In what ways, and to what extent, has the project performed well in terms of the evaluation criterion of coherence (defined by OECD-DAC as: the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in the country, region, sector or institution)?
- What lessons can be learnt, or recommendations made, to ensure that the remainder of Macaya Grand Sud Phase II and the proposed Phase III, reach their optimal performance levels?
- What evidence exists, if any, to suggest that the project has generated benefits within the broader communities and at a landscape level rather than among only the direct beneficiaries and targeted areas of the project? If a wider effect is evidenced, what factors have contributed to this?
- Given the importance of ownership by, and leadership from, local communities for the effectiveness of the project and the sustainability of its benefits, what evidence

exists, if any, to support the view that the relationship with the local population and authorities has evolved over time? If strong community engagement is evidenced, what factors have contributed to this?

- What adjustments, if any, were made to the project as a direct consequence of challenges in the Haiti context (including the COVID-19 situation in relation to the ongoing second phase of the MGS project). To what extent did any adjustments allow the project to effectively respond to the new priorities that emerged in relation to key challenges/COVID-19? How did any adjustments affect the achievement of the project's expected results, as stated in its original results framework?

38. Taking agreed criteria and recommended questions into account, the following framework was used.

Table 2: Evaluation framework

Criterion	Questions to be considered
Relevance	Alignment with Government of Norway's strategic priorities and with its standard agreement with UNEP
	Relevance and contribution to the expected accomplishments of UNEP's subprogrammes on Disasters and Conflicts and on Ecosystems Management
	Alignment with national policies and strategies and coherence with programmes and priorities of national institutions, degree of country ownership of project design and interventions
	Relevance to regional policies and strategies, e.g., SPAW Protocol
	Relevance to human development and natural resource management needs and priorities in targeted region, degree of stakeholder ownership of project design and interventions
	Coherence with other development initiatives in targeted region
	Overall coherence of CSI, with focus on phase 2, and place of MGS1 within overall CSI
	Consideration of external context in project design
	Relevance of approaches (e.g., ecosystem-based approach) to project objectives and to local needs and priorities
	Relevance of UNEP's role and overall approach
Impact	Delivery of outcomes as per project document
	Likelihood of, and requirement for, impact at community, sector and landscape level
	Uptake and replication of project design, approaches, methods and partnerships in other initiatives
	Evidence of any negative impacts (on resources, capacities, partnerships, others)
	Impact of project on equity, power relations and empowerment of women, girls and vulnerable groups
	Suitability of M&E systems and procedures, availability of baseline data, availability of reporting on outcomes, results, impacts and cross-cutting issues
Effectiveness	Delivery of outputs as per project document and revision
	Delivery of outcomes as per project document
	Effectiveness of communications, awareness and understanding of project and its intended impact, degree of support by partners and beneficiaries

Criterion	Questions to be considered
	Effectiveness of coordination and collaboration with other agencies, synergies, exchange of expertise
	Extent to which ecosystem-based approach was actually applied
	Are there other models and operational partnership that could have been more effective? What was, and could have been, UNEP's added value?
Efficiency	Roles in project management, suitability of arrangements, suitability of management systems and procedures, quality of project management and supervision
	Adherence to financial and other management systems and procedures
	Adherence to monitoring and evaluation systems and procedures, including reporting
	Cost-effectiveness and timeliness of outputs and implementation arrangements, in design and in actual implementation
Effectiveness & efficiency	Impact of Hurricane Matthew (2016) on project, and response of project team and partners
	Impact of COVID-19 crisis on current project activities, analysis in relation to Haiti Office's response to and handling of other constraints and crises
	Contribution of project partners to effectiveness and efficiency
Sustainability	Inclusion of sustainability and scaling-up considerations and requirements in project design
	Extent to which the project outcomes and outputs are politically, institutionally and financially sustainable and could be scaled-up
	Extent to which MGS2 and other projects have sustained and complemented activities and outcomes of MGS1
	Requirements for sustainability and for implementation of management plans
Equity	Extent of stakeholder participation in project design and execution
	Consideration of human rights issues in project design and execution
	Integration of gender and other equity issues and dimensions in project design
	Risk of corruption, degree to which risk was considered and managed, evidence available

39. This evaluation was conducted under somewhat novel circumstances, for the following reasons: travel restrictions caused by the pandemic would not allow the lead consultant to conduct field work in Haiti; the security situation in the country at the time was particularly grave and made it risky to travel from the capital to the project area; this evaluation was initiated a little over two years after the completion of the project; and, lastly, the project did not benefit from a mid-term review[6]. The implications of these circumstances for the conduct of this evaluation were as follows:

- *sources of evidence:* because of limited opportunities to conduct field visits, this evaluation has relied primarily on the information, impressions and reflections provided by individuals directly involved in project management and implementation, either as members of the project team or as people attached to

[6] The Terms of Reference for this terminal evaluation indicate that the mid-term review was "considered under the terminal evaluations of other Haiti projects in 2016". but this is not actually the case. This consultant was part of the two-person team that evaluated the three projects of the CSI (*Gouvernance Sud, Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*) that had just been completed at the time (in addition to the review of UNEP's national portfolio of projects and activities in Haiti), and the team was not asked to include the Macaya Grand Sud project in its review. The MGS1 project was therefore considered only from the perspective of the continuity and sustainability of the interventions initiated by the three projects being evaluated.

the co-executing partner organisations. As can be seen in Annex II, the gender ratio within the group of respondents therefore largely reflects the composition of the project team and partnerships;

- *verification of outputs*: under more favourable conditions, the evaluator would have been able to arrange more visits to project sites and more interviews with beneficiaries. This evaluation therefore relied heavily on the data provided by the project itself, in particular the self-assessment report (UNEP 2015b) and the interviews with project personnel and partners;
- *attribution*: an additional challenge came from the fact that: (a) some of the others projects executed by UNEP concurrently and following MGS1 have included activities and expected outputs that are similar, at times even identical, to those of this project; (b) some of the activities of MGS1 have received complementary funding from other sources; and, (c) other agencies, notably the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have been involved in the financing and execution of projects with similar objectives in this geographic area in recent years. While project personnel were able to link specific activities and outputs to each project, partners and beneficiaries were not always able to make the distinction between projects and they often attributed actions and results to "UNEP";
- *review of project design*: while interviews were carried out with all members of the Haiti Office and project team at the time the MGS1 project was designed and initiated, it could not be expected that these colleagues would recall all details of a design process that took place over 6 years ago. Also, because two other projects were designed very soon after this one was initiated, project partners were unable to recall if and how they would have been engaged in the formulation of this particular project. Also, a report of the UNEP Project Review Committee (PRC) dated January 2015 has been received and reviewed, but this review was unable to locate correspondence between UNEP Headquarters and the Haiti Office during the design phase (it is understood that there were substantial comments made on successive drafts of the project document during the course of 2014).

40. This evaluation benefited from the fact that the lead consultant had conducted two previous evaluations of projects executed by UNEP in Haiti. In 2015 – 2016, he was part of a team of two evaluators that conducted a formal evaluation of three projects that were completed on 31 December 2015, namely: (a) *Gouvernance Sud* or 'Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform project'; (b) *Terre Sud* or 'Agroforestry & Landscape Rehabilitation project'; and, (c) *Mer Sud* or 'Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti project', together with a forward-looking assessment of the overall portfolio of projects and activities implemented by UNEP in Haiti, in the context of its country strategy and other relevant policy frameworks and processes. In late 2019 – early 2020, he also conducted the mid-term review of the project 'Ecosystem Approach to Haiti Côte Sud' that is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Some of the observations and analyses made for these reviews were relevant to the MGS1 project, and the consultant therefore reviewed his field and interview notes to extract information and quotes that could be exploited for the current evaluation.

41. As noted above, arrangements were made to recruit two national consultants to assist with field observations and interviews. Their mandate was to focus on elements (field visits and interviews) that would complement the information gathered earlier by the principal

evaluator through online and telephone interviews, and, when necessary, allow for verification and validation of such information through triangulation. In spite of the lateness of these arrangements and the extremely volatile/explosive socio-political situation, these resource people were able to meet with several project partners, to visit project sites and to conduct interviews. The sites and local organisations visited are: *Konbit pou Potapiman* (KPP), a community organisation in Port-à-Piment, the *Comité d'Approvisonnement en Eau Potable et d'Assainissement* (CAEPA) of Port Salut, the Buisson locality in Port Salut, the AYITIKA cacao nursery in Camp-Perrin, and Pointe Abacou (meeting and site visits with community leaders engaged in the planning process for the Port Salut and Pointe Abacou marine protected areas, and in mangrove management). The two consultants were also asked to conduct in-depth interviews of a small number of key informants, focusing on the assessment of project outcomes. The notes provided by these two consultants have proven extremely useful to this evaluation.

III. THE PROJECT

A. Context

42. Haiti is often described, with reason, as the poorest and most environmentally degraded country in the Western Hemisphere. Issues of environment and development in Haiti are indeed severe, as illustrated by indicators such as life expectancy (62 years for men and 67 years for women in 2021[7]), GDP per capita (USD 732 in 2020 and in a steady decline since 2018[8]), the human development index (rank of 170 in 2020 out of 189 countries[9]), primary forest cover (which shrank from 4.4% in 1988 to 0.32% in 2016[10]) or the percentage of people living below the poverty line (nearly 60% in 2020, compared to the last official national estimate of 58.5% in 2012[11]). Haiti is a country where there is very high dependence on natural resources for livelihoods, acute food insecurity (with an estimated 4.4 million estimated to be in need of food in March 2021[12]), unemployment officially stands at 14.5%[13], informal employment is predominant with two-thirds of the labour force not holding formal jobs[14] and disaster risk reduction. It is also a country with very valuable biodiversity (over 25,000 fauna and flora species, of which around 36% are endemic), an improving Environmental Performance Index in terms of ecosystem vitality (which, although low at 34.5 in 2020 with respect to the target of 100, was drastically improved compared to the 2018 index of 14.39[15]), exceptional cultural and artistic vitality, and a proud history and heritage.

43. The *Département du Sud*, where this project was implemented, as indeed the entire south-western peninsula (which also includes the *Départements* of Grand'Anse and Nippes), is representative of the issues and challenges faced by rural Haiti, but at the same time features specific issues and very critical development and environmental management needs because of geographic isolation, institutional weaknesses, severe environmental degradation, and a high vulnerability to disasters. It is a region of rich biodiversity and high natural resource value and potential, notably with the *Massif de la Hotte* (that includes Pic Macaya and its national park) and diverse coastal ecosystems. It is also a region where donor-funded projects and development assistance initiatives were few, at least until the earthquake of 2010.

44. In late 2008, following a dramatic hurricane season during which Haiti was touched by four major storms, UNEP established a country programme aimed at addressing

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[7] United Nations Population Fund, consulted May 2021 via https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/HT
[8] World Bank, consulted May 2021 via https://knoema.com/atlas/Haiti/GDP-per-capita
[9] United Nations Development Programme, consulted May 2021 via http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI
[10] See, among others, https://news.mongabay.com/2018/11/haiti-may-lose-all-primary-forest-by-2035-mass-extinction-underway/
[11] World Bank overview of April 2021, consulted May 2021 via https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview
[12] CIA World Factbook, consulted May 2021 via https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/haiti/#people-and-society
[13] World Bank, consulted May 2021 via https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=HT
[14] CIA World Factbook, consulted May 2021 via https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/haiti/#economy
[15] Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy/epi.yale.edu, consulted May 2021 via https://knoema.com/EPI2018/environmental-performance-index?tsId=1071540

environmental degradation, extreme poverty and disaster vulnerability[16]. The design of this programme was informed by a Post Disasters Needs Assessment, and was first conceptualised as the Haiti Regeneration Initiative, an ambitious 20-year programme that already included some geographic focus on the Southern Peninsula, as the Côte Sud Initiative was part of that proposed programme, notably with the proposed transformation of the community of Port-a-Piment into a "Millennium Village"[17], as conceived and supported by the Earth Institute of Columbia University in the USA.

45. This initiative came as a response to a specific request from the Haitian Minister of the Environment, and received tangible support from senior staff at UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi, where there was a desire to develop "flagship projects". In addition, it is likely that the Deputy Executive Director of UNEP at the time, who was from the Caribbean and was committed to greater solidarity with, and support for, Haiti, provided additional impetus to ensure that this initiative was conceived.

46. During 2009, work focused primarily on research, preliminary assessments, consultations and development of concepts. In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake ravaged parts of Haiti, including the capital Port au Prince and the South of the country, and UNEP was mandated by the UN Relief Coordinator to coordinate the environmental response to the earthquake, while the UNEP Governing Council requested UNEP to play a key role in the recovery and sustainable development of Haiti. UNEP in Haiti responded immediately by redirecting its efforts towards the provision of technical assistance in the most critical sectors of energy, sanitation, waste management and resettlement planning, with a focus on the camps of internally displaced persons. UNEP also led and participated in a number of environmental assessments.

47. In 2011, with the phasing out of most of its early recovery assistance work following the earthquake, UNEP, in close collaboration with the Government of Norway (Haiti is one of Norway's partner countries), re-conceptualised the Haiti Regeneration Initiative and decided to focus its interventions on, and move its main operations to, the *Département du Sud*, under the framework of the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI). Norway supported the development of the CSI with an initial package of three investments towards a project called Southwest Sustainable Development Project: USD 8 million provided through UNEP; USD 8 million provided through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and USD 14 million provided through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In August of that year, UNEP established an office in Port Salut.

48. Building on this initial work, the UNEP Country Office, in collaboration with partners and in consultation with the Government of Norway, conceived Phase 2 of the CSI, comprising four components (all funded by Norway):

- Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform Project: "*Gouvernance Sud*"
- Agroforestry & Landscape Rehabilitation Project: "*Terre Sud*"
- Haiti "*Mer Sud*" Project

[16] Haiti's Ministry of the Environment had actually asked for a stronger UNEP presence since 2004, with the expectation that this would enhance the delivery of projects in the field while supporting the strengthening of the Ministry.

[17] See for example the project document for the Haiti Regeneration Initiative – Development and Support Programme, November 2010, as well as a draft case study (2014) titled Cote Sud Initiative – Integrated Development in Haiti, Case Consortium at Columbia University.

- Sustainable Energy Project: "*Énergie Sud*".

49. One of the activities carried out during the first phase of implementation of CSI was an assessment of the coastal and marine resources and ecosystems of the southwestern peninsula, conducted with support from the The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and under the auspices of the *Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire* (CIAT), and it is largely as a result of this work that a first set of marine and coastal protected areas were officially declared by presidential decree in August 2013 (see

50. Table 3).

Table 3: Marine and coastal areas declared in 2013 in the South of Haiti

Marine and/or coastal protected area	Area (hectares)
Parc National Naturel Île-à-Vache	11.235
Aire Protégée d'Aquin	10.974
Aire Protégée d'Olivier/Zanglais	7.553
Aire Protégée de Fonds des Cayes	2.365
Aire Protégée de Pointe Abacou	1.840
Aire Protégée de Port-Salut	1.840
Aire Protégée La Cahouane	5.940

51. The project Macaya Grand Sud 1 was conceived in 2014, during implementation of the four projects mentioned above, and was approved in March 2015. In May of the same year, using funding from the *Mer Sud* project and in anticipation of further work to be done in marine protected area planning and management, UNEP organised a study tour to Guadeloupe and Saint Lucia with 13 participants, including representatives of the governmental and civil society organisations involved in marine protected area planning in the South of Haiti. The projects *Gouvernance* Sud, *Mer* Sud and *Terre* Sud were completed in December 2015, while *Énergie Sud* was completed at the end of 2016.

52. Another important element of context that is directly relevant to this evaluation is the place and mode of operations of multi-lateral, bi-lateral and civil society aid and development agencies in Haiti, marked by the absence of effective coordination, even at the local level, where several of these agencies are active. This is one of the factors responsible for a frequent lack of government and community ownership of the processes led by these external agencies. Too often, fragmented development interventions, in spite of stated objectives of building capacity, actually result in a further weakening of national institutions at central and decentralised levels. The approach used by UNEP since the launch of the CSI, including in the design and execution of this particular project, precisely sought to remedy this situation in at least one region by facilitating coordination and partnerships.

53. The context in which the CSI and its various components, of which Macaya Grand Sud was part, are being implemented has not changed radically since 2010, but there are some significant evolutions that deserve to be noted. All institutions, including UNEP, have progressively moved out of a post-disaster recovery mode to risk reduction and sustainable development work. Over the past ten years, a number of projects and initiatives in environmental management and sustainable development have been implemented, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and other

financing institutions have made large investments in these sectors, while institutional arrangements have evolved, notably with the operationalisation and strengthening of the *Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées* (ANAP), which is the national agency responsible for protected areas.

B. Results Framework

54. The original results framework provided in the Project Document (ProDoc) and in the revision of December 2017 was articulated around the following elements:

Objective: to support the Government of Haiti in promoting the use of ecosystem management approaches in the Southern region of the country (*Départements du Sud, Grande Anse et Nippes*) and to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems while improving the livelihoods of local communities.

Outcome 1: Strengthened Government capacities to identify, establish and manage protected areas and marine and coastal PAs in the Southern Region of Haiti.

- Output 1: A comprehensive and sustainable Macaya NNP Management Plan (including priority infrastructures, equipment, services and regulations), is established and implemented.
- Output 2: Two new MPAs are established, along with supporting Comprehensive MPA Management Plans (including priority infrastructure, equipment, services and regulations).
- Output 3: All the high marine and coastal biodiversity values areas in Southern Haiti are identified and a proposed IUCN classification is done by the Ministry of the Environment.

Outcome 2: Strengthened Government and local resource users' capacities to promote sustainable environmental management for socio-economic purposes outside protected areas and hence to contribute to a viable and healthy network of protected areas in Southern Haiti.

- Output 1: An efficient fisheries governance structure is developed to ensure fisheries planning/monitoring and promote public understanding of the need to protect the marine coastal environment.
- Output 2: Increased income from existing sustainable nature-based livelihoods (e.g., agriculture, forestry and fisheries).
- Output 3: Additional income is generated from new or alternative livelihoods (e.g., solid waste management, aquaculture, apiculture) in areas outside protected areas but influencing protected areas.
- Output 4: Natural barriers (river banks, river mouths and shoreline) are restored and protect communities and associated economic assets against natural hazards (wave surge, flooding, soil erosion).

Outcome 3: Strengthened government capacities to develop and publicly present a Southern Haiti regional development plan integrating biodiversity values, ecosystem considerations, economic priorities, and environmental health issues.

- Output 1. A regional development plan that is based on information generated by this project under outcomes 1 and 2.
- Output 2. A high-level Regional Development Plan launching platform is convened.

C. Stakeholders

55. There are a number of stakeholders who were engaged with this project in various capacities, as execution partners, sources of expertise and/or beneficiaries of project interventions. This project therefore worked with government agencies (at both central and decentralised levels), elected officials, civil society organisations, rural and coastal households and communities, micro businesses and development partners.

Table 4: Stakeholder groups and roles in the MGS1 project

Stakeholder group	Levels of Influence and Interest over the Project Outcomes
Ministry of the Environment (MdE) and ANAP	Lead partners and primary beneficiary of work done and capacity support in protected area planning and management
Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT)	Lead partner in, and primary beneficiary of support to, regional planning Execution partner in project activities in waste management in Les Cayes
Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (MARNDR)	Partner and beneficiary of work done and capacity support in rural development and in marine protected area planning and management
Other ministries and central government agencies	Partners in selected activities in this project, such as the *Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement* (DINEPA), as well as in complementary projects (e.g., Ministry of Tourism)
Decentralised government agencies	Beneficiaries of support to regional planning, urban planning, protected area planning and management, and waste management, including the municipalities of Les Cayes, Port Salut, Saint Jean du Sud and Port-à-Piment
Civil society organisations involved in conservation and rural development in the South, and project partners[18]	Contractual project partners, involved in execution of specific activities
Other civil society organisations[19]	Sources of information and expertise in support project activities Community and other organisations involved in waste management work in Les Cayes, such as the American University of the Caribbean (AUC)
Individual experts, including consultants	Sources of information and expertise in support project activities

[18] These are: *Agronomes et Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (AVSF), Organisation pour la Réhabilitation de l'Environnement (ORE), Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré (PADI),* ReefCheck and *SOS Enfants Sans Frontières/Un Enfant Par La Main.* At the time of this project, UNEP also worked with the *Fondation Nouvelle Grand'Anse* (FNGA), although this organisation was not a contracted co-execution partner in the MGS1 project.

[19] These include: *Société Audubon Haïti,* The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and the American University of the Caribbean (AUC).

Stakeholder group	Levels of Influence and Interest over the Project Outcomes
Organisations of resources users and micro businesses (e.g., cooperatives), including AYITIKA	Beneficiaries of all field activities, including capacity building and organisational development
Local communities, resources users and businesses	Direct beneficiaries of project outcomes and outputs, especially under Outcome 2
Funding agencies	Funders of complementary projects, notably the IDB and the GEF
Other UN agencies (FAO, UN-Habitat, UNDP and WFP)	Partners in CSI and in specific project activities Executing agencies of complementary projects
Government of Norway	Funder of MGS1 and primary financial partner of CSI
UNOPS	Provision of support to operations, procurement, human resources and contract management and data base management
UNEP Crisis Management Branch	Responsible for project management and oversight
UNEP ROLAC	One officer identified as member of the MGS1 project team for 5% of her time ROLAC responsible for UNEP policy and programming in the region
UNEP Haiti	Responsible for project design and execution

D. Project implementation structure and partners

56. As noted above, CSI was originally conceived and initially implemented as a coalition of UN agencies working in a coordinated fashion to support integrated sustainable development in the South of Haiti. During the initial two phases (2010 – 2013 and 2013 – 2015), UNDP and UNEP shared responsibility for activities related to governance, capacity-building, watershed management and restoration, and rural livelihoods, with UNEP serving as the lead agency for marine and coastal management, for governance at the regional level, and for joint reporting. Meanwhile, UNOPS implemented infrastructural projects and provided support to other agencies; and other agencies, such as the FAO, executed specific activities that fall within their respective mandates. As shown in Table 5 below, the MGS1 project constituted UNEP's only engagement in natural resource management and regional planning during Phase 3 of CSI, the only other ongoing project at the time being the Sustainable Energy Project.

Table 5: Projects executed by UNEP under CSI, 2010 - 2021

Phase	Projects
Phase 1 (2010-13)	Haiti Regeneration Initiative
	Southwest Sustainable Development Project
Phase 2 (2013-15)	Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform Project *(Gouvernance Sud)*
	Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project *(Terre Sud)*
	Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti Project *(Mer Sud)*
	Sustainable Energy Project I (2012-2016) *(Énergie Sud)*
Phase 3 (2015-17)	Macaya Grand Sud, Phase I (2015-2017, extended 2018) Completion of Sustainable Energy Project I (2012-2016) Initiation of Sustainable Energy Project II (2016-2020)
Phase 4 (2018-21)	Macaya Grand Sud, Phase II (2018-2020, extended September 2021)
	Continuation of Sustainable Energy Project II (2016-2020)

Phase	Projects
	AFD-funded Green Value Chains Project (2018-2021)
	GEF-funded Ecosystem Based Adaptation Project (2018-2021)

57. Beginning with Phase 2 of CSI, the UNEP Country Office and Programme were placed under UNEP's Crisis Management Branch (CMB), which provided overall programmatic, technical and administrative support to the country programmes placed under its responsibility, including the one in Haiti. This role was performed with part-time inputs by the CMB's Director, its Operations Manager and its Administrative Officer, and with one Administrative Assistant dedicated to the Haiti portfolio on a full-time basis. The CMB executes both global and country projects, and is almost entirely dependent on the funding raised for these projects (at the time when the MGS1 project was implemented, there were approximately 100 people working on a full-time basis under the auspices of CMB, with only 5 positions, all Geneva-based, covered by UNEP Headquarters).

58. While supported by the CMB, since 2010 UNEP's Haiti Country Programme has functioned, and continues to function, quite autonomously. It leads the design of programmes and projects, and has the primary responsibility for fundraising, with the CMB in Geneva providing support and assisting in negotiations with donors whenever necessary. CMB also occasionally provides support through global programmes, as has been the case with a project on Environmental Management for Disaster Risk Reduction financed by the European Union. There is one Administrative Assistant at the Port-au-Prince office, who provides overall administrative and logistical support to the team's operations. It should be noted that, at the start of the MGS1 project, that person's involvement in financial management matters was hindered by the fact that she did not have access to the UMOJA[20] management system and platform, but this was subsequently resolved.

59. With respect to administration and financial management, the main functions of the CMB in Geneva are to:

- receive (from the Country Office) and review requests for payments and generate the cable to UNDP or to UNON to process payment;
- receive (from the Country Office) and review and finalise the terms of reference and selection for the recruitment of UNEP consultants, prepare and issue contracts, and manage payments;
- liaise with UNOPS whenever required to facilitate the execution of its contract with UNEP;
- receive (from the Country Office and UNOPS) terms of reference and proposed contractual agreements with partners, and authorise UNOPS to issue contracts (or to renew contracts in the case of existing partners);
- in the case of new partners, conduct an assessment of due diligence prior to the approval and issuance of the contract;
- liaise with the Human Resources Management Service at UNON on recruitment and personnel matters;
- update expenditure reports and budgets, control expenditure against budget and control cash against payments;

[20] Umoja is an United Nations Secretariat initiative that includes a thorough streamlining of UN business processes. It is a central administrative system aimed at enabling efficient and transparent management of the United Nation's financial, human and physical resources and improving programmatic delivery

- review financial statements provided by UNOPS and forward to UNON once certified;
- receive and certify the financial statements provided by UNON;
- ensure that the financial data and statements provided by UNOPS are integrated into UMOJA;
- coordinate and authorise financial closure of projects, having verified that there are no outstanding commitments at the time of closure; and,
- provide occasional assistance to resolve information technology issues.

60. Accordingly, the reporting and accountability arrangements for the MGS1 were designed and expected to be as follows:

- the formal reporting mechanism is UNEP's Programme Information and Management System (PIMS), in which the Country Programme Manager enters information on progress made;
- the primary lines of reporting and accountability are from members of the Country Office team to the Country Programme Manager, and from the Country Programme Manager to the Operations Manager and the Chief at CMB in Geneva;
- through CMB, the Country Programme Manager also reports to the coordinators of the pertinent global sub-programmes (Disasters and Conflict, and Ecosystem Management during the 2016 – 2017 period) on progress made against the expected accomplishments and the indicators of the UNEP Programme of Work for the corresponding period;
- there is no formal requirement for reporting to ROLAC;
- various documents indicate that the UNEP Country Office would establish and support a CSI Steering Committee, one Project Steering Committee for each project, and one management committee for each project component.

61. Consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two organisations to govern and strengthen their collaboration, UNEP and UNOPS in December 2012 signed a UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement for a period of 3 years and 1 month. With a total value of USD 1,882,924, this agreement covered the provision of UNOPS operational support to three projects that were part of Phase 2 of CSI. In summary, the contract covered the provision, by UNOPS, of a fully-serviced office in Port Salut (with all logistical and security support), transport services (vehicles and boats), human resource management services for national project staff and one international project staff, procurement services, and management services for contracts with a value below USD 100,000. This agreement was amended on three occasions to provide for additional activities and the corresponding changes in budgets and payment schedules. A new agreement was signed in March 2015, for a total value of USD 6,427,679, to cover a range of services provided under this MGS1 project ("logistics, security, procurements, administration of human resources, partner contracts, grant support and other back-office services"). Following the revision of the project and its extension until December 2018, an amendment to the Contribution Agreement was signed in 2017 for an additional amount of USD 1,316,983, bringing the total contribution to UNOPS under the MGS1 project to USD 7,744,862 (inclusive of an amount of USD 424,577 to cover UNOPS' direct and indirect support costs).

62. The contractual agreement between UNEP and UNOPS includes a management fee, which UNEP is able to cover as part of its own management fee provided by the donor. The practice within UNOPS (which is the only self-financing organisation in the UN) is to set the

fee on a case-by-case basis, determined by complexity, scale, duration and level of risk. In this instance, the fee was set at 7% of the total budget. In addition to this fee, the budget of this project covered the costs of the UNOPS Project Manager and the UNOPS Support Officer (both international consultants).

63. For the performance of its human resource management functions, UNOPS enters into individual contractor agreements with international experts, local specialists and local support personnel. Local contractors with contracts of three years or more are entitled to benefits that include medical insurance, leave and maternity / paternity leave. In the procurement of services by local partner organisations (principally AVSF, ORE, PADI and ReefCheck for the MGS1 project), UNEP carried out a pre-selection and requested UNOPS to issue the contracts, with the written understanding that the pre-selection was beyond UNOPS' control and that UNOPS would therefore not be accountable and would not carry any liability for the performance of the contractor. All the support provided by the UNEP projects to local partners is done through contracts with selected organisations; this even includes items such as travel allowances or honoraria paid to compensate personnel of partner organisations for additional responsibilities and expenses incurred in the execution of project activities.

64. A dedicated UNOPS Programme Support Officer previously based in Haiti and recently relocated to Geneva serves as the focal point for the execution of the contractual agreement and acts as the main liaison between UNOPS and UNEP (both the CO in Haiti and CMB in Geneva). In support of this arrangement, both parties indicate that collaboration is excellent, and that it is helped by UNOPS' large presence in Haiti (approximately 200 people), by physical proximity in offices in Port Salut, Port-au-Prince and Geneva, and by good communication between the parties (ever since the stage of project document preparation).

65. The ProDoc and the revision of 2017 provided for a Project Team of four people, in addition to the Technical Staff, such as the Marine Ecosystem Coordinator and the Terrestrial Ecosystem Coordinator contracted through UNOPS: a Project Supervisor at 50% of time, a Project Manager dedicated full-time to the project, and another officer with 50% of time allocated to the project. In addition, an officer at UNEP's ROLAC Office was expected to dedicate 5% of her time to the project. These positions were filled as follows:

- Project Supervisor (in effect the Country Representative and Programme Manager): this position was assumed by Antonio Perera until late 2015, with his replacement, Matti Lehtonen, arriving in April 2016 and leaving in March 2018. During the remainder of 2018, the function of project supervision was undertaken by officers attached to the CMB in Geneva;
- Project Manager: this position was first occupied by Adrienne Stork, who arrived in Haiti in March 2014 to conduct a 6-month study of the charcoal supply chain, and who served as MGS1 Project Manager from the commencement of the project until her departure in April 2017. Her successor, Altan Butt, joined the team in June 2017 and remained until the end of the project in December 2018;
- the position of other project team member mentioned in the ProDoc, with 50% of time allocated to MGS1, was occupied by Maximilien Pardo throughout the duration of the project;
- ROLAC personnel: the person mentioned in the ProDoc and in the revision of 2017 indicates that she did not participate in the project, but that she was well aware of it and would have been the recipient of exchanges between the Project Supervisor and ROLAC.

66. In March 2017, the UNEP Country Office (with locations in Port Salut and Port-au-Prince) had a total of 4 international staff and 16 national staff. In addition, through consultancy agreements or through the agreements with execution partners, the following personnel contributed to the implementation of the MGS1 project:

- *Unité de Gestion de Parc* Macaya: one Conservation Officer and one Green Economy Assistant.
- *Ministère de l'Environnement* (MdE): a Protected Areas Coordinator, a Mangrove specialist and two Marine Technicians.
- MARNDR: a Fisheries Management Unit Coordinator, a Fisheries Statistician and four Aquaculture Technicians.
- CIAT: a Regional Coordinator for the *Département du Sud.*

67. Project execution was done largely through partners (see Table 6 below for list of contracted partners and main features of contracts). Most of these partners were already associated with UNEP projects in CSI's Phase 2 and had a role in the execution of the two projects implemented in Phase 4. All contractual agreements were between the partner and UNOPS, with UNOPS and UNEP sharing the responsibility for oversight and monitoring, as presented in Table 7.

Table 6: MGS1 project partners and contracts

Contractual partner	Role and main activities	Contract period	Total amount (in USD)
MdE	Support to protected area planning and management, establishment of nurseries, management of *Sargassum*, environmental education	December 2015 – December 2017	570,000
MARNDR	Support to fisheries management and to marine protected area planning and management, improvement and management of fish hatcheries	December 2015 – December 2017	110,000
CIAT	Preparation of a regional development plan for the *Grand Sud*, waste management planning for the city of Les Cayes, preparation of legislation for coastal planning and management, support to the *Délégations* in the *Grand Sud*	December 2015 – December 2017, extended to September 2018	500,000
ORE	Execution of agroforestry activities, development of green value chains, sustainable agriculture	April 2016 – December 2017	1,200,000
PADI	Support to protected area planning and management, community awareness and sensitisation, support to	July 2016 – June 2017	150,587

Contractual partner	Role and main activities	Contract period	Total amount (in USD)
	fisherfolk and fishing communities		
ReefCheck	Support to protected area planning and management, community awareness and sensitisation, capacity building in support of protected area management	December 2015 – December 2016	150,000
SOS Enfants sans Frontières	Control of erosion, establishment of nurseries and propagation of seedlings, creation of family and collective water tanks	December 2016 – June 2018	150,000
AVSF	Provision of support to two vetiver cooperatives	December 2016 – May 2017	80,000

Table 7: Allocation of responsibilities between UNEP and UNOPS in contracting partners

Tasks	UNEP	UNOPS
Preparation of requirements, activities or scope of work	XX	
Endorsement of technical contents of terms of reference and technical specifications	XX	
Initiation of the selection method	XX	
Drafting and consultations on contracts and agreements		XX
Negotiations with partners and grantees		XX
Award and signature of contracts and agreements		XX
Contract and grant management		XX
Endorsement of payments to grantees and partners	XX	
Approval of payments to grantees and partners		XX
Technical supervision of the grantees and partners	XX	

68. While the project has been operationally closed since December 2018, it has not yet been closed financially, because the contract for this terminal evaluation is still ongoing. Financial closure will therefore be applied once the evaluation has been completed and once the final financial statement has been cleared by the Chief of UNON's Accounts section, approved by the Head of UNEP's Finance Unit and certified by UNEP's Fund Management Officer.

E. Changes in design during implementation

69. As noted above, the project did not benefit from a mid-term review, and the only formal changes in design that were made during implementation were all made at the time of the project revision and extension of December 2017, which introduced three additional activities, with additional funding provided by the Government of Norway, in the amount of USD 1,765,335. These activities were:

- the preparation of a waste management plan for the city of Les Cayes, with a focus on solid waste and excreta management, and with the implementation of two pilot projects. The project revision document indicates that this activity would contribute to Project Outcome 2, but it does not show how that could be done and measured, except if green jobs were created as a result of implementation of the plan. Considering the project's reconstructed ToC and its expected outcomes, it may have been preferable to see this waste management plan as an additional output under Project Outcome 3, within the framework of regional development planning for Southern Haiti;
- the development of a strategy for the development of cacao in the South of Haiti through the production of 100 hectares of new cacao-based agroforestry and the commercialisation and marketing of the cacao produced. This activity was a direct contribution to Project Outcome 2;
- the provision of training and equipment to a team involved in the management of the MNNP, as well as the development and implementation of a protocol of interventions to stop the fires within the Park and mitigate their effects. These activities directly complemented, and were meant to build on, the other activities planned and executed under Project Outcome 1.

F. Project financing

70. The agreement between the Government of Norway and UNEP for the financing of this project falls within the terms of the Framework Agreement signed on 30 January 2006 between the two parties to set out the overall arrangements for the receipt and use by UNEP of resources provided by Norway. On the basis of a draft project document dated May 2014, an agreement for the financing of the Macaya Grand Sud project was signed by Norway on 25 July 2014 and by UNEP on 8 August 2014, with an anticipated contribution of NOK 56,000,000 for the period from 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2017. By amendment Number 1 signed by UNEP on 30 November 2015, the budget was increased by the amount of NOK 12,583,337 for the period 2014 – 2016, while a second amendment was signed in 2016 to provide NOK 2,000,000 for waste management in Les Cayes and other cities for the period 2016 – 2017. This brought the total original financing to USD 7,989,969. The project received an additional contribution of USD 29,995.00 as transfer of the balance available from previous projects, also funded by the Government of Norway.

71. In December 2017, the project was revised and extended by 12 months, until December 2018, with additional funding provided by the Government of Norway in the amount of USD 1,765,335. The total amount budgeted became USD 9,755,505 and, with fluctuations in the rate of exchange between currencies, the total of Norway's contributions to the project came to USD 10,279,855.05. As noted above, this revision of December 2017 included three sets of activities, with the additional budget allocated as follows:

- Water, sanitation and waste: USD 755,845
- Cacao agroforestry development in South Haiti: USD 679,845
- Forest fire response in protected areas: USD 329,645.

72. One of the outputs of the project (Output 1.1: A comprehensive and sustainable Macaya National Nature Park Management Plan) actually received additional funding prior to the inception of this project, as this was also an output of the GEF-funded project "Sustainable Land Management of the Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti". This was:

- USD 112,083 from UNDP, as part of a GEF-funded project to support and strengthen the *Système National des Aires Protégées* (SNAP);

- USD 113,670 from the IDB through the Ministry of the Environment for training activities in support of the preparation of the management. The actual amount claimed and received by UNEP was USD 90,936, and it is understood that the balance of USD 22,734 was retained and used by the Ministry for expenditures related to the same activity.

73. In the period since this project was originally designed, UNEP has secured complementary funding for three new projects:

- the "Support Programme for Watershed Management through Strengthening Sustainable Value Chains in the Department of the South", which is funded by the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) and the *Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial* (FFEM). With a budget of 3.5 million Euros, this project has two expected outcomes:
  - improved livelihoods of smallholder farmers (in the buffer zones of protected areas in South Haiti) through reforestation and soil stabilisation; and,
  - producers in vulnerable watersheds will take up new vetiver production practices, gain environmental certification of production and improve watershed management;
- the GEF-funded "Ecosystem Approach to Haiti's Cote Sud" (GEF financing of USD 6,216,000), with five components:
  - extension and management of the protected areas system in the South;
  - ecosystem sustainability and resilience in the identified Protected Areas of the South Department in Haiti's Southwestern Peninsula;
  - disaster risk reduction, achieved through an ecosystem management approach in the broader southwestern peninsula landscape;
  - reducing land degradation and climate change impacts by introducing improvements in the vetiver value chain; and,
  - enforcement, knowledge management & awareness;
- the Macaya Grand Sud Phase 2 project, which seeks to "enhance local capacities to address ecosystem degradation, and to introduce sustainable local livelihoods at scale in the Macaya and Port Salut-Abacou protected areas and in their buffer zones". The total budget for this project is USD 5,138,243, with financing coming primarily from the Government of Norway through UNEP.

IV. THEORY OF CHANGE AT EVALUATION

74. This evaluation reconstructed a Theory of Change is provided in the diagram provided at the end of this section. Elements of this reconstructed TOC form the basis of the assessment that can be found in the following section, especially with respect to the criterion of effectiveness (see Table 12 and Table 14).

75. As there was no Theory of Change (TOC) or similar instrument in the Project Document, a reconstructed TOC has been prepared on the basis of available materials. In this instance, the sources used to reconstruct the TOC have been the project's logical framework, the narrative of the ProDoc, and a diagram illustrating the causal pathways (see page 25 of the approved Project Document). As noted in Section 92 below, this project was well designed and the Project Document has a detailed and strong narrative, but there were significant weaknesses in its intervention logic, as well as some discrepancies between the narrative, the logical framework and the diagram illustrating the causal pathways. The reconstructed TOC therefore attempts to reconcile these various elements, with reformulated outcomes and outputs, and with the drivers, assumptions and intermediate states derived primarily from the narrative of the Project Document, complemented by the evaluation team's knowledge of the context in which the project was designed and executed. Care was taken to enhance the explanatory power of the TOC while retaining the original level of ambition at the project outcome level.

76. The reconstructed TOC also takes into account the fact that the primary target audiences of an evaluation are the project's donors and executing agencies, and the TOC must therefore be aligned, as much as possible, with the structures and ways in which the project has reported to these stakeholders during implementation. This has posed a particular challenge in this instance, because this project effectively used two main frameworks and channels for reporting: reporting to UNEP was done through the Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) while reporting to Norway and other project partners was done as part of the UNEP Haiti Office's overall reporting on CSI, with narrative bi-annual reports and annual review meetings between Norway and UNEP. In both cases (PIMS and annual meetings), there is no evidence that the logical framework was used for monitoring and reporting. The overall Logic of Intervention of CSI, as presented in one of UNEP's self-assessment reports (UNEP 2015b), has therefore also been taken into account in the reconstruction of this project's TOC.

77. The reconstructed TOC and results framework are based on the following elements:

    Impact. *Restored and well-managed ecosystems provide sustainable ecosystem services and support sustainable livelihoods*. This is a reformulation of the original impact statement, keeping the focus on ecosystem management for the dual purpose of providing ecosystem services on a sustainable basis and on supporting sustainable livelihoods.

    Project Outcomes. These are the results that the project seeks to achieve, and against which the project performance will be assessed, especially in relation to its relevance and its effectiveness. This project's reconstructed TOC includes three reformulated outcomes:

    - *Project Outcome 1: Key elements of a network of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas established and managed in the Southern Region of Haiti.*

- *Project Outcome 2: Sustainable environmental management practices for socio-economic purposes promoted outside protected areas and contributing to a viable and healthy network of protected areas in Southern Haiti.*
- *Project Outcome 3: Southern Haiti regional development plan integrating biodiversity values, ecosystem considerations, economic priorities, and environmental health issues developed and launched.*

Intermediate states. These are the changes that are expected to happen as a result of the outcomes, if the assumptions and drivers identified in the TOC were indeed valid and verified. When intermediate states are realised, then a project is likely to deliver, or at least contribute significantly to, its desired impact. There are four intermediate states in the reconstructed TOC, and it should be noted that these intermediate states could only be reached if national institutions/government agencies and civil society organisations that have mandates and missions in relevant domains do actually play their role and build on the project outcomes:

- *Intermediate State 1: National institutions actively manage, sustain and expand the Network of protected areas, and especially those established and/or supported under this project.*
- *Intermediate State 2: Sustainable resource use practices are promoted by government agencies and civil society organisations, and are adopted by resource users in and near protected areas, resulting in improved living conditions and increased income.*
- *Intermediate State 3: Regional planning is undertaken in a manner that balances ecological and economic concerns.*
- *Intermediate State 4: The Government of Haiti uses ecosystem management approaches in the Southern region as a means to maintain ecosystem services and productivity.*

Drivers. These are the external factors that contribute to the delivery of the outcomes and to the realisation of the expected impact, and which can be influenced by the project and its partners. On the basis of the narrative sections of the Project Document and other materials produced by the project, the following drivers have been identified:

- *Progress towards the establishment and management of protected areas*: this project was conceived shortly after the issuance of the presidential decree of 2013 establishing eight new protected areas in the South of Haiti, and in the context of progress made towards the strengthening of institutions involved in protected area management in government and in civil society. This driver would help determine the extent to which the outputs under Project Outcome 1 would actually deliver this outcome, and the project would influence it by building the capacity of the various institutions.
- *Civil society engagement in rural and coastal community development processes, with strong capacities*: thanks in part to their participation in the first two phases of CSI and to their own organisational development processes, at the time of project design there were a small number of competent and well-grounded non-governmental organisations engaged in local development and natural resource management work; capable of providing the project with knowledge and expertise in the main sectors covered. This driver would play a key role in

determining the ability of outputs under Project Outcome 2 to deliver that outcome, and in the pathway towards Intermediate State 2 The project would enhance that ability by building the capacity of these civil society actors.

- *National commitment to regional development planning, with a focus on the South*: the national development strategy formulated following the devastating earthquake of 2010 (Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti, 2012) identified the South as one of four poles for regional development. The CIAT was at the time initiating a process of regional planning, and it had established a close relationship with the UNEP project team based on trust, shared vision and complementarity of skills. This driver would have been considered critical to achieve Project Outcome 3 and Intermediate States 1 and 2, with activities under Project Outcome 3 contributing to the strengthening of the planning capacities of central and decentralised government institutions.

Assumptions. These are conditions that are largely outside the sphere of influence of the project, but that can impact significantly on performance and results. The main assumptions are adequately described in the Project Document, especially the risks of security, political instability and natural hazards. However, in addition to these, there are other assumptions that should be considered within the reconstructed TOC:

- *The management practices for socio-economic purposes that are promoted by the project outside protected areas actually contribute to the protection and management of these areas*. This is an assumption that is frequently made, explicitly or implicitly, in projects that aim to combine natural resource conservation and management with livelihood development and income generation. Within the limits imposed by the conditions under which it was conducted, this evaluation has tested this assumption.
- *The national institutions that have mandates, functions and programmes relevant to the sustainability of project interventions will retain their mandates and core capacities*. While the project can help to strengthen the capacities of partners and beneficiaries, its implementation can be affected by changes in policies and institutional mandates, over which it has no control. This was an important assumption in project design, as several of the outputs and outcomes would in fact depend on other institutions performing the roles they were expected to play at the time of design.

V. EVALUATION FINDINGS

A. Strategic Relevance

Alignment to UNEP's Medium-term Strategy and Programme of Work.

78. At the global level, UNEP has two overarching programming frameworks: the Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) and the Programme of Work (PoW). Since it had an overall duration of 45 months, this project's alignment must be assessed against two consecutive MTSs (2014 – 2017 and 2018 – 2021) and two consecutive biennial PoWs (2016 – 2017 and 2018 – 2019). Both sets of documents identify seven priority areas, each one providing the strategic focus for a sub-programme, but with differences between the titles of some of the areas and sub-programmes, and with some changes between the strategies employed for each sub-programme.

Table 8: Priority areas and sub-programmes in MTSs and PoWs

MTS 2014 – 2017 PoW 2016 – 2017	MTS 2018 – 2021 PoW 2018 – 2019
1. climate change 2. disasters and conflicts 3. ecosystem management 4. environmental governance 5. chemicals and waste 6. resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production 7. environment under review	1. climate change 2. resilience to disasters and conflicts 3. healthy and productive ecosystems 4. environmental governance 5. chemicals, waste and air quality 6. resource efficiency 7. environment under review

79. The MGS1 project has directly contributed to several of the sub-programmes of the two relevant PoWs.

Table 9: Contribution of the project to UNEP sub-programmes (PoWs 2016 – 2017 and 2018 – 2019)

Strategic focus area in MTS and Sub-programme	Main contributions of MGS1 project
Climate change	• conservation and management of coastal ecosystems (reefs and mangroves) to enhance resilience • demonstration of the benefits of ecosystem-based management to support adaptation
(Resilience to) Disasters and conflicts	• testing and demonstration of the contribution of natural resources (reefs, mangroves, forested river banks) to the prevention and reduction of risks
Ecosystem management / Healthy and productive ecosystems	• use of an ecosystem approach to maintain ecosystem services in terrestrial, marine and coastal protected areas and in communities where environmental regeneration is promoted
Environmental governance	• facilitation of, and provision of support to, greater collaboration and increased synergies among UN agencies at national and local levels • provision of support to, and collaboration with, relevant agencies, notably the Ministry of the Environment, ANAP

Strategic focus area in MTS and Sub-programme	Main contributions of MGS1 project
	and CIAT, to ensure that environmental and ecosystem management is mainstreamed in national and regional development policies and plans
Chemicals and waste / and air quality	• provision of technical assistance and capacity-building to selected municipalities to improve waste management, with strengthening of their institutional capacity for waste management
Resource efficiency (and sustainable consumption and production)	• promotion of green economy opportunities and selected value chains
Environment under review	• knowledge management with facilitation of access to information through an online library and platform • collaboration with selected partners.

80. When it was designed, the MGS1 project was part of the Ecosystem management sub-programme, and was expected to contribute to the following accomplishment: "Use of ecosystem management approaches in countries to maintain ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems is increased". In effect, the project was directly relevant to two sub-programmes: (Resilience to) Disasters and conflicts, and Ecosystem management / Healthy and productive ecosystems. Since the project ended in December 2018, and since the MGS2 project is still under execution, the assessment of the relevance of MGS1 to UNEP's strategic and programmatic frameworks should also examine its potential contribution to the expected accomplishments of the subprogrammes 2 (Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts) and 3 (Healthy and Productive Ecosystems) in the current MTS.

Table 10: Relevance of the project to sub-programme 2 of PoW 2018 – 2019

Subprogramme 2: Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts **Objective:** Countries increasingly prevent and reduce the environmental impacts of disasters and conflicts, while building resilience to future crises	
Expected accomplishments	**Relevance and potential contribution of MGS1**
(a) Countries and international partners integrate environmental measures for risk reduction in key policies and frameworks	This integration would take place within the regional planning frameworks that the project sought to support.
(b) Emergency response and postcrisis recovery plans integrate environmental considerations to increase the sustainability of recovery	There is no output in the design of MGS1 that would focus on this accomplishment.
(c) Crisis-affected countries adopt key environmental and natural resource governance policies and sustainable practices as a contribution to recovery and development	With the establishment of protected areas and the development of a regional development plan, the project supports the adoption of key environmental and natural resource governance policies. The sustainable practices promoted and supported by the project, if effective, have the potential to inform and influence practices beyond the scope of project activities and the project area

Table 11: Relevance of the project to sub-programme 3 of PoW 2018 – 2019

Subprogramme 3: Healthy and Productive Ecosystems **Objective:** Marine, freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems are increasingly managed through an integrated approach that enables them to maintain and restore biodiversity, ecosystems' long-term functioning and supply of ecosystem goods and services	
Expected accomplishments	**Relevance and potential contribution of MGS1**
(a) The health and productivity of marine, freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems are institutionalised in education, monitoring and cross-sector and transboundary collaboration frameworks at the national and international levels	Work on terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas, watershed management, erosion control, riverbank protection and sustainable resource use (agroforestry, fisheries) contributes directly to the health of ecosystems. The establishment and management of protected areas and the provision of support to the SNAP and to the agencies responsible for protected area management is a form of institutionalisation. The preparation of a regional development plan for the South and the convening of the *Tables Vertes* would contribute directly to institutionalisation of collaboration frameworks.
(b) Policymakers in the public and private sectors test the inclusion of the health and productivity of ecosystems in economic decision-making	There is no output in the design of MGS1 that would focus on this accomplishment. Activities that demonstrate the contribution of healthy and productive ecosystems to sustainable livelihoods, economic development and poverty reduction have the potential to guide policy-level decision-making if policy-makers are informed and influenced.

Relevance to Donor Strategic Priorities

81. *The project is fully aligned to the strategic priorities of the main donor (Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which sees it as a flagship project in a priority country for development cooperation.* The relevance of this project to the strategic priorities of the Government of Norway must be assessed in the context of its engagement in Haiti over time, and of its thematic areas for development cooperation, With respect to the latter, climate change and the environment are among the main focus areas of Norwegian development policy, with priority attention given to the conservation of tropical forests while improving the livelihoods of those who live off, in or near the forests, to adaptation to climate change and to sustainable fisheries[21]. With respect to Norway's cooperation with Haiti, it is important to recall that Norway was one of the first countries to join the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission and to contribute to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (while serving on its board) following the devastating earthquake of January 2010. While Norway did not have an explicit country strategy for Haiti when CSI was initiated (Particip GmbH 2014), decision memos (January and July 2010) and subsequent documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[21] See in particular: https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/.

provide clear indications of its strategic priorities in the country: an engagement over the long-term, the use of natural resource management and environment as points of entry for cooperation, and a geographic concentration on the south of the country. The MGS1 project and the other project financed by Norway and executed by UNEP in Haiti contribute directly to the implementation of these strategic priorities. The fact that the Norwegian State Secretary visited the project in June 2017 can also be seen as a demonstration of these commitments.

Relevance to Global, Regional, National and Local Priorities

82. *The project was highly relevant to the needs and priorities of the Grand Sud region and of that region's communities and ecosystems.* As already noted, the *Département du Sud*, as indeed the larger Southern region (which also includes the *Départements* of Grand'Anse and Nippes), is representative of the issues and challenges faced by rural Haiti, but at the same time features specific issues and very critical development and environmental management needs because of geographic isolation, institutional weaknesses, severe environmental degradation, and a high vulnerability to disasters. It is also a region of rich biodiversity and high natural resource value and potential, notably with the Massif de la Hotte (that includes Pic Macaya and its national park) and diverse coastal ecosystems. It is also one of the regions without significant international presence and development assistance (prior to CSI). As part of its reconstruction and development strategies following the devastating earthquake of 2010, the Government of Haiti identified the southern region as one of two development poles. In this context, this project was relevant because:

- it sought to establish and enhance the management of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas, with the understanding that these areas provide local communities and the entire southwestern peninsula with critically important goods and ecosystem services;
- it contributed to poverty reduction by protecting and diversifying livelihoods in fisheries, agriculture, apiculture, aquaculture, agroforestry and other locally important sectors;
- it sought to reduce vulnerability to disasters and to the impacts of climate change, in a region where vulnerability is very high; and,
- it supported local civil society organisations and decentralised governmental agencies in domains where skills and financial resources are badly needed.

83. *The project contributed to all relevant national policies as well as regional and international agreements*. At the regional and international levels, the expected results under the first project outcome contributed to a range of policies, strategies and agreements, and in particular to the Protocol on Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) of the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Area, known as the Cartagena Convention. At national level, the project's focus on terrestrial, marine and coastal protected areas is particularly relevant to Haiti's efforts to establish and manage a national system of protected areas. With the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNEP, the GEF, the Government of Norway, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and several other partners, Haiti established the *Système National des Aires Protégées* (SNAP) and created, under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment, the *Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées* (ANAP), with a mandate to protect biodiversity and manage the SNAP. There are at present 26 declared protected areas within the system, but it is only recently that processes to identify, plan and declare marine and

coastal protected areas have been initiated. The work done by ANAP in collaboration with this project was therefore very timely and relevant, especially since the protected areas of Pointe Abacou / Port Salut, Île-à-Vache and La Cahouane, which were officially declared as such in 2013, did not have management plans at the start of this project.

84. *While the Grand Sud Initiative had up to that time worked primarily in regional planning, natural resource management, disaster risk reduction and energy, this project saw a useful and legitimate expansion of the scope of its activities into waste management*. This was entirely relevant, especially considering the efforts being made in managing coastal and marine resources and in establishing marine protected areas, as waste management issues are extremely severe in this region (as in other parts of Haiti), and as pollution and contamination of coastal waters by liquid and solid waste could well be the greatest threat to nearshore marine biodiversity and to the productivity of coastal ecosystems. In Haiti, especially in sites located near urban areas, effective management of waste is a requirement for the effective management of coastal protected areas.

85. *While the project as designed and initially implemented was highly relevant to regional, sub-regional and national environmental priorities, the relevance of the activities planned and undertaken by the MGS1 project in 2018 after its revision, their complementarity to the activities already underway in the project and their contribution to post-disaster recovery are questionable*. In December 2017, the project proposed a revision that was justified primarily by the donor's pledge of additional funding to assist with responses to the impact of Hurricane Matthew (October 2016). This revision extended the project by 12 months, until December 2018, with additional funding in the amount of USD 1,765,536 to support three sets of activities: a surveillance and fire protection plan for the Macaya National Park; the expansion of cacao agroforestry cultivation; and a waste management plan for the city of Les Cayes, together with a pilot initiative on eco-sanitation solutions. While pertinent, these activities cannot really be seen as a response to the impact of the hurricane, and they did not directly complement or enhance the outputs of the MGS1 project during its first three years of implementation. Indeed, it is revealing that the revision document of December 2017, in its section titled "What has been achieved so far", did not mention any achievement of the MGS1 project and only described, in summarised form, the results obtained from Phase 2 of CSI (*Gouvernance Sud, Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* projects). This suggests that the rationale for the selection of activities in the design of the revision came from programming opportunities created by the offer of additional funding by the donor.

Complementarity with existing interventions

86. *The activities undertaken by the project usefully and effectively complemented other interventions in the same domains, but the project did not lead to new or increased collaboration among UN agencies actually or potentially active in the South of Haiti*. The approaches used by the project in support of protected area planning and management and of improved, sustainable livelihoods in communities living in, near or off these protected areas were similar to those employed by other interventions in the same geographic region, notably those supported by the IDB and financed by the GEF. More specifically, the project directly complemented other initiatives to create coastal and marine protected areas in the South of Haiti, within the framework of the SNAP, in collaboration with ANAP, the Ministry of Tourism and the IDB. With respect to the MNNP, the project complemented ongoing planning and management intervention by facilitating the preparation of the management plan, providing technical expertise to the management team and developing the fire prevention and control plan.

Technical relevance[22]

87. *The methodologies used for protected area planning may not have been entirely relevant to the local context*. A first methodological framework was developed for use in the process to formulate the management plan for the MNNP, which was very complete and elaborate, but several weaknesses can be noted. For this Park, the process involved several experts and representatives of a number of institutions, but it was a process that "should have been much more participatory," to quote one of the local actors, who notes that "there were no representatives of the local communities at the planning meetings". This is echoed by the evaluation of the GEF-funded project, which notes that "the creation of the Management Plan was not as participative as expected. Participants were limited to people working with organizations working within park boundaries. Central and local government and communities were not involved" (Lejonc and Palazi 2018). UNEP's own self-assessment (UNEP 2015), however, gives a different picture, stating that "the first-ever protected area management plan, Macaya Natural National Park, was developed in 2015 in Haiti in close consultation with various stakeholders (at local and national levels)". Meanwhile, "the methodology should have been lighter and clearer; it was too detailed, it had too many things, and therefore was not sufficiently appropriated by the team," says one of the persons directly involved, and this is reflected in the plan that was actually produced, with a range of programmes and activities that are well beyond the capacities of the local institutions. In addition, observes one of the members of the project team, "the methodology developed by the project was not validated and appropriated by ANAP". Recognising the need to adapt the methodology and make it simpler and more applicable to local realities, it was later revised with support from the IDB and with inputs from both technical personnel at ANAP and the managers of the various protected areas in the country (Créocéan 2019). Lastly, a major weakness of this management plan, which can also be discerned in the planning processes underway for the marine protected areas, is that it pays too little attention to governance, as if the people responsible for those processes assumed that the institutional arrangements and capacities to implement management programmes were available. It is actually possible that the methodology followed too closely a model suited to countries where conditions are radically different.

88. *The communication and education activities carried out by the project were well suited to the local realities*. Most of those activities were carried out by ReefCheck, one of UNEP's civil society partners, including a "blue education" programme for schools in settlements located near the marine protected areas that were the focus of the project's planning efforts. With hands-on exercises and with the use of both Creole and French in communication, the facilitators were able to engage children, with the expectation of a wider impact on their communities and families.

89. The project's approach to the promotion of sustainable livelihoods, with the strengthening and expansion of sustainable environmental management practices for socio-economic purposes, was entirely relevant to local realities and development needs, but there is little evidence that this promotion of sustainable livelihoods outside protected areas actually does contribute to the effective management of these protected areas. The approach seeks to enhance existing economic activities, explore new value chains and integrate conservation and sustainable resource use practices within rural and marine-based production systems.

[22] This sub-category is not typically assessed by UNEP and, in this evaluation process, no performance rating was assigned or included in the overall peformance assessment. It was, however, considered to be relevant to the learning of the project.

This approach meets the priority needs of local households and communities, it demonstrates that good environmental practice can support subsistence and enhance economic opportunities, and it places the responsibility for stewardship in the hands of those who are the most directly affected by poor environmental management and unsustainable practices. Apart from one specific site (the mangroves of Pointe Abacou) where local community leaders testify that the project's activities in fisheries development and apiculture have encouraged local residents to end or reduce unsustainable resource use practices, this and previous evaluations have not found evidence that the promotion of sustainable livelihoods near protected areas directly contributes to the conservation and effective management of these areas.

90. *The technical relevance and appropriateness of the approach used in the design and initial implementation of the project's work in sanitation and waste management must be highlighted*. In close collaboration with CIAT, DINEPA and the Municipality of Les Cayes, a management plan for sanitation and solid waste management was formulated, and appropriate technologies promoted by SOIL, "a non-profit research and development organisation working in Haiti to design, test, and implement sustainable and cost-effective solutions to the sanitation crisis[23]" were selected, including the use of container-based sanitation. On this basis, the project envisaged a small number of pilot projects, including one focusing on waste management at the main market in Les Cayes, and one involving an experimental site for waste separation, as well as the collection and treatment of wastewater from restaurants in a popular beach area. In all these pilot activities, the approach aimed at behavioural change by working with local organisations and using locally-tested solutions, with the active support and participation of the Municipality.

91. *The project's emphasis on capacity-building was entirely relevant to the needs of actors at all levels*. There were, and there remain, capacity issues, at national and decentralised levels, that are relevant to all projects implemented under the CSI and that have been taken into account in the design of this particular project. Some of the factors responsible for institutional weaknesses and dysfunctions include a frequent turn-over of senior personnel – and resulting policy shifts – at central level, the inadequacy of human and financial resources, the poor linkages between the local and national organs of the same institutions, and the absence or weakness of collaboration mechanisms between institutions. Capacity issues are also evident in civil society, particularly in the organisations of resource users, and the project's efforts towards the strengthening of fisherfolk and farmers' organisations and of producers' cooperatives was highly relevant.

Rating for Strategic Relevance: S

- **Alignment to UNEP MTS and POW: S**
- **Alignment to Donor strategic priorities: HS**
- **Relevance to regional, sub-regional and national environmental priorities: S**
- **Complementarity with existing interventions: S**

B. Quality of Project Design

92. *The assessment of Project Design Quality conducted at inception stage produced a satisfactory rating of 4.4.* In many respects, this project was very well designed, and yet it

[23] https://www.oursoil.org/who-we-are/about-soil/

suffers from significant weaknesses in its structure. It is actually unusual for a project document to have such a complete, pertinent and well-written narrative and yet present significant weaknesses in its intervention logic, something that the Project Review Committee (PRC) actually noted. Indeed, its January 2015 report mentions "a divorce between the narrative and the logframe". Interviews conducted for this evaluation indicate that the design of the overall logic and the formulation and presentation finally adopted for the three outcomes in the ProDoc, with one causal pathway for each, came as a result of an extensive process of project review involving the Haiti Office project team and UNEP Headquarters.

Rating for Project Design: S

C. Nature of the External Context

93. *"By 2015, we had passed the disaster recovery phase."* These words from one of the senior UNEP officials linked to the project recall the fact that the initial justification for the CSI, for UNEP's Country Programme in Haiti and for its attachment to the CMB was the focus on disaster management and recovery, following the devastating hurricanes of 2008 and the earthquake of 2010, but that the context was no longer the same five years later. Certainly, at the time this project was conceived, there were still many factors of vulnerability, insecurity and instability that determined the context within which it would be implemented, but these conditions were not the result of specific disasters. This evolution in the context would have justified a more explicit and active review of the rationale for the placement of the Haiti Country Programme within the CMB as opposed to the implementation of the planned transition to ROLAC[24], especially considering that there are other countries within the region that share some of the features of vulnerability, insecurity and instability that characterise the Haitian context.

94. *In 2014, the year during which the MGS1 was designed, there were a number of factors that would have encouraged UNEP to sustain and expand its engagement in Haiti.* The UN General Assembly had declared 2014 to be the International Year of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which UNEP supported actively. At the time, the overall coordination of the delivery of UNEP's SIDS Programme was provided by the Freshwater and Marine Ecosystems Branch, and projects focusing on SIDS had been incorporated into three UNEP Sub-Programme Framework Documents, including one on Ecosystem management ("Integrated Marine and Coastal Environment and Resource Management for Human Well-being"). It is also in 2014 that Haiti received an official visit by Dr Achim Steiner, then Director General of UNEP, who, in a ceremony attended by the Haitian President Philippe Martelly and the Minister of the Environment Jean-François Thomas, was quoted in the local media as saying that UNEP "will work to strengthen the management capacity of the Macaya [NNP]; establish a network of marine and coastal protected areas connected to the park by biological corridors; and develop sustainable economic opportunities in agro-forestry, which will allow a green

[24] CSI was initially (2010 – 2012) managed by ROLAC before being placed within the CMB/PCDMB, and while a greater integration of the Haiti Country Programme withing the regional office and programme has been in discussion for some time, and recommended in earlier evaluations, concrete steps have been taken recently, with ROLAC having conducted an assessment of the technical and administrative requirements for an effective transition, and with the Haiti Country Programme Manager now being part of the Programme Team at ROLAC.

economy in the Southern Department."[25] To the Government of Haiti, the execution partners and the Government of Norway, all this gave a clear message that UNEP was committed to a sustained involvement in Haiti, with a focus on the Southern region.

95. *The national institutional context that prevailed during the period of project execution was particularly challenging, the project team made good use of its intimate knowledge and good understanding of local realities, but some of its choices may have impacted negatively on the effectiveness and sustainability of some of the interventions*. In its ProDoc, this project rightly identified the Ministry of the Environment as "the weakest Ministry", and over the project period there were no less than six different Ministers of the Environment, with each new nomination accompanied by changes in senior positions in the Ministry and in the management of the main projects executed by the Ministry. The ProDoc also noted that "despite the decentralized approach to governance promoted by the Haitian government, in reality sub-national authorities lack strong technical support, funding and staff to fulfil their key regulatory role. This is particularly true for the Ministry of Environment and associated ANAP'. Conscious of these realities, the UNEP Country Office adopted a number of appropriate strategies, including the choice to establish partnerships with local entities and the support provided to the decentralised directorates of the relevant Ministries. The project was also designed on the premise that "inter-ministerial collaboration [was] dysfunctional, making consistent and coordinated actions in spatial planning an alarming concern". The project therefore placed much hope in its collaboration with the CIAT, but some of the project participants note that this may have been detrimental to its relationship with the Ministries and the decentralised government entities, as the CIAT was created to perform a coordinating role among existing ministries, but not to perform project execution functions.

96. A major hurricane temporarily hampered several parts of the project's operations to a significant extent, but the project responded well to the challenge, and took advantage of its partnerships, field presence and capacities to contribute meaningfully to the humanitarian response. In October 2016, powerful Hurricane Matthew devastated the south of Haiti, impacting negatively on some of the project activities and on some of the natural areas and resources, notably the mangroves at Pointe Abacou. At the same time, the response of the UNEP Country team demonstrated its ability to adapt to and cope with external challenges and to ensure that work could be implemented as planned, even in the most challenging of circumstances (see paragraph 134 below).

Rating for Nature of the external context: MU

D. Effectiveness

Availability of Outputs

97. At inception stage, the reconstructed Theory of Change provided a revised formulation for the outputs, with justification, as presented in Table 12 below. The availability of these outputs as a result of the project is assessed in Table 13.

[25] https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-11339-haiti-environment-investing-in-environmental-resources-of-the-country.html

Table 12: Reformulation of outputs in results statements, as per inception report

Formulation in original project document(s), March 17th, 2015	Formulation for Reconstructed Theory of Change at Evaluation Inception	Justification for Reformulation
1.1- A comprehensive and sustainable Macaya National Nature Park Management Plan (including priority infrastructures, equipment, services and regulations), is established and implemented	1.1- A comprehensive and sustainable Macaya National Nature Park Management Plan (including priority infrastructures, equipment, services and regulations), is formulated and submitted to relevant agencies for approval and implementation	The actual implementation of such a management plan could not be an output of this project, all the project could do is facilitate planning and create favourable conditions for implementation
1.2- Two new Marine Protected Areas are established, along with supporting Comprehensive Management Plans (including priority infrastructure, equipment, services and regulations)	This output does not require reformulation	
1.3- All the high marine and coastal biodiversity values areas in Southern Haiti are identified and a proposed IUCN classification is done by the Ministry of the Environment	1.3- All the high marine and coastal biodiversity values areas in Southern Haiti are identified and a proposed IUCN classification is developed with, and validated by, the Ministry of the Environment	This reformulation reflects better the role of the project in relation to the Ministry of the Environment and the *Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées* (ANAP)
2.1- An efficient fisheries governance structure is developed to ensure fisheries planning/monitoring and promote public understanding of the need to protect the marine coastal environment	This output does not require reformulation	
2.2- Increased income from existing sustainable nature-based livelihoods (e.g., agriculture, forestry and fisheries)	2.2- Existing sustainable nature-based livelihoods (e.g., agriculture, forestry and fisheries) are supported and enhanced	The output of the project itself could not be increased income, but such increase would be both an indicator of impact at outcome level and reflected in one of the Intermediate States
2.3- Additional income is generated from new or alternative livelihoods (e.g., solid waste management, aquaculture, apiculture) in areas outside protected areas but influencing protected areas	2.3- New or alternative livelihoods (e.g., aquaculture, apiculture) are identified and promoted in areas outside protected areas	Same as above
	2.4. The management of solid and liquid waste is improved in at least one locality	Waste management could be considered as a livelihood only in the context of reuse and recycling, but the intent of this output was clearly to support one locality (Les Cayes) in formulating and implementing a waste management plan
2.4- Natural barriers (river banks, river mouths and shoreline) are restored and protect communities and associated economic assets against natural hazards (wave surge, flooding, soil erosion)	This output does not require reformulation, but would be numbered as 2.5	

Formulation in original project document(s), March 17th, 2015	Formulation for Reconstructed Theory of Change at Evaluation Inception	Justification for Reformulation
3.1- A regional development plan that is based on information generated by this project under outcomes 1 and 2	3.1- The information generated by this project under Outcomes 1 and 2 is used and integrated in the formulation of the regional development plan	It is assumed that it was not the sole responsibility of the project to formulate the regional development plan, and that such a plan was under preparation (even if at a very preliminary stage) at the time of project design
3.2- A high-level Regional Development Plan launching platform is convened	This output does not require reformulation	

Table 13: Availability of outputs at December 2018

Outputs	Status at December 2018	Discussion
1.1- A comprehensive and sustainable Macaya National Nature Park Management Plan (including priority infrastructures, equipment, services and regulations), is formulated and submitted to relevant agencies for approval and implementation	Management plan for MNNP prepared and validated. Technical support provided to the implementation of the management plan. Fire prevention and control plan developed and validated by relevant agencies. Reforestation work done at small site (Grotte Marie Jeanne) linked to MNNP. Very little active management of the MNNP and other protected areas by the institutions responsible.	The management plan for the MNNP was actually developed as part of a GEF-funded IDB-executed project and was completed at the very beginning of this MGS1 project, with funding from IDB and UNDP. Since the plan was finalised and validated in mid-2015 while the PIMS indicates that project activities had not started by August 2015, it is understood that this management plan was not an output of this project, although it is repeatedly mentioned in project documents as one of its main achievements.
1.2- Two new Marine Protected Areas are established, along with supporting Comprehensive Management Plans (including priority infrastructure, equipment, services and regulations)	Two new protected areas (Barràderes-Cayemites and Jeremie-Bonbon-Abricots) identified and officially declared in 2017. No management planning underway, no effective management on the ground. Process to develop management plan for Port Salut and Pointe Abacou marine protected areas initiated in 2015, roughly 50% completed by the end of 2018, now nearing completion. Community engagement, management and restoration activities and education programmes conducted. 120,000 mangrove seedlings cultivated in the Saint-Jean-du-Sud nursery, 185,000, mangroves transferred to the Port-Salut and Pointe Abacou protected areas.	It is unclear if the ProDoc expected that the new protected areas established during the project would have comprehensive management plans developed and validated during the lifetime of the project. In reality, the two new marine protected areas have simply been declared, with no management planning and no management action on the ground. Management planning activities have focused on four marine protected areas that had been declared in 2013, with a single management plan being prepared for two contiguous areas Port Salut and Pointe Abacou). The other management planning processes have focused on La Cahouane (60% complete) and for Île-à-Vache (25% complete).
1.3- All the high marine and coastal biodiversity values areas in Southern Haiti are identified and a proposed IUCN classification is developed with, and validated by, the Ministry of the Environment	Areas of high biodiversity value identified before the declaration of protected areas in 2013. Knowledge on areas of high biodiversity value increased thanks to the diagnostic studies conducted by the project in the Port Salut, Pointe Abacou, La Cahouanne and Île-à-Vache marine protected areas. Classification of	Specific sites were identified within the already declared protected areas and two new protected areas were declared. There is no evidence that a specific classification as used, while the IUCN management categories already exists and apply to Haitian protected areas.

Outputs	Status at December 2018	Discussion
	protected areas according to IUCN categories and management regimes not developed.	
2.1- An efficient fisheries governance structure is developed to ensure fisheries planning/monitoring and promote public understanding of the need to protect the marine coastal environment	No significant change in governance structure and arrangements over the period of project execution. Fisherfolk organisations strengthened.	Existing fisheries legislation is considered obsolete and is not enforced. It is only after MGS1 project that efforts have been made to compile the existing regulations and raise awareness among fishers and others involved in fish marketing ,
2.2- Existing sustainable nature-based livelihoods (e.g., agriculture, forestry and fisheries) are supported and enhanced	Vetiver cooperatives supported and three castor oil nurseries established with 166,000 seedlings produced. Support provided to 6 organisations of rural women producers. Fishing boats repaired / refurbished to encourage move of fishing effort away from nearshore areas. Rehabilitation of one fish market.	While this evaluation could not measure the specific products of these two outputs, interviews with key informants and reviews of partner contract agreements and reports suggest that the performance of the partners engaged in the promotion of sustainable livelihoods was excellent and that they often delivered more (e.g., in the number of seedlings produced in nurseries or in the number of tree crops planted) than what was contractually expected from them.
2.3- New or alternative livelihoods (e.g., aquaculture, apiculture) are identified and promoted in areas outside protected areas	Cultivation of high value crops including cacao, castor oil, cashew nuts and mangoes promoted, with focus on buffer zones of protected areas. Hatcheries supported, with fingerlings distributed to producers. Training in apiculture provided	
2.4. The management of solid and liquid waste is improved in at least one locality	Waste management plan developed for Les Cayes but not implemented. Occasional cleaning exercises conducted in specific localities.	The project produced a suitable and comprehensive plan for the management of solid and liquid waste in the city of Les Cayes, but the resources to implement the plan are not available.
2.5. Natural barriers (river banks, river mouths and shoreline) are restored and protect communities and associated economic assets against natural hazards (wave surge, flooding, soil erosion)	Restoration work planned for Pointe Abacou/La Cahouane mangroves, Pointe Sable beach, rivermouths and important watersheds. Port Salut and Pointe Abacou coastal species nurseries established. Early warning systems developed and shared with selected communities. 126,921 forest trees produced and 31,718 wooded lots established in order to rehabilitate riverbanks. 165 km of riverbanks rehabilitated in Port-Salut, Roche-à-Bateau, Côteaux, Port-à-Piment, and Les Anglais.	As in the case of activities carried out towards outputs 2.2 and 2.3, it appears that the performance of co-execution partners in the pursuit of these outputs has been highly satisfactory.
3.1- The information generated by this project under Outcomes 1 and 2 is used and integrated in the formulation of the regional development plan	No regional development plan. Information, experiences and plans developed by the project used by the CIAT in its planning and regulatory activities in the South.	The *Tables Vertes* have allowed for enhanced communication and coordination among a wide range of actors involved in development planning and implementation in the South of Haiti, but this output was based on the assumption that a regional development plan would actually be produced during the project's lifetime, and this assumption may not have been realistic.
3.2- A high-level Regional Development Plan launching platform is convened	*Table Verte* established and operational as coordination and planning mechanism for the *Grand Sud*. Played a critical role (meeting of July 2015) in coordinated response to drought of 2015.	

98. *While the formulation of a comprehensive and sustainable Macaya National Nature Park Management Plan (Output 1.1) is frequently mentioned in project reports and monitoring*

instruments as one of the key achievements of the MGS1 project, this output was actually realised prior to the initiation of this project, with partial funding from other sources. As noted in paragraph 72 above, the preparation of this management plan was commissioned by the UGP Macaya prior to the commencement of the MGS1 project, and UNEP received funding from the IDB and from UNDP for that purpose.

99. *With respect to the actual management of the MNNP, the project provided significant support in the form of technical support and human resources, but impacts and outputs were limited*. Undoubtedly, the project remained involved in, and supportive of, efforts aimed at establishing an effective management regime for this protected area throughout its period of implementation, and the management plan was complemented by the fire prevention and control plan, but changes in personnel prompted by the Ministry of the Environment and typically coinciding with appointments of new Ministers have weakened capacity and limited the ability of the UGP Macaya to implement the management programmes.

100. *With respect to Outcome 2, critical support was provided to important sectors of the local economy, based on a strategic approach to the development of green value chains, and the project was able to deliver most of its expected outputs in this regard*. The project formulated a strategy for the development of cacao production (UNEP 2015), in collaboration with AYTIKA, ORE and other partners, one for vetiver in March 2016 (UNEP 2016) and one for castor oil in April 2016. On the basis of these and other studies, with support from this project, the Ministry of the Environment formulated a comprehensive strategy for the development of green value chains in the buffer zone of PNNM (Desile Destine 2016). In support of agroforestry and watershed management, nurseries were created, with 150,000 fruit tree seedlings produced and distributed. With respect to cacao production, between 2015 and 2018, with support from the MGS1 project, the organisation AYITIKA was able to establish 90 hectares of plantations on small holdings within the buffer zone of the MNNP, and these remain in production today. All these are important and remarkable achievements.

101. *The project has also implemented site-specific conservation and rehabilitation activities that have had positive impacts and are considered beneficial by local communities*. For example, this evaluation was able to review work done towards the protection of two springs that provide the source of potable water to Port Salut, where local farmers and other residents were appropriately consulted to select the species used in reforestation, with local labour employed for the creation of a small on-site nursery and transportation and planting of the seedlings.

102. *While the project's initiative in waste management in Les Cayes was highly relevant to local needs and would have usefully complemented work in coastal and marine conservation and sustainable use, it did not deliver the expected outputs*. With adequate professional guidance and with the participation of relevant agencies, notably the Municipality of Les Cayes, a comprehensive management plan (covering both sanitation and solid waste management) had been prepared in advance. Following a delayed start of this activity (because efforts were directed at post-hurricane relief and recovery during the final months of 2016) pilot activities and methods had been identified. Regrettably, one of the partners decided to redirect all resources towards a project that may have paid too much attention to public awareness (with a major cleaning event scheduled on 15 August 2017) and not enough to the promotion of the appropriate technical solutions that were envisaged in the initial design. Soon after, the consultant who facilitated this component of the project was asked to focus on other components of UNEP's programme, putting an effective end to this initiative. The

project however embarked in June of the following year on two cleaning initiatives in Port Salut and in Pointe Abacou, coinciding with World Environment Day.

Achievement of Project Outcomes

103. The assessment of the achievement of project outcomes is based on the outcomes of the reconstructed theory of change. As noted in the inception report, the project outcomes that were enunciated in the original project document were all formulated in terms of "strengthened capacities", and while capacity-building was certainly an important part of the project, the outcomes that would be delivered through the achievement of the outputs were broader, as shown in Table 14. The availability of these outcomes as a result of the project is assessed in Table 15.

Table 14: Reformulation of outcomes in results statements, as per inception report

Formulation in original project document(s), March 17th, 2015	Formulation for Reconstructed Theory of Change at Evaluation Inception	Justification for Reformulation
1- Strengthened Government capacities to identify, establish and manage protected areas and marine and coastal protected areas in the Southern Region of Haiti	1- Key elements of a network of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas established and managed in the Southern Region of Haiti	This reformulation provides an outcome that goes beyond the strengthening of capacities, and recognises that government agencies are not the sole implementers of management measures and programmes
2- Strengthened Government and local resource users' capacities to promote sustainable environmental management for socio-economic purposes outside protected areas and hence to contribute to a viable and healthy network of protected areas in Southern Haiti	2- Sustainable environmental management practices for socio-economic purposes promoted outside protected areas and contributing to a viable and healthy network of protected areas in Southern Haiti	This reformulation focuses the outcome on actual livelihood, ecosystem restoration and risk reduction impacts
3- Strengthened government capacities to develop and publicly present a Southern Haiti regional development plan integrating biodiversity values, ecosystem considerations, economic priorities, and environmental health issues	3- Southern Haiti regional development plan integrating biodiversity values, ecosystem considerations, economic priorities, and environmental health issues developed and launched	This reformulation recognises that a project such as this could not aim at building the capacity of national planning agencies, and assumes that the regional development plan was under preparation (even if at a very preliminary stage) at the time of project design

Table 15: Achievement of outcomes at December 2018

Outcome	Status at December 2018	Discussion
Key elements of a network of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas established and managed in the Southern Region of Haiti	Progress made towards the management of at least three previously declared protected areas in the Southern Region (MNNP, Port Salut and Pointe Abacou) and two new protected areas declared (Barràderes-Cayemites and Jeremie-Bonbon-Abricots). No evidence of a functioning network of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas. Capacity of decentralised agencies responsible for protected area planning and management strengthened.	From the ProDoc and from the various reports and other documents produced by the project, the expected outcome ("a network") is unclear. An established and managed network of protected areas would at least require: (a) documented and monitored functional linkages between ecosystems and species in the various units of the network, (b) functional cooperation among the units in areas such as training,

Outcome	Status at December 2018	Discussion
	Blue education initiative spearheaded by ReefCheck.	monitoring or public awareness, and (c) a coherent management and governance framework. In the case of the protected areas of Haiti's, these elements do not exist.
Sustainable environmental management practices for socio-economic purposes promoted outside protected areas and contributing to a viable and healthy network of protected areas in Southern Haiti	Many environmental management practices and natural resource based economic activities supported, with likely impact on the livelihoods of a large number of households. No evidence of impact on the viability and health of the terrestrial protected area (MNNP). Pressure on mangrove areas for charcoal production reduced thanks to promotion of apiculture. No other evidence of impact on the viability and health of the coastal and marine protected area.	This expected outcome would have been based on the assumption that the promotion of economic activities and sustainable livelihoods near protected areas would automatically reduce the pressure on these areas, but this is an assumption that is rarely verified, especially in contexts such as what prevails in Haiti, with high incidence of poverty, human settlements near and within protected areas, and very limited surveillance and enforcement capacity.
Southern Haiti regional development plan integrating biodiversity values, ecosystem considerations, economic priorities, and environmental health issues developed and launched	Regional development plan not developed and not launched.	The project would not have been in a position to deliver this outcome, which was most likely formulated with the assumption that the CIAT would have developed the plan during the course of this project. This assumption has not been verified.

Achievement of Likelihood of Impact

104. *By the time this project ended, there were very few ongoing management activities taking place in the protected areas that the project was working with, and most of the threats to their resources and ecosystems had not been significantly reduced.* In spite of continued efforts in the ensuing years, notably with support from the GEF-funded project, the current situation mirrors what prevailed three years ago. In the MNNP, there is very little management presence on the ground, except for localised surveillance and enforcement actions by government agencies and by civil society organisations such as *Société Audubon Haïti* and the *Fondation Macaya pour le Développement*. As noted by the evaluation of the GEF-funded project "Sustainable Land Management of the Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti" (Lejonc and Palazy 2018): "the demarcation of Park Macaya is incomplete, the park infrastructure is non-operational and the cabins–which were to allow CSE agents to monitor the park–were never built. The Management Plan is not implemented". In the marine protected areas of Port-Salut and Pointe Abacou, there are signs of behavioural change by local communities that have resulted in improved ecosystem management, especially in the mangroves, but these areas are not effectively managed. An article published in February 2021 in Haiti's leading newspaper *Le Nouvelliste*[26] provides a detailed and worrying picture of the status of these areas; entitled "*7 ans après leur création, les aires marines protégées du Sud ne sont ni surveillées ni protégées* (Seven years after their creation, the South's marine protected areas are neither monitored nor protected)", it notes that the community's awareness of the value of mangroves has been raised, but that the management plan has not been finalised and that the process "has not yet put in place a system for the surveillance

[26] https://lenouvelliste.com/article/226346/7-ans-apres-leur-creation-les-aires-marines-protegees-du-sud-ne-sont-ni-surveillees-ni-protegees

and protection" of these areas. Project personnel indicate that by the time this project ended, the status of studies and management planning was 50% for the Port Salut-Pointe Abacou protected areas and 5% for the La Cahouanne protected area. At the Grotte Marie-Jeanne, where the project conducted reforestation activities and established visitor facilities, interviews with local community leaders and site visits reveal that "dwelling houses and other structures have been built within the area, and trees have been cut to open space".

105. *The project has devoted much of its resources to protected areas management, but there is no evidence to suggest that the "key elements of a network of terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas [were] established and managed in the Southern Region of Haiti' by the end of the project*. The project's efforts in protected area planning and management were intended to support the establishment and management of one terrestrial area (the Macaya National Natural Park – MNNP) and three coastal and marine protected areas. In summary, the status of protected area establishment and management in the South at the end of the MGS1 project and the likelihood of impact beyond the MGS1 project were as follows:

- with respect to MNNP, project output 1 under outcome 1 reads: "a comprehensive and sustainable Macaya NNP Management Plan (including priority infrastructures, equipment, services and regulations), is established and implemented". In reality, as noted elsewhere in this report, the preparation of this management plan was one of the expected outputs from the GEF-funded project "Sustainable Land Management of the Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti", and in 2014 the Société Audubon Haïti was contracted by that project to facilitate the preparation of the management plan. In early 2015, in light of the slow progress made in this planning initiative, UNEP was approached by the *Unité de Gestion de Projet* (UGP Macaya) responsible for that GEF-funded project and the IDB to prepare that management plan, with USD 90,936 provided by the IDB and USD 112,083 provided by UNDP. The management plan was completed in October 2015;
- while the management plan is a detailed and comprehensive document, it is almost silent on governance arrangements, and this is what prompted the initiative taken by the UGP Macaya in 2018 to develop a *Charte de Gouvernance* (Governance Charter) for the Park;
- UNEP also covered the cost of the salaries of two professionals assigned to the UGP Macaya, ostensibly to implement the management plan, but this support ended in 2016, following the nomination of a new Minister of the Environment and resulting changes in the leadership of the UGP Macaya;
- the process used for the formulation of the management plans for coastal and marine protected areas involved the following elements: constitution of a technical team responsible for stakeholder analysis; formulation of management objectives and design of the management plan; provision of ongoing support by an international consultant; diagnostic studies, with ReefCheck having done the assessment of coral reefs, mangroves and other habitats; community consultation, with initial activities aimed at confidence building; early initiation of selected conservation and management interventions such as beach cleaning exercises or the establishment of nurseries for mangrove species, using local labour; conduct of a public awareness programme, with activities aimed at local schools; strengthening of local fisherfolk associations;
- in support of these efforts, in 2016 the project commissioned and produced a communication strategy to promote the marine protected areas (Brunet 2016);

- the project also provided support to a community organisation, *Konbit pou Potapiman* (KPP) to assist with the establishment of a natural site attached to the MNNP. The site is Grotte Marie Jeanne, a large karstic cave located near the community of Port-à-Piment. KPP managed a nursery and recruited local labour to work at the nursery and in the creation of visitor facilities at the site, but it appears that there was little management activity after the project, and that threats to the integrity of the site had actually increased.

106. *While there is no evidence that would permit a measurement of this impact and its likelihood, the project has undoubtedly contributed to the enhancement of relevant capacities, and this would have been a positive factor of effectiveness*. While the project outcomes were reformulated at inception stage to reflect broader yet more relevant expectations, it remains necessary and pertinent to document and evaluate the extent to which the project has contributed to the strengthening of the capacities of the various actors. The civil society partners have obviously benefited from the project as it has helped them to build skills and to acquire human resources critical to their missions. The government agencies have similarly benefited from the experience of the project and from training activities, but some of the actors in protected area management in the country also note that the process of preparation of the management plan for the MNNP could have served as a training exercise for key personnel of the Ministry of the Environment, but unfortunately the Ministry was only peripherally involved. A similar observation is made by some project participants regarding the planning processes for the Port Salut – Pointe Abacou and La Cahouanne marine protected areas, in which the ANAP was apparently not involved, at least not until these processes was significantly advanced.

Rating for Effectiveness: MU

E. Financial Management

Adherence to UNEP's Financial Policies and Procedures

107. *Interviews conducted for this evaluation and financial documentation received and reviewed indicate that UNEP's financial policies and procedures were adhered to in the management of this project.* The established procedure for the transfer of funds to UNOPS, as per the terms of the UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement between UNEP and UNOPS, was followed, as well as the procedure for submission of annual financial statements and requests for payments. CMB also complied with UNON's requirement that financial statements from UNOPS be certified by CMB. CMB and the UNEP Country Office have also ensured that the data from UNOPS' financial statements was entered into UMOJA. Interest generated by UNOPS was correctly considered as programme funds, in this case a total of USD 129,942 was generated. While the MGS1 project has not yet been closed financially, it has been agreed between UNEP and Norway that any remaining balance would be allocated to the MGS2 project. Project management also followed all established procedures for recruitment and procurement, although in one instance this affected project execution, because UNEP was unable to enter into an agreement with the organisation AYITIKA, because it is registered as a commercial enterprise and procurement procedures prevented its engagement as a project partner.

108. However, it is noted that one of the management processes and decisions that may not have been fully consistent with UNEP procedures is a closure which is described by one

of the people interviewed for this evaluation as "artificial", i.e., with the MGS1 having been "artificially" closed by agreement between UNEP and Norway, in order to permit commencement of MGS2. This was justified primarily by the desire of the donor to avoid delays in the implementation of MGS2, and the technical closure of MGS1 was still done in accordance with UNEP procedures, while this arrangement was beneficial to both projects, as the donor had committed additional resources.

Completeness of Financial Information

109. *The financial information provided to this evaluation is complete, and constitutes additional evidence that the financial management of the project was effective, efficient and consistent with UNEP's financial policies and procedures*. The documentation provided has included: annual interim financial statements and requests for payment submitted by UNOPS in accordance with the terms of the UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement ; the performance evaluations that accompany such requests for payments; annual financial statements prepared and cleared by UNON's Accounts Section; the letter from UNOPS certifying and reporting on financial closure; and the request for bank transfer to refund UNEP with the surplus remaining with UNOPS at financial closure.

Table 16: Summary financial table

Item	Amount
Original agreement between Norway and UNEP	NOK 56,000.000.00 USD 6,427,879.00
First amendment, agreement between Norway and UNEP (2015)	NOK 12,583,337.00 USD 1,316,983.00
Total contribution (Norway) at project inception (2015) • programmable amount • support costs	USD 7,744,862.00 USD 7,320,285.00 USD 424,577.00
Second amendment, agreement between Norway and UNEP (2016)	NOK 2,000,000.00
Total contribution (Norway) following second amendment (2016)	USD 7,989,969.00
Budget revision, December , additional contribution from Norway	USD 1,765,335.00
Total contribution (Norway) following revision (December 2017) and 12-month extension	USD 9,755,505.00
Transfer, additional contribution from Norway	USD 29,995.00
Total contribution to MGS1, Norway, as per UNON certified financial statement	USD 10,249,860.05
Total project income, as per UNON certified financial statement	USD 10,279,855.05
UNEP expenditure: staff and other personnel costs	USD 1,567,591.29
UNEP expenditure: contractual services	USD 44,752.79
UNEP expenditure: operating and other direct costs	USD 247,953.28
UNEP transfer to UNOPS (transfers and grants)	USD 7,442,746.62
Total direct expenditure UNEP	USD 9,477,881.40
Indirect support costs (UN and implementing partners)	USD 758,230.81
Total expenditure UNEP at 28 February 2021	USD 10,236,111.91

Item	Amount
Balance UNEP at 28 February 2021	USD 43,743.14
Gain on exchange rate at 28 February 2021	USD 113.52
Total available balance at 28 February 2021	USD 43,856.66
UNOPS actual income from transfers	USD 7,744,862.00
Interest earned by UNOPS, 2015 - 2020	USD 129,942.00
Total revenue UNOPS	USD 7,874,804.00
UNOPS disbursements: • 2015 • 2016 • 2017 • 2018 • 2019/20	USD 397,128.00 2,871,309.00 2,827,192.00 1,114,144.00 55,317.00
Currency exchange	USD 4,205.00
Management fees, UNOPS	USD 421,473.00
Total expenditure UNOPS	USD 7,690,768.00
Surplus returned by UNOPS to UNEP on 31 July 2020	USD 184,036.00

Communication Between Finance and Project Management Staff

110. *Interviews carried out for the purpose of this evaluation suggest that communication between finance and project management staff has been effective and efficient.* Financial management staff indicate that, from their perspective, this project has been "going well" and while this project encountered administrative issues and delays, especially at the start, these were obviously due to the nature of UNEP's systems and procedures, not to deficiencies in communication between the personnel in Geneva and in Haiti. Members of the project team in Haiti actually mention that they received adequate support from their counterparts at CMB when they had to address and adapt to these issues. It must also be noted that the CMB staff providing support to the project has been associated with the Haiti team since at least 2013, that several among them had visited Haiti, and that the personal relationships that had been established would have undoubtedly contribute to good communication.

Rating for Financial Management: HS (see Annex IV for further detail)

F. Efficiency

111. There are a number of factors related to UNEP's rules and procedures, and to the management and operations of this particular project, that have impacted negatively on its execution and on the efficiency of project delivery. These factors include:

delayed commencement of project activities: the PIMS report at June 2015 indicates that the project was still in its inception phase and that "due to administrative issues the activities for this project have not yet begun; estimated start date is August 2015". The administrative issues identified in that report include: delayed funding (disbursement or allotment), UNEP administrative processes (delays due to legal, HR, procurement) and problems with project design (changes to logframe, activities). Progress remained slow throughout 2015, as the PIMS report of December 2015

indicates that: “due to significant delays in internal UNEP processes, the implementation of activities for this project have been significantly delayed. Results are expected in the next reporting period.”

high rate of staff turnover, in the two positions most critical to the execution and coordination of this project: the Head of the Country Office at the time this project is designed and initiated leaves shortly after the start of the project (late 2015), his replacement arrives in April 2016 and leaves in March 2018, but his successor, who is the current UNEP Representative and Programme Manager in Haiti, only arrives in September 2019, leaving more than a year and a half without someone in the position of Project Supervisor. It is a known fact that the recruitment process within the UN system can be long (typically 9 months for a staff at P4 or P5 level), but in this case it was exceptionally long, one of the reasons being that the nomination of the person who was eventually selected was initially rejected by the UNEP Executive Office on the basis of the criterion of gender parity. During the period of vacancy in the position of Programme Manager and Project Supervisor (with 50% of time allocated to this project), the responsibility for oversight was transferred to one officer at CMB in Geneva, and in June 2018 it was transferred to one of his colleagues at that office, who served as interim Programme Manager. The position of Project Manager (100% of time allocated to this project) has been similarly affected by a period of vacancy between the date of departure of the Consultant who occupied that position at the start of the project April 2017) and the date of arrival (June 2017) of her successor. While this gap lasted only a couple of months, the transition was complicated by the fact that there was no in-person handover from the first Project Manager to the second, and this is described by one member of the Country Office as “detrimental to the partners” because of the importance of personal contacts in the working relationships between UNEP and its civil society partners on the ground;

delays in the management and execution of the contracts with the implementing partners: it appears that this was caused by some instances of protracted negotiations between the CMB and UNOPS. Such delays are particularly detrimental to the execution partners and their work plans, as they may have to suspend their activities pending the receipt of funds;

expenditure reports and budget updates: for a number of reasons, including the use of different budget categories between proposals and internal budgets, as well as the move from the cash-based Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) to the new UMOJA system, the management of budgets has been very time-consuming and the CMB in Geneva has not always been able to respond in a timely fashion to the CO’s requests for budget updates – with the CO at times being forced to make its own updates calculations before making important management decisions;

the introduction of UMOJA: more generally, the introduction within the UN of the new central administrative system known as UMOJA has caused a number of delays and difficulties, in part because of enduring challenges in the operationalisation of the system, and because of the need to integrate the project within UMOJA “with some cleaning up to do”, to quote one of the people involved in that process. As a result, some of the contractual partners experienced delays in receiving payments, and the transfer to UNOPS of the first tranche of funds for this MGS1 project was also delayed, creating

a difficult cash-flow situation that UNOPS was able to manage a by temporarily allocating funds available from the Énergie Sud project;

travel authorisation and payment: for in-country travel, CO team members are required to submit indicative travel plans every three months, so that the corresponding DSA would be made available to UNDP in Haiti for disbursement when travel is actually done, while for international travel authorisation must be sought from CMB/PDCMB at least 21 days in advance. Team members have found these procedures cumbersome, but they themselves often fail to submit plans and requests on time, and there have been frustrations over delays in approval and reimbursement of expenses;

currency exchange: the grant agreement between Norway and UNEP was expressed in Norwegian Krone, but the US dollar was the main currency used in budgeting and execution and this resulted in minor losses;

insufficient delegated authority: the arrangement whereby CMB provides operational support and facilitates a large number of transactions has been described by one of the officers directly involved in these arrangements as "grossly inefficient";

procurement procedures: one of UNEP's important technical partners in Haiti is social enterprise called AYITIKA, which provides support to all actors on the cacao value chain. UNEP was however unable to enter into an agreement with this organisation because it is considered as a private sector entity, and UNEP's procurement rules and procedures for private sector had to apply, with an invitation to tender.

112. *While this evaluation is not a financial audit and does not have access to the data that would be necessary to confirm this, members of the project team mention that some of the human and financial resources allocated to this project were used to support the coordination of activities planned under another project, typically for very short periods, and that this MGS1 project itself benefited from such an arrangement*. The fact that the UNEP Haiti Office was at the time implementing several projects indeed allowed it to manage delays in approvals and fund transfers, but it also blurred the boundaries between projects, and it resulted in funds allocated to one project actually serving to support another one. This happened in particular with the initial period of implementation of the GEF-funded project, as funds came in very late, and "MGS1 supported it in many ways", to quote one of the members of the project team at the time. Similarly, it seems that coordination costs during the period of extension of this MGS1 project (December 2017 to December 2018) were covered by other projects, as the additional funding provided by Norway all went to field activities. This is one of the symptoms of a larger reality, the fact that there was significant overlap between projects: as one of the UNEP colleagues associated with the Country Office recalls, it was always "difficult to tell which project was doing what".

113. *Contrary to what was stipulated in its ProDoc, this project did not have a constituted and operational Steering Committee.* The ProDoc stated that the project would be "under the leadership of a Project Steering Committee (PSC) co-shared (sic) by MDE, CIAT and MARNDR". The responsibility of the PSC would have been to "receive periodic reports on progress and …. make recommendations concerning the need to revise any aspects of the Results Framework or the M&E plan." In the documentation provided by UNEP for the

purpose of this evaluation, there is no evidence of meetings of this Steering Committee, and members of the project team have confirmed that it was not constituted and did not meet.

114. *UNOPS role and the manner in which it was performed contributed to efficient project execution.* The financial agreement between UNEP and UNOPS was negotiated with an agency fee of 7%, which UNEP was able to cover through its own agency fees to the main donor, but UNOPS was able to offer this fee only because its staff costs for project management were covered separately under the projects' budgets. The agreement between UNEP and UNOPS has clearly been a positive factor, with UNOPS being described by one project participant as "more efficient than others in the UN system", while another one indicates that UNOPS is "very pragmatic and professional".

115. *While there was good communication between the CMB and the Haiti Country Office, and while CMB's overall management of the projects in Haiti was efficient, opinions gathered for this evaluation suggest that there was a certain level of dissatisfaction with the manner in which the project, and the Country Office generally, were managed by the Branch*. "Geneva was disconnected from the real needs", "sometimes they made strange management decisions", and "Geneva was giving priority to other countries, to them Haiti was very marginal", are some of the impressions gathered. These remarks may apply more directly to the period during which the office in Geneva assumed the responsibility for project and staff supervision, because of the long vacancy in the position of Programme Manager and Country Representative.

116. *A positive factor of efficiency has been the location of the main office in Port Salut.* If UNEP had had to coordinate and execute all these activities from a base in the capital city, the costs would have been much higher, and the quality and efficiency of the collaboration with implementing partners would have suffered. The value of a local base, in terms of efficiency, was brought in evidence with the response to the impacts of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, and has been confirmed in recent months, making it easier for the UNEP team to operate in the context of the constraints imposed by the pandemic of COVID19.

Rating for Efficiency: MS

G. Monitoring and Reporting

Monitoring Design and Budgeting

117. *The project, as originally designed, included all the main elements required for the effective monitoring of project implementation, as well as ambitious plans to monitor patterns of resource use and impacts of protected area management.* The monitoring plan included: a logical framework with indicators; a Project Steering Committee; periodic reporting through the PIMS, the annual review meetings between UNEP and the donor; and the preparation of periodic progress reports for dissemination to all partners. With respect to evaluation, the budget had an amount of USD 50,000 allocated for that purpose, with a mid-term review planned for June 2016 and a terminal evaluation originally planned for June 2017. With respect to the monitoring of the impact and effectiveness of management regimes, the project envisaged that it would monitor the implementation of the five management programmes within the management plan for the MNNP, and that it would set up a system to monitor fishing effort and catch. The project's budget included an amount of USD 50,000 for monitoring and evaluation consultants, and it is understood that these funds were used to support monitoring and reporting work and functions within the UNEP Country team.

118. *The primary instrument of monitoring was the logical framework, but there were significant weaknesses in its design, and this evaluation has not seen evidence of its use in monitoring and adaptive management*. The person responsible for project monitoring generously mentions that there were "perhaps one or two indicators that were difficult to measure", but the selection of indicators was indeed inappropriate in a number of cases, especially as there was a lack of baseline data to allow for the measurement of progress towards the targets and indicators. For example:

- in order to be monitored, several indicators would have required sophisticated skills and equipment in order to measure surface areas in the MNNP (e.g., "% of Macaya NNP area in which farmers are directly engaged in sustainable management"), something that is unrealistic, especially when considering the nature of the terrain and the types of farming activities in which people engage in that protected area;
- the "number of countries in the Caribbean Biological Corridor integrating the ecosystem approach with traditional sector-based natural resources" is an indicator, but the project did not have any activity aimed at sharing approaches with other countries within the CBC; or
- one indicator, with a baseline of zero, reads "number of women whose income increased from nature-based alternatives livelihoods and/or supplementary livelihoods developed", and this would have required assessment tools and protocols that were not available to the project.

Monitoring of Project Implementation

119. *In spite of the weaknesses in design that are noted above, the MGS1 project helped the UNEP Haiti Country Office to design and introduce a robust system to monitor its activities and outputs, this system was actually extended to the entire portfolio of projects executed by UNEP in the South of Haiti, with significant improvements in the quality of programme and project management*. The evaluation of 2016 had noted that there were several weaknesses with respect to monitoring and reporting in the projects implemented during Phase 2 of CSI, and that the main constraint had been the absence of staff dedicated to monitoring and evaluation within the Country Office during the period 2013 – 2015, when four projects were being implemented concurrently. Although there were line items in the budgets of these projects that were allocated to these aspects, the amounts were apparently insufficient and the project time frames too short to permit the recruitment of a team member dedicated to monitoring and evaluation. With funds from this project, under a budget line allocated to a Communications Officer, a Haitian professional – who is still part of the UNEP Country Team – was recruited by UNOPS in 2015 with the mandate to develop this system, building results files that also tracked the sources of evidence. The system allowed for the monitoring of grants to partners, the tracking of activities and the delivery of outputs against the indicators from the various project documents. This system was first applied to this MGS1 project, then to the GEF-funded project, and it remains in use nowadays for the portfolio of projects in Haiti.

Reporting on Project Implementation

120. *At the time when the MGS1 was implemented, the UNEP Country Office used a good reporting framework that provided the donor, UNEP and the other project stakeholders with a good account of the activities implemented, but within which it was, and still is, difficult to identify the specific activities undertaken and results obtained by each project*. One important instrument of project monitoring was the annual review meeting between representatives of the

Government of Norway and UNEP; typically, these would bring together the Ambassador and Councillor from the Embassy of Norway, the entire project team in Haiti, and at least one representative from UNEP's CMB, and it would include one or two days of field visits and encounters with implementing partners and beneficiaries, followed by the review meeting itself. The reporting framework included: bi-annual progress reports (*Rapports de progrès*) covering UNEP's entire portfolio of projects in Haiti; brief summaries of progress posted in the PIMS; reports to, and on, the annual UNEP-Norway review meetings; and the production and dissemination of comprehensive self-assessment reports. The first such self-assessment report was produced in November 2015 and covered the period 2013 – 2015 (with an introduction to the MGS1 project) and the second one was produced in October 2019, covering all activities conducted and results obtained in the MGS1 project, together with those of the other projects implemented during the period, and without the possibility for the reader to attribute activities and results to each project. Another concern, shared by the representatives of Norway in the annual review meeting of 2017, was that the reporting instruments and processes did not provide a suitable account of results obtained and of the project's consideration of and impact on cross-cutting issues.

Rating for Monitoring and Reporting: S

- **Monitoring design and budgeting: MS**
- **Monitoring of project implementation: S**
- **Reporting on project implementation: S**

H. Sustainability

Socio-political Sustainability

121. *While there are, in Haiti, a number of challenging socio-political factors that impact on the implementation of projects such as this one, the UNEP team's good understanding of these realities, its good working relationship with Haitian colleagues and institutions and its ability to cope with difficult working and living conditions, together with the long-term commitment of the Government of Norway, are sufficient to ensure the sustainability of interventions, as demonstrated by the fact that three major projects have been and are still being implemented by UNEP in the South of Haiti following this MGS1 project.* Any assessment of the sustainability of a development intervention in Haiti must take into account the specific conditions of that country. By definition, a fragile state is a state where the effectiveness of processes of policy reform and institutional strengthening is largely dependent on factors external to these processes. Factors of fragility may include economic performance and volatility, weak and unstable institutions, environmental vulnerability, a weak rule of law and a lack of good governance, as well as insecurity and violence. All these factors are at play in Haiti, in one way or another. In such a context, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the interventions and processes involved in a particular project will be sustained beyond the life of the project or projects, but there are at least two criteria that can be used to assess socio-political sustainability: (a) to what extent have external socio-political factors and conditions been taken into account in design and execution, and (b) has the project taken suitable measures and actions to mitigate the impact of these external factors? Against both criteria, this project rates very highly.

Financial Sustainability

122. *In a project such as this one, it is not possible to talk about financial sustainability per se, because of the limited budgets of national institutions, the fact that local civil society organisations do not have unrestricted resources, and the impossibility to raise revenue from resource use for management; continuity can therefore only be assessed by examining the extent to which the project has been able to identify and raise resources to sustain its activities.* In this regard, the Macaya Grand Sud 1 project has been very effective, as it is during its execution, and largely through its support, that UNEP was able not only to negotiate a follow-up Macaya Grand Sud project, but also to develop proposals and receive funding for three other projects:

- the project titled "Ecosystem Approach to Haiti Cote Sud" funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with the agreement signed in May 2016, an effective start in October 2017 and an expected completion date of December 2021. In this project, the Ministry of the Environment, ORE, PADI and AYITIKA are UNEP's co-execution partners. The GEF Project Grant is USD 6,216M, with a total co-financing of USD 42,668M. The project aims to increase resilience to climate change risks and decrease disaster risk using an ecosystem management approach targeting protected areas and fragile ecosystems in the Southwestern Peninsula of Haiti;
- the project titled "Support Programme for Watershed Management through Strengthening Sustainable Value Chains in the Department of the South, Haiti" funded by the *Agence française de développement* (AFD) and the *Fonds français pour l'environnement Mondial* (FFEM); and,
- the project titled "Developing Core Capacity for MEA Implementation" (joint execution Haitian Ministry of the Environment and UNEP, 36 months from mid 2016). This project aims to enhance institutional capacities so as to establish government structures for the effective implementation of international environmental conventions and environmental priorities, and ensure that institutions and stakeholders have access to the skills and knowledge to conduct research, collect information and implement collective environmental actions.

123. *While the securing of these two projects was undoubtedly a positive development, as this provided UNEP and its partners with the funds required to sustain and expand activities (especially in the promotion of green economy and ecosystem-based livelihoods, as well as marine protected areas), there is a larger question concerning the sustainability of interventions.* An internal, unpublished document titled Update on UNEP projects in Haiti, prepared during the last quarter of 2015, reported on a 2015-2018 project portfolio of USD 35 million, with a total of eleven projects. This is a very large portfolio, representing a wide range of activities, and it represents a level of funding and a volume of project management responsibilities that are hard to sustain.

Institutional Sustainability

124. *The continuity of, and follow-up to, project interventions and initiatives in protected area planning and management rests largely on institutions that have limited capacity and financial resources*. The overall responsibility for protected area management rests with the Ministry of the Environment and with ANAP, which is committed to sustaining and expanding activities, but has a weak presence in the field and limited human, financial and technical capacities. For the MNNP, the UGP – which should actually be an *Unité de Gestion de Parc* and not an *Unité de Gestion de Projet* – has been, and apparently still is, considered and

treated by the Ministry of the Environment and some of its partners as a project management unit that is entirely dependent on external funding, and this has not helped to create conditions favourable to sustainability. Much of the human capacity available to the two *Directions Départementales* in marine protected area planning and management has been made available through contractual agreements with UNOPS as part of this and subsequent projects, and there is no evidence that the personnel hired with that support could be retained if project funding is discontinued.

125. *Within UNEP, the continuity and sustainability of interventions depend, to a large extent, on a smooth and effective transition from the PCDMB to ROLAC as the entity to which the Haiti Country Programme and Office are attached*. This will require the full integration of the Haiti Country Team leadership in the Programme Team at ROLAC, the transfer of some of the administrative functions from UNOPS and from UNEP Haiti to ROLAC, as well as improved capacity and greater familiarity with the UMOJA system among administrative personnel in Haiti. At the same time, the ability of ROLAC to provide technical and administrative supervision and support will depend on the availability of a portfolio of projects that is sufficiently large to generate the necessary overheads and administrative fees. On the technical front, the transition to ROLAC should be beneficial to the Haiti Programme, as it will place its varied expertise at its disposal.

126. *The sustainability of processes initiated in the promotion of green value chains, in agroforestry and in artisanal fisheries development will depend largely on the efforts of the project's civil society partners*. "Civil society organisations are better at continuity, they understand needs, they are really the only ones outside of the project logic", says a member of the UNEP country team at the time, and it is obvious that UNEP's partners in the South have strong capacities. They do however need continued support, their activities in the field require project funding, and such project funding is usually insufficient to cover core costs. Projects executed by UNEP during Phase 4 of CSI have engaged the same partners for similar activities, and the interventions were therefore continued for approximately three years, but there is no certainty that these organisations will have the capacity to sustain these activities beyond the closure of the two projects currently being implemented.

127. *With respect to its work on waste management and sanitation, the project has equipped the city and Municipality of Les Cayes with a comprehensive plan, but the conditions for implementation do not exist*. The *Plan de gestion et de valorisation des déchets pour la ville des Cayes* (Urbaconsulting - Hydroconseil – CGS 2018) was finalised towards the end of the MGS1 project, thanks to the additional support provided by the Government of Norway when the project was revised in December 2017. This is obviously an excellent plan that has benefited from the right expertise and that is somewhat unique in Haiti, but the financial and technical resources required to implement it are lacking.

Rating for Sustainability: U

- **Socio-political sustainability: L**
- **Financial sustainability: ML**
- **Institutional sustainability: U**

I. Equity, Factors Affecting Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues

128. *If some of the ultimate purposes of sustainable development initiatives are to redress inequities and to enhance the rights and livelihoods of vulnerable people and communities, this project has certainly contributed to realising these objectives and to making development more*

equitable in the targeted areas and communities. Most of the activities conducted under component 2 were all directed towards the enhancement of the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable households and, by working with organisations that are well grounded and legitimate, such as the FNGA, ORE and PADI, the project was able to reach localities and communities where the project could make a difference in the lives of people. Also, there is no evidence that the rights of the traditional users of the existing and proposed protected areas have been or would be curtailed by the project's conservation and management initiatives, and one of the approaches used by the project was to identify and promote forms of resource use that would be more sustainable than existing ones (and at least equally beneficial to resource users). For example, in the mangroves of the Pointe Abacou protected area that are threatened by charcoal production, the project has promoted apiculture, with obvious success. In the fisheries sector, in order to reduce the fishing effort in nearshore areas with negative impacts on coral reefs, the project has promoted the use of fish aggregating devices (FAD) and has encouraged a progressive and partial redirecting of the fishing effort from nearshore benthic species to more resilient pelagic fisheries and to deeper demersal species.

129. *One of the issues raised by some of the project participants is that of transparency in programming and decision-making, especially in relation to the selection of partners*. "We did not know what UNEP wanted to do, and we never knew how partners were selected", says one of the project participants, and this is not the only voice heard in this and previous evaluations questioning the project's partnerships and the process through which potential partners would be identified. Indeed, an analysis of civil society organisations with significant capacities and a credible track-record of achievements in natural resource management and rural development in the southwestern region of Haiti would reveal that there are other organisations – at least one, the *Fondation Macaya pour le Développement* – that could legitimately aspire to a long-term partnership with UNEP, but this evaluation has not found any evidence of that organisation engagement in project activities.

130. *Partnerships have been at the core of the business model developed and applied by UNEP in CSI*. In this project and in the other phases of CSI, UNEP has acted largely as a convener, and as a facilitator of collaborative planning and decision-making, as illustrated by the processes to formulate management plans for protected areas (Macaya Natural National Park and marine protected areas of Port Salut and Pointe Abacou), but also by the Tables Vertes organised by the CIAT, with support from this project. This convening role is important, as it promotes collaboration, and as it has allowed UNEP to advocate for, and support, the inclusion of civil society in processes and management arrangements and sometimes "even telling the government what it does not want to hear", to quote a member of the project team at the time of MGS1 project execution. Some of the local actors however question the fact that UNEP would simultaneously act as a facilitator, as a source of technical assistance to national institutions, and an implementor with access to donor funding, with one partner noting that "no one can be on both sides of the fence at the same time[27]". Partnerships have also been at the core of the approach to project execution, with long-term collaboration with competent and legitimate civil society organisations with relevant capacities and experience. With respect to government agencies, the project – and indeed the entire Côte Sud initiative – obviously made the right choices by working with the relevant agencies, in this instance the CIAT, the Ministry of the Environment and the

[27] The original quote in French is: "*on ne peut pas être juge et partie en même temps*".

MANRDR, and by doing so through the decentralised *Directions* in the case of the two ministries. One weakness however resides in the fact that the ANAP was only marginally involved, at least at the initial stages, in the processes to develop the management plans for the protected areas, it is only recently that UNEP and ANAP developed a "*protocole de collaboration*".

131. *While there is no written evidence available to this evaluation in this regard, interviews with UNEP personnel and other stakeholders indicate that the risk of corruption was deliberately considered in project management and implementation, and that there were no instances where actual cases corruption were suspected or identified*. At the 2017 annual review meeting between Norway and UNEP, the Norwegian delegation mentioned the need to document corruption, and indicated that a Norwegian template would be shared and used. This evaluation has however not been able to locate such a template, and there is no evidence that it was shared with, or used by, the MGS1 project team. Colleagues however indicate that they were conscious of the need to prevent corruption, and that this risk was managed by:

- establishing long-term partnerships with local organisations, building trust in the relationship, and ensuring, as part of the due diligence process and during project execution, that these partners have adequate management systems;
- conducting regular monitoring visits to the organisation, including occasional verification of project activities on site; and
- relying on UNOPS for an assessment of the quality and completeness of financial reporting by the partner.

132. *The evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that the project was sensitive, in both design and implementation, to the gender dimension of the issues being addressed and of the its own interventions, but that it has not done enough to measure and document its performance in this regard*. The project document indicates that the project would: (a) involve women in job creation, income generating activities and associated business training; (b) ensure the effective participation of women in decisions making processes via formal membership in local structures, and (c) requesting partners to disaggregate data by sex in their project reporting processes. In effect, the project took the gender dimension into account in a number of its interventions. For example, the project supported six organisations of women producers, and it ensured that there was gender parity in the membership of local protected area committees. At the 2017 annual review meeting between Norway and UNEP, the donor however noted that more attention was needed in reporting about the gender mainstreaming aspects of the project. In response, the UNEP team indicated that this was being discussed internally and that it would be enhanced in future contracts with local partners. At that meeting, it was further recognised by all participants that gender aspects are well integrated into the project, but that the communications around this work is lacking.

133. *One of the factors responsible for this project's good performance has been the sustained commitment of the Government of Norway, and the quality of the inputs made by its representatives*. Indeed, one of the members of the project team refers to the Government of Norway as "a loyal core partner", and this partnership goes well beyond funding. As illustrated by the two examples provided above (documenting and reporting on gender sensitivity, and being vigilant on corruption), the Norwegian representatives have made quality inputs into project programming and governance, they have developed good working relationship with a range of project partners, and they have contributed to the shaping and evolution of the long-term vision pursued by this and other projects in Haiti's southwestern region. At the same time, Norway has consistently ensured that this project would contribute optimally to the objectives of its larger,

134. *In this and the other projects that it has executed in Haiti in the past decade, UNEP has demonstrated its ability to adapt to and cope with external challenges and to ensure that work could be implemented as planned, even in the most challenging of circumstances*. One very significant event that impacted on the project and the project area was Hurricane Matthew, which devastated the southwestern region of Haiti in October 2016. "They played the role of early responders", says one of the project partners, highlighting the quality and usefulness of UNEP's engagement in post-hurricane support. "Geneva did not respond after Matthew", says a member of the project team, "they did not send the right support", but the UNEP team on the ground acted quickly. From its basis in Port Salut, it responded primarily by assisting, in collaboration with Oxfam, with the distribution of potable water and hygiene kits, as part of an effort to prevent the spread of cholera. UNEP provided logistical support to this initiative, with its vehicles, its intimate knowledge of the terrain, and the contact already established with communities within and around Parc Macaya, thereby demonstrating the value of having well-grounded partners who could assess the needs and act quickly. There were of course impacts on project activities and outputs, with lost seedlings in cacao nurseries and similar impacts, but not to a scale that could derail the project or substantially delay its execution. Soon after the passage of the storm, field surveys of coral reefs were done by ReefCheck to assess damage in and around the proposed MPA of Port Salut – Pointe Abacou. Although it was not done for the proposed protected area at La Cahouanne, and 150,000 mangrove seedlings were planted in the Pointe Abacou area where mangrove trees were affected by the high winds. One of the project's – and the overall Country Office's – strategic responses to the devastation of Hurricane Matthew was an increased effort towards to promotion of economic activities, and this is reflected in the project revision of 2017, with the inclusion of an initiative to support cacao production in the South.

Rating for Equity, Factors Affecting Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues: S

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

135. *The overall picture that emerges from this assessment is one of a project that was part of a Country Programme that had progressively become larger and more complex than what the Country Office could reasonably manage, implemented in a challenging political and institutional context, with senior management positions that remained vacant or inadequately filled for long periods, with blurred boundaries between projects, with projects often running behind schedules (requiring no-cost extensions, typically with personnel costs covered, in part or in full, by another project during such extensions), with management systems and procedures unsuited to the tasks performed, and yet with significant achievements on the ground, thanks to a dedicated and competent (and usually overloaded and overworked) team of technical personnel and local civil society partners.* This is a picture that reinforces the conclusion that the model may not be sustainable and not entirely suitable, and that UNEP needs to define and adopt a new model for its engagement in Haiti, a model that builds on the achievements but that is more efficient than the current arrangement and that is more consistent with the mission, mandate, systems and capacities of a UN organisation.

136. *With this project, the work of UNEP in Haiti lost some of the strategic coherence that characterised its early stages of implementation.* In its Phase 2, CSI had a clear and robust structure, with roles assigned to various UN organisations, and with UNEP focusing on three main areas of work (governance and regional planning, ecosystem and watershed management, and energy) organised around four projects (*Gouvernance Sud, Mer Sud, Terre Sud* and *Énergie Sud*). With the expansion of work in green value chains and sustainable agriculture, with new activities in waste management and with more engagement in field activities and operational support to protected area management, UNEP broadened the scope of its work with the inclusion of new activities and new forms of intervention that were certainly all pertinent, but that weakened the coherence of the work programme, as well as the perception of that coherence among other actors. Indeed, because of this broadening and because of the departure from the original structure, but also possibly because of the way the projects were managed and the way communication was handled, some of the original clarity was lost: “we did not know what UNEP wanted to do”, says one of the partners, while another one laments that “there was very little transparency”.

137. *With this and the other projects implemented in the South of Haiti over the past decade, UNEP has built a unique and valuable capital of experiences, competencies, partnerships and methodologies, and its future role, programming and mode of operation in Haiti should make optimal use of this important capital.* As UNEP is reviewing its delivery model globally, this project – as indeed UNEP’s entire portfolio of projects in Haiti – illustrates the reasons why such a review remains relevant and timely, but it also provides lessons that can be useful to the global review and that should guide the design of UNEP’s future engagement in this country. This and other evaluations have noted significant weaknesses in the approaches used and in delivery mechanisms and procedures, projects have not always produced expected outcomes and outputs, UNEP is putting into question its role in project execution in regions and countries, but all this should not obscure the relevance of the original vision of CSI, the many achievements of the various projects and the unique role UNEP can play, in complement and in support to its normative functions.

138. *While this is clearly beyond the scope of this evaluation, as it focuses on a project that ended over 2 years ago, programming and management decisions regarding the legacy and the*

future of UNEP's work in Haiti must be informed, in part, by the lessons from this project, and from all the other projects that UNEP has been involved in in that country since 2008. This discussion must take place at several levels, providing answers to the following questions:

- UNEP Country Programme: what should be UNEP's role and functions? how can the model be made financially viable? how can results be upscaled and the number of beneficiaries drastically increased? how can synergies between local action and national-level normative work be enhanced?
- ROLAC: with a transition of the oversight function to ROLAC, how could the resources and capacities of that regional office contribute optimally to the work done in Haiti, and how could this association with ROLAC contribute to a greater integration of Haitian institutions, programmes in regional processes?
- other UN agencies in Haiti: how could partnerships between UNEP and other UN agencies be sustained and enhanced? how could UNEP facilitate environmental mainstreaming in the programming and operations of other UN agencies?
- UNEP personnel: how could the competencies built within the UNEP team be made at the disposal of continued work in Haiti, in ways that are fair to the past and current members of the UNEP team?
- UNEP's execution partners: what could and should be the role of the civil society actors that have been at the centre of project execution, and how can this role be sustained?

139. *Indeed, this and the other projects implemented by UNEP in Haiti have benefited from strong, well-grounded, long-term local partnerships, and there is a need to strengthen them further and to help the civil society partners to become less dependent on occasional project funding*. "We let them lead, even if we were funding them", says one of the members of the project team at the time, and this has certainly been a significant factor of quality and stability, as the partners were effectively part of programming. Thanks to their long-term partnership with UNEP, these organisations have also been able to implement major programmes in their respective areas of interest. In this way, funding from the Government of Norway has contributed to building civil society capacity in the South of Haiti and beyond, as the reach of organisations such as AYITIKA, ReefCheck and PADI goes well beyond the *Grand Sud*. These organisations have proven to be effective executors of project activities, but the funding they receive through grant agreements are specifically geared towards these activities, and it is extremely difficult for a civil society organisation in Haiti to generate revenue from its development activities and to access core funding. Yet, unrestricted resources are needed to cover core costs such as governance, administration and accountability.

140. *While the original vision of HRI and CSI was to engage all relevant UN agencies and to provide a platform for synergies and cooperation, the period of implementation of the MGS1 project was marked by the absence, or at least the weakness, of such linkages*. One of the members of the UNEP team at the time this project was being implemented refers to the "difficulty of getting the other UN agencies mobilised". It should however be noted that efforts have since been made, and are currently being made, to establish operational agreements with other UN agencies, notably the World Food Programme (WFP) and the FAO, with encouraging responses and outcomes.

141. *This project, like most of the other projects executed by and with UNEP in the South of Haiti, was expected to establish linkages with a number of relevant regional frameworks in the Caribbean, but it has achieved very little in this regard*. The ProDoc specifically mentions the Caribbean Biological Corridor (CBC), the Convention for the Protection and Development of

the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention), its Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW), as well as the Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP) and the various regional projects implemented under its auspices as well as those of other UN bodies (especially regional projects funded by the GEF). Specific areas of collaboration were also envisaged with ROLAC, notably with the expectation that "ROLAC [would] also ensure visibility and advocacy for Haiti's move towards ecological approach and its increasing consideration for marine management, which is of regional biodiversity relevance". In effect, regional exchanges have been very few, but the rationale for a greater integration of Haiti in regional processes in the field of sustainable development remains as strong today as it was when this project was designed. It is therefore not surprising to hear one UNEP colleague referring to "the isolation of the Haiti Country Programme", but this project has done very little to combat this isolation.

142. *The protected area planning processes piloted by this project have been rigorous and scientifically sound, but they have paid insufficient attention to governance arrangements, and they have not created the conditions required for implementation.* Several participants and observers comment that these processes have taken a very long time (for example, work on the formulation of the management plan of the Port Salut and Pointe Abacou marine protected areas, which began in 2015, is only now nearing completion, six years later) and that they typically provide detailed plans for management interventions, but they have not yet defined the roles of the various actors in implementation. This is actually why the UGP Macaya had to embark, in 2018, on the formulation of a *Charte de Gouvernance* (Governance Charter) for the MNNP, because the management plan that had been formulated was almost silent on the allocation of roles and responsibilities for management, and on the instruments of governance.

143. *The form, scope and level of stakeholder engagement, especially with respect to protected area planning and management, have been insufficient to generate local buy-in and to create the conditions required for the sustainability of interventions*. Valuable efforts have been made to consult and engage local communities and households in project activities, but one of the weaknesses noted by project participants and partners in relation to the MNNP, to the marine protected areas, and to the Grotte Marie-Jeanne is precisely the lack of involvement of local government entities in the planning process and in the formulation of management decisions, when these entities have a central role to play in follow-up implementation, enforcement and sustainability.

144. *Key Strategic Questions*. At inception stage, this evaluation identified five strategic questions (see paragraph 37) which have been addressed in various sections of this report. The table below provides a summarised response to each question, with cross-references to the relevant sections of the report.

Table 17: Summary of responses to strategic questions

1) In what ways, and to what extent, has the project performed well in terms of the evaluation criterion Coherence (defined by OECD-DAC as: the compatibility of the	This evaluation has rated this project's strategic relevance as Highly Satisfactory, because of its alignment to Donor strategic priorities and to its relevance to regional, sub-regional and national environmental priorities. The project also complemented well other existing interventions. See section V.A.

intervention with other interventions[28] in a country, sector or institution)	
2) What lessons can be learned, or recommendations made, to ensure that the remainder of Macaya Grand Sud Phase II and the proposed Phase III, reach their optimal performance levels?	All lessons learnt (see section 0) and recommendations made (see section VI.D) in this evaluation are relevant to the ongoing MGS2 project and to successor projects and programmes. Recommendation #1 is seen as particularly critical here, as an integrated monitoring, evaluation and learning framework would allow for a more in-depth assessment of impact and performance.
3) What evidence exists, if any, to suggest that the project has generated benefits within the broader communities and at a landscape level rather than among only the direct beneficiaries and targeted areas of the project? If a wider effect is evidenced, what factors have contributed to this?	This evaluation did not find evidence of impacts beyond the direct beneficiaries and specific sites and areas targeted by the project. This does not mean that the project did not generate benefits at the larger scale, but the absence of a baseline (see sections 10 and 118) makes it impossible to conduct such an assessment. This strategic question however remains critical, and it would be useful to address it in future evaluations, for example by conducting case studies (with reconstructed baselines) at landscape, watershed or community levels.
4) Given the importance of ownership by, and leadership from, local communities for the effectiveness of the project and the sustainability of its benefits, what evidence exists, if any, to support the view that the relationship with the local population and authorities has evolved over time? If strong community engagement is evidenced, what factors have contributed to this?	This evaluation shows that local stakeholders have been engaged in the planning processes related to the marine protected areas, and that this has resulted in improved management of resources, as in the case of mangrove forests. Yet, while community engagement may not be qualified as "strong", it has been significant in many instances, and a primary factor has been the role played by well-grounded and legitimate partners. organisations that have long-term engagements at community level and an intimate knowledge of local actors and issues (see section 139).
5) What adjustments, if any, were made to the project as a direct consequence of	This project was implemented before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the

[28] 'Other' interventions should be identified as those implemented either by UNEP or other organisations that target the same beneficiaries and are working towards similar (or interdependent) results.

challenges in the Haiti context (including the COVID-19 situation in relation to the ongoing second phase of the MGS project). To what extent did any adjustments allow the project to effectively respond to the new priorities that emerged in relation to key challenges/COVID-19? How did any adjustments affect the achievement of the project's expected results, as stated in its original results framework?	UNEP Country Office and the project team have demonstrated (see sections 121 and 134) their ability to adapt to and operate effectively in a difficult context, and to respond to challenges, as in the case of the positive role played in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew.

B. Summary of project findings and ratings

145. The table below provides a summary of the ratings and finding discussed in Chapter V. Overall, the project demonstrates a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** because it was highly relevant and produced a large number of outputs, in collaboration with a number of co-execution partners, but it did not deliver its expected outcomes and the likelihood of sustainability is limited.

Table 18: Summary of project findings and ratings

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
Strategic Relevance	**The project was highly relevant to local needs, opportunities and priorities, and it was well aligned to relevant national, regional and global policies and strategies, including UNEP's own MTS and PoW**	**S**
1. Alignment to UNEP MTS and POW	The project is aligned to the MTS and the PoW, although its design did not refer to the sub-programme on resilience to disasters and conflicts	S
2. Alignment to Donor strategic priorities	The project is fully aligned to the donor's priority, which sees it as a flagship project in a priority country for development cooperation where the Government of Norway has been a key development partner since the devastating earthquake of January 2010.	HS
3. Relevance to regional, sub-regional and national environmental priorities	The project was highly relevant to the needs and priorities of the Grand Sud region and of that region's communities and ecosystems, and it contributed to all relevant national policies as well as regional and international agreements	S
4. Complementarity with existing interventions	The project was built on UNEP interventions that were being implemented at the time of project design, with full complementarity, but the complementarity of the activities added at the time of project revision in December 2017 is more questionable	S
Quality of Project Design	**The assessment of Project Design Quality conducted at inception stage resulted in a satisfactory rating of 4.4.**	**S**

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
Nature of External Context	**The context in which the project was executed was moderately unfavourable because it presented a number of challenges: political instability, insecurity, institutional weaknesses and the devastation of a major hurricane in 2016. These factors were however well mitigated thanks to the project team's in-depth knowledge and understanding of local realities and its ability to cope with the disruptions caused by the natural disaster**	**MU**
Effectiveness	**The overall effectiveness is assessed as Moderately Satisfactory because the project produced many of its expected outputs, especially under Component / Outcome 2, but the project did not achieve most of what it intended to deliver under Outcomes 1 and 3**	**MU**
1. Availability of outputs	Most of the outputs expected under outcome/component 2 have been delivered, but the majority of the other expected outputs is not available	MS
2. Achievement of project outcomes	The outcomes as expressed in the ProDoc were somewhat ambitious and difficult to measure, and they have not been achieved.	MU
3. Likelihood of impact	Generally, the likelihood of impact is low	MU
Financial Management	**Financial management by the Haiti Country Office, UNON, CMB and UNOPS is highly satisfactory**	**HS**
1. Adherence to UNEP's financial policies and procedures	The project has fully adhered to UNEP's financial policies and procedures	S
2. Completeness of project financial information	The documentation provided to this evaluation indicates that project financial information is complete	HS
3. Communication between finance and project management staff	Interviews carried out for the purpose of this evaluation indicate that communication between finance and project management staff has been effective and efficient	HS
Efficiency	**While financial management has been satisfactory, some of the procedures have resulted in reduced efficiency, notably with delays in fund transfers and resulting impacts on the ability of the project and its partners to deliver outputs within agreed time frames**	**MS**
Monitoring and Reporting		**S**
1. Monitoring design and budgeting	Monitoring design as per the ProDoc was complete and adequate, but there were significant weaknesses in the design of the logical framework and in the selection of its indicators, and the lack of baseline data made monitoring of targets and indicators difficult. The budget available allowed the UNEP Country Office to strengthen significantly its M&E capacity and systems	MS
2. Monitoring of project implementation	Monitoring of project implementation was satisfactory, especially as this project helped the UNEP Haiti Country Office to design and introduce a robust system to monitor its activities and outputs, and as this system was actually extended to the entire portfolio of projects executed by UNEP in the South of Haiti,	S
3. Reporting on project implementation	Reporting was good, but the formats and coverage of the reports produced did not always make it possible to distinguish activities, inputs and outputs between the various projects implemented concurrently	S

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
Sustainability	**External factors make the sustainability of project interventions unlikely**	**U**
1. Socio-political sustainability	It is highly unlikely that the socio-political context will improve substantially, but the sustainability of project outcomes has a low degree of dependency on social/political factors, there is local commitment to sustaining interventions and outcomes, and the UNEP Country Office has demonstrated its capacity to adapt to changes	L
2. Financial sustainability	Financial sustainability is moderately likely, thanks in part to the long-term commitment of the Government of Norway and to the involvement of other development partners in the same sectors and geographic area	ML
3. Institutional sustainability	The key institutions upon which the sustainability of interventions depends are generally weak	U
Factors Affecting Performance	**Taken together, the factors mentioned here contributed positively to project implementation and to performance**	**S**
1. Preparation and readiness	The project was part of an ongoing initiative and the majority of its activities built on earlier work, with adequate preparation. With an office already functioning on-site and with established partnerships with execution partners, UNEP was ready to implement this project once it started	S
2. Quality of project management and supervision	Evidence gathered for this evaluation indicates that the project and its activities were well managed and properly supervised, although there was a short period during which the type of supervision required for a project of this kind and for the local conditions was not available	S
3. Stakeholders' participation and cooperation	The project was built on and enhanced a large number of valuable partnerships, with good cooperation, but in some instances the extent of participation was limited, with limited impact on the quality and applicability of outputs of planning processes and on the sustainability of interventions	MS
4. Responsiveness to social justice, human rights and gender equity	The evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that the project was sensitive, in both design and implementation, to equity issues and to the gender dimension of the issues being addressed and its own interventions, but that it has not done enough to measure and document its performance in this regard	S
5. Environmental, social and economic safeguards	Due diligence exercises conducted prior to the contracting of partners have guaranteed compliance with safeguards	S
6. Country ownership and driven-ness	This has been generally satisfactory.	S
7. Communication and public awareness	A number of quality communication activities have been conducted, including some targeted at the communities potentially impacted by development interventions.	S
Overall Project Performance Rating		**MS**

C. Lessons learnt

Lesson Learnt #1	**It is important to formulate and use methodologies and instruments that are adapted to local realities and meet local needs**
Context/comment	The project has applied very rigorous methodologies for protected area planning that reflect the best practice available in the Caribbean region, but the approaches and methods used were not always suited to local realities, because they paid insufficient attention to governance and institutional arrangements, and they resulted in the formulation of management programmes and actions that could not be effectively implemented.

Lesson Learnt #2:	**Land use and protected area management planning require consultation and participation of all relevant stakeholders, including those who are likely to benefit from, or be affected by, the new management regimes**
Context/comment:	This is a lesson that all planners and managers should have learned a long time ago, but it was not fully applied in this instance, and several of the weaknesses and shortcomings of this project can be linked to this fact. As noted by the terminal evaluation of the project Sustainable Land Management of the Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti" "the development of the MNNP Management Plan would have benefited from a participatory approach with local communities in order to develop a sense of ownership in the local communities. Local communities were not involved in this process." On the other hand, it is clear that the only tangible impacts of planning and management activities in the Port Salut – Pointe Abacou Marine Protected Area can be traced back to the effort made by the project team to consult and engage the local community.

Lesson Learnt #3:	**The effective establishment and operation of a network of protected areas require effective networking activities and systems, with an adequate institutional arrangement, and must be based on a clear ecological and institutional rationale for networking**
Context/comment:	In institutions and circles involved in protected areas, there is a tendency to envisage and work towards the establishment of networks of protected areas, but the declaration and

	establishment of several protected areas in a given geographic region does not automatically result in the creation of a network. First, there must an ecological basis for linking the protected areas (and that link certainly exists among all the terrestrial, coastal and marine protected areas in the south of Haiti), and there must be functional cooperation in specific areas of protected area planning and management, for example with the sharing of human and technical resources, with joint monitoring protocols and programmes, with collaborative public awareness initiatives, and with a common brand.

D. Recommendations

Recommendation #1:	**Develop a new country strategy that defines a new role for UNEP. The strategy should incorporate the key lessons from this and previous, project evaluations of work in Haiti, and it should pursue the original idea of facilitating collaboration among UN agencies. The strategy should also provide an integrated framework for monitoring, evaluation and learning that can be applied to specific projects and programmes.**
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	There is a clear demand among partners for UNEP to remain involved in regional planning, protected area planning and management, and green value chains in the South of Haiti. Building on the capital of partnerships, knowledge and action accumulated over a decade, UNEP's role should be one of support (*accompagnement*) to national and local actors, in government, in civil society and in the private sector (cooperatives, small and micro enterprises). The new strategy should be consistent with the recently formulated integrated strategic framework for Haiti, known as the "One United Nations plan", aimed at focusing UN efforts on support to Haitian institutions to ensure they are better equipped to tackle challenges to peace, stability and development and to deliver on the commitments of the 2030 Agenda. In the design of specific elements of this new strategy, UNEP should: (a) ensure that all stakeholders are effectively engaged in the planning processes, (b) give early attention to the design of a suitable governance and institutional arrangements, and (c) be realistic in the formulation of management programmes, actions and investments. In the design and implementation of this strategy, UNEP should also actively pursue the original idea of facilitating collaboration among UN agencies and helping to mainstream the environmental dimension into the programming and practices of

	other UN agencies. Actors and observers indeed note the importance of donor coordination, at both national and decentralised levels, and see a clear role for UNEP in this regard. The original ambition of CSI to bring together UN agencies and provide them with a common platform to which each agency can contribute according to its mandate and areas of expertise remains entirely valid and relevant today. The programmes and activities of UN agencies all have an environmental dimension, all need to ensure that potentially negative environmental impacts are avoided and mitigated, and all have the potential to embrace objectives related to environmental sustainability and quality. With the expertise at its disposal, especially within the Country team and in ROLAC, UNEP has much to offer to other UN agencies, to help them mainstream the environment in their programming and operations.
Priority Level:	Important
Type of Recommendation:	Project level
Responsibility:	UNEP Country Office, in collaboration with partners.
Proposed implementation time-frame:	Immediate and on-going, with lessons from this and other evaluations and self-assessments applied in the design and implementation of the strategy and of future programmes and projects.

Cross-reference to rationale and supporting discussions: paragraphs 93, 135 and 136 provide some of the rationale and background in support of this recommendation

Recommendation #2:	**Take advantage of the Haiti Country Programme's and Office's transition to oversight by the UNEP Regional Office to build and strengthen linkages between institutions, programmes and professionals in Haiti and in the rest of the region, reflected in a position paper and in concept note and full proposals for regional projects.**
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	There are many benefits to be gained from increased cooperation between Haiti and the rest of the region, and from greater integration of Haitian institutions, programmes and professionals into relevant regional processes. With its repositioning within the regional structure, the Haiti Office can play a useful facilitating role by identifying opportunities for enhanced cooperation within its own programme and projects, while ROLAC and other UNEP offices in the region can do the same with regional initiatives.

Priority Level:	*Important*: the purpose of this recommendation is not to address a specific problem or deficiency, but to take advantage of an opportunity that could add value to what will be done in the future.
Type of Recommendation:	Project level
Responsibility:	ROLAC and Country Office, in consultation with and with support from CAR/RCU.
Proposed implementation time-frame:	This is not urgent, but it should be initiated soon after the transition to ROLAC is complete (end of 2021?), and it should be a gradual process linked to the schedule of project design in Haiti and to ROLAC's own calendar of events and activities.

Cross-reference to rationale and supporting discussions: Section 141 provides the rationale for this recommendation.

Recommendation #3:	**Develop and make publicly available an explicit strategy for engagement of and provision of support of civil society partners, in Haiti for the purpose of building their capacity and enhancing their institutional sustainability, with clear and transparent procedures for the selection of project partners.**
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	This and the other projects implemented by UNEP in Haiti have benefited from strong, well-grounded, long-term local partnerships, and there is a need to strengthen them further and to help the civil society partners to become less dependent on occasional project funding. There is however no evidence that the process to select partners has been transparent and open. There are certainly benefits to be gained from collaborating with known entities with which a strong working relationship has been established, but there is a reputational risk in not following transparent procedures, as well as a risk that valuable expertise is not made available to the project.
Priority Level:	Critical
Type of Recommendation:	Project level
Responsibility:	UNEP, in collaboration with the FHB, the other development partners and relevant government agencies, and with the active participation of the civil society organisations.

Proposed implementation time-frame:	Immediate.

See paragraphs 93, 125, 138 and 141 for rationale and supporting discussions.

Recommendation #4:	**Review the projects executed by UNEP in Haiti between 2018 and 2021 as a portfolio of projects, looking in particular at complementarity and synergies between projects, and ensure that lessons learnt from this review are documented and applied to the design of UNEP's Country Programme and of future projects. As part of this review, identify and document the costs and benefits of the partnership between UNEP and UNOPS in Haiti, and formulate recommendations regarding the future of this partnership.**
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	During the implementation of the MGS1 project, two project proposals were developed, one submitted to the AFD and the other to the GEF. The MGS1 was extended by 12 months until December 2018, and these two other projects were initiated before the end of MGS1. This means that there was a period of time during which the three projects were running concurrently, and a review of the ProDoc for the AFD-funded and GEF-funded projects as well as the report on the mid-term review of the GEF-funded project (Renard 2020) suggest that the three projects included similar outputs and that there would be several instances of co-financing of specific activities. It would therefore be useful to examine the three projects as a coherent ensemble, to document and learn lessons from complementarities and synergies, and to identify and explain possible overlaps.
Priority Level:	Important.
Type of Recommendation:	UNEP-wide
Responsibility:	UNEP Evaluation Office and UNEP Country Representative.
Proposed implementation time-frame:	To be determined on the basis of planned dates for terminal evaluations of MGS2 and of current AFD-funded and GEF-funded projects.

See paragraphs 49, 71 and 108 for rationale and supporting discussions.

Recommendation #5:	**Produce a short brochure for internal, online use by UNEP with descriptive detail on the ways in which gender and equity dimensions have been incorporated in this, and if relevant other, UNEP projects in Haiti.**
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	The evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that the project was sensitive, in both design and implementation, to the gender dimension of the issues being addressed and of the its own interventions, but that it has not done enough to measure and document its performance in this regard.
Priority Level:	Important.
Responsibility:	UNEP Project Team
Proposed implementation time-frame:	Within 6 months of the completion of the Recommendations Implementation Plan.

See paragraph 132 for rationale and supporting discussions.

ANNEX I. RESPONSE TO STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Table 19: Response to stakeholder comments received but not (fully) accepted by the reviewers, where appropriate

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response	UNEP Evaluation Office Response
p. 7 "A successor project (Macaya Grand Sud 2 – MGS2) began before the completion of MGS1",	MGS 2 began in January 2019, so it did not begin before the completion of MGS1, although it might have begun before financial closure of MGS1.	The documentation reviewed by the evaluator indicates that the MGS2 project started in 2018, before the completion of MGS1, including the following: the PRODOC (approved 24 October 2018); the Specific Agreement between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNEP (signed in December 2017, with expected project starting date of January 2018); and the UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement between UNEP and UNOPS (signed November 2018, with "Activities Start Date at 01 December 2018", and with first payment of USD 1,000,800 to UNOPS made in November 2018). The transition between MGS1 and MGS2 as well as the conditions and exact timing of the initiation of MGS2 certainly deserve to be examined and documented, but this is beyond the scope of the TE of MGS1.	Evaluator's response accepted.
p. 11. "to focus on waste management",	To specify: To focus on a waste management plan for the City of Les Cayes	Comment accepted, with thanks, and correction made.	Evaluator's response accepted.
P. 35 « with a range of programmes and activities that are well beyond the capacities of the local institutions."	The local institutions have very little, if no capacities at all. Therefore, one of the objectives of the management plan is to raise financing to implement the programmes	The text quoted refers specifically to the management plan for the Macaya National Nature Park, and there is no evidence that this management plan, which was produced in 2015, has been used specifically for fundraising. Even with increased funding, the observation quoted here remains valid, as the	Evaluator's response accepted.

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response	UNEP Evaluation Office Response
		capacity issues do not relate specifically or primarily to funding, but to other areas such as scientific and technical expertise, field presence, equipment and infrastructure and partnerships. Most of these capacities could not be acquired simply through project funding.	
p. 35 "the methodology developed by the project was not validated and appropriated by ANAP"	There were challenges in working with ANAP during MGS1, from what I have been told. Very little if no reactivity from ANAP. Conflicts between ANAP, UGP Macaya and MDE/DDS. I assume this was highlighted during the interviews? These problems have been resolved, as ANAP is actively involved in the finalization of the PSPA, La Cahouane and Ile-à-Vache management plans.	The section quoted is actually a quote extracted from one of the interviews with the member of the UNEP project team most directly involved in protected area management planning during MGS1 and MGS2. This evaluation has indeed heard mention of tensions (rather than conflicts) between some of the institutions named here, but an examination of the nature and causes of these tensions would not be relevant to the TE of MGS1. The increased involvement of ANAP in planning processes supported by UNEP is already noted elsewhere in the report, and this is indeed a positive development (but one that took place after the completion of MGS1).	Evaluator's response accepted.
"The project's approach to the promotion of sustainable livelihoods was entirely relevant to local realities and needs, but there is only anecdotal, site-specific evidence that the strengthening and expansion of sustainable environmental management practices for socioeconomic purposes promoted outside protected areas do contribute to	There is a lack of baseline assessment data and updated data from monitoring that makes it difficult to assess the actual benefits of the alternative livelihoods that were introduced on the protected areas. Also, to achieve a critical volume of production on any value chain requires a longer timeframe than the duration of the MGS1 project. This is why both MGS2 and GEF Cote Sud supported the results of MGS1.	The lack of baseline data is indeed an important point, which is now noted in the revised version of the report. The availability of baseline data, while critical for monitoring and impact assessment, would however not suffice to provide "evidence that the strengthening and expansion of sustainable environmental management practices for socioeconomic purposes promoted outside protected areas do	Evaluator's response accepted.

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response	UNEP Evaluation Office Response
the effective management of protected areas."		contribute to the effective management of protected areas.". The challenge here is not measurement, it is attribution: e.g. have we witnessed changes in behaviour and resource use patterns within a particular protected area, and, if so, can these changes be attributed to (i.e. are they the direct results of) livelihood enhancement and the promotions of sustainable environmental management practices outside that protected area?	
'They resulted in the formulation of management programs and actions that could not be effectively implemented"	Same comment as above: one of the objectives of the management plan is to raise financing to implement the programmes	See response above.	
p. 65 "It would therefore be useful to examine the three projects as a coherent ensemble, to document and learn lessons from complementarities and synergies and to identify and explain possible overlap"	A joint evaluation of the 3 projects : MGS2, GEF Côte Sud and AFD "Filières Vertes" has been suggested to the Evaluation office and is being considered.	This is good. Please note however that the recommendation is to review these projects as "a coherent ensemble", i.e. this should not consist simply of three concurrent evaluations, but it should examine these projects as elements of a programmatic approach. The evaluator therefore proposes that this recommendation be retained.	Evaluator's response accepted.
Paragraph 14	Bearing in mind the Executive Summary should be able to stand alone as an accurate summary of the main evaluation product, I suggest adding some text to support this conclusion	Agreed, and text added	
Section V.A.	Some statements do not help to justify the overall rating of HS for Strategic Relevance.	Agreed, the rating has been revised to S, and some language has been added to specify where weaknesses were identified with respect to relevance.	
New text proposed	Since this report will most likely come out in September or October in its final version, should it include some sort of post-scriptum about the earthquake and the storm (August)? This is suggested because these events and	A paragraph has been added at the end of the Executive Summary, as recommended by the Evaluation Office.	I would add a paragraph to the Executive Summary.

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response	UNEP Evaluation Office Response
	some of the responses highlight or amplify some of the points already made in the report, including: • the usefulness, efficiency and relevance of UNEP's ability to respond to a disaster, because of partnerships, field presence and legitimacy. In this regard, see this article • the relevance of the "Grand Sud" approach that UNEP has promoted since the start of its engagement in the South of Haiti • the need for a regional development plan (one of the weaknesses of the MGS1 project is that it did not make much progress there). There is a recent article in the Haitian media that mentions a post-disaster assessment just done by CIAT (one of UNEP's partners). This assessment notes that the villages and small towns located in higher elevations along the Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault zone were more badly hit by the earthquake (landslides, destruction of buildings) and that future planning should take this into account • the work done by UNEP in supporting rural livelihoods through meaningful partnerships with civil society and producers' organisations is made even more relevant by disasters such as these • all this serves to validate further the landscape approach that the UNEP Country Office would like to adopt in future initiatives		

ANNEX II. PEOPLE CONSULTED DURING THE EVALUATION

Table 20: People consulted during the Evaluation

Organisation	Name	Position	Gender
Ministère de l'Environnement	Nozile Clausel	Coordinator, Marine Protected Areas	M
ANAP	Prenor Coudo	Technical Director	M
MARNDR	Hugues Surfin	Coordinator	M
Konbit pou Potapiman	Jean Robert Isidor	Vice President of KPP, a community organisation in Port-à-Piment	M
CAEPA	Jean Donald	Treasurer	M
	Duclair Clausel	President	M
ORE	Joseph André Pricien	Agroforestry Specialist	M
	Claude Alecé	Nursery Manager	M
ReefCheck	Stephen Jean-Louis	Director	M
Ayitika	Julien Tisserat	Operations Director	M
Fonds Haïtien pour la Biodiversité	Jean Vilmond Hilaire	Executive Director	M
Interamerican Development Bank	Nastasia Keurmeur	Consultant Environment	F
	Géraud Albaret	Natural Resources Management Specialist	M
Agence Française de Développement	Florian Tourteau	*Chargé de projets*	M
Consultants	Francis Dubé	Consultant (waste management and energy), July 2016 to October 2018	M
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Norway	Vibeke (Pippa) G. Søegaard	Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Havana, Cuba	F
UNEP	Silja Halle	Manager UNEP-EU Climate Change and Security Programme	F
	Leo Heileman	Regional Director and Representative, Latin America and the Caribbean Office	M
	Paule Juneau	Head of the Port Salut Office	F
	Matti Lehtonen	Senior Advisor, former Head, Haiti Country Office, 2016 to January 2018	M
	Ronald Louis	Manager Haiti Sustainable Energy II (HSE2) project, formerly M&E Officer	M
	Isabel Martinez	Head, Legal Office, Corporate Services Division and former Programme Officer, ROLAC	F
	Fabien Monteils	UNEP Representative and Programme Manager, Haiti Country Office (since September 2019)	M
	Andrew Morton	Energy and Engineering Programme Manager, CMB	M
	Dario Noel	Technical Coordinator, Haiti Country Office	M

Organisation	Name	Position	Gender
	Sergo Notus	Coordinator, Waste Management and Green Value Chains, Port Salut Office	M
	Paul Obonyo	Financial Management Officer, MGS1 project, CMB	M
	Maximilien Pardo	Former Programme Coordinator and Head of the Port au Prince Office	M
	Antonio Perera	Former UNEP Representative and Programme Manager, Haiti Country Office Consultant to MGS1 project	M
	Stefan Smith	Coordinator, Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts	M
	Adrienne Stork	Consultant, MGS1 Project Manager March 2014 to April 2017	F
	Altan Butt	Consultant, MGS1 Project Manager June 2017 to December 2018	M
	Nita Venturelli,	Administrative Assistant, CMB	F

ANNEX III. KEY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Project planning and reporting documents

Donor agreement between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNEP, July-August 2014. Addendum Number 1, November-December 2015. Addendum Number 2, no date.

PRC Report – QAS/OFO UNEP January 2015

Project document – March 2015

Project Revision – December 2017

PIMS reports: June 2015, December 2015, June 2016, December 2016, June 2017, December 2017, June 2018 and December 2018.

UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement. Operational Support to UNEP Managed Projects in Haiti Office. March 2015

Amendment Number 1 to UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement regarding the Macaya Grand Sud project. April 2017.

Norway – UN Environment annual meeting report. 29 March 2017. Port Salut, Haiti

Norway – UN Environment annual meeting. PowerPoint presentation. 29 March 2017. Port Salut, Haiti

Particip GmbH. 2014. Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake. NORAD, Evaluation Department

Project Macaya Grand Sud, status of implementation. Norway – UN Environment annual meeting. PowerPoint presentation. Matti Lehtonen. 29 March 2017. Port Salut, Haiti

Rapports de progrés / Progress reports (semi-annual):

- Rapport de Progrès, CSI T1 and T2 of 2015
- Grand Sud Sustainable Development Program, Progress Report for Q1 and Q2 2016
- Sustainable Development Programme in Haiti's Grand Sud, Progress Report Q3 & Q4 2016
- Sustainable development programme for Haiti's Grand Sud region, Progress report. Port Salut, Haiti. January - June 2017
- Programme de développement durable du Grand Sud d'Haïti. Rapport de progrès : juillet – décembre 2017 | Port Salut, Haïti
- UN Environment in Haiti Progress Report. January-June 2018
- UN Environment in Haiti –Activity Report July-December 2018

UNEP. 2015b. United Nations Environment Programme in the South of Haiti, Strategy – Achievements – Lessons Learned, 2013 – 2015 Self-Assessment and Substantive Progress Report. Norway-UNEP 2015 Annual Review

UNEP. 2019. United Nations Environment Programme in the South of Haiti, Strategy – Achievements – Lessons Learned, 2015 – 2018 Self-Assessment. Norway-UNEP 2015 Annual Review. UN Environment Haiti Country Office.

Financial statements

Interim Certified Financial Statement for the period ending 28 February 2021. Haiti MSG – 1000/32AEL – MI-32AEL-000002. Cleared by UNON Accounts Section, 11 May 2021.

Financial statement, IDB and Ministry of the Environment, CPL-5060-1121-3F05. March 2016. (MNNP management plan).

Financial statement. UNDP SNAP AEL2K71. March 2016. (MNNP management plan)

Project outputs

Brunet, Nathalie. 2016. Document de stratégie de communication pour la promotion des aires marines protégées (Port Salut – St Jean du Sud). Programme des Nations Unies pour l'Environnement, Port-au-Prince, Haïti.

Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti. 2015. Plan de Gestion, Parc National Naturel Macaya, 2015 – 2020. Ministère de l'Environnement, Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées.

Desile Destine, Horiol. 2016. Développement de Filières Vertes dans la Zone Tampon du Parc Macaya -- Propositions de Filières Stratégiques. Ministère de l'Environnement et Agenca Nationale des Aires Protégées.

UNEP. 2015. Document de stratégie : Intervention de PNUE et partenaires dans le secteur du cacao dans le Département du Sud.

UNEP 2016a. Document de stratégie : Intervention de PNUE et partenaires dans le secteur du vétiver dans le Département du Sud.

UNEP 2016b. Strategy document: Interventions by UNEP and partners in castor oil in Haiti's South Department.

Urbaconsulting - Hydroconseil – CGS. 2018. Plan de gestion et de valorisation des déchets pour la ville des Cayes. Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT).
Statut du rapport : modifié après commentaires

Previous evaluations

UN Environment Evaluation Office. 2016a. Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP projects in the Haiti Cote Sud Initiative Portfolio. Part I: Gouvernance Sud Project.

UN Environment Evaluation Office. 2016b. Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP projects in the Haiti Cote Sud Initiative Portfolio. Part II: Mer Sud and Terre Sud Projects.

Renard, Yves. 2020. Ecosystem Approach to Haiti Côte Sud. Mid-term Review.

Reference and strategy documents – UN and UNEP

Busby, Joshua and Wolfgang Weiszegger. 2020. Independent Review of UNEP engagement on conflict- and disaster-affected states. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum.

Carbon, Michael and Tiina Piiroinen. 2012. Evaluation of the UNEP Sub-Programme on Disasters and Conflicts. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.

Security Council. 11 February 2021. United Nations Integrated Office for Haiti – Report of the Secretary-General.

UNEP. 2013. UNEP Haiti Country Programme. 2013 – 2017 Strategy.

UNEP. 2014. Biennial programme of work for 2016–2017.

UNEP. 2015a. Medium Term Strategy 2014 – 2017. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya

UNEP. 2016. Medium Term Strategy 2018 – 2021. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya

UNEP. 2016b. Programme of work and budget for the biennium 2018-2019. United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations Environment Programme. Report of the Executive Director.

UNEP. May 2016. Strengthened UNEP Strategic Regional Presence: Contributing to The Future We Want. Operational Guidance Note.

Varty, Nigel, Sarah Humphrey, Tiina Piiroinen and Michael Spilsbury. 2015. Evaluation of the UNEP Sub-Programme on Ecosystem Management. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.

Outputs, related projects and institutions

Créocéan. 2019. Révision de la méthodologie pour l'élaboration des documents de plan de gestion des aires protégées terrestres et marines en Haïti. Banque Interaméricaine de Développement.

Lejonc, Grégoire and Lucille Palazy. 2018. Final Evaluation of the Sustainable Land Management of the Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti Program. Grant Agreement GRT/FM-11803-HA & GRT/HR-13930-HAGEF –HA-X1002; GEF ID: 3132. Ministère de l'Environnement and Agence Nationale des Aires protegées. BRL Ingénierie, IDB, Norad and GEF

Reference documents – Haiti

Gouvernement de la République d'Haïti. 2012. Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti, Pays Émergent en 2030.

Le Moniteur, Journal Officiel de la République d'Haïti. 172ème année, Numéro 55-A, 7 avril 2017.

Relevant books and articles

Maertens, Lucile and Adrienne Stork, The Real Story of Haiti's Forests. Changing the narrative around deforestation and charcoal in Haiti. Books and Ideas, 9 October 2017. ISSN : 2105-3030. URL : https://booksandideas.net/The-Real-Story-of-Haiti-s-Forests.html

Annex IV. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TABLE

NON-GEF AND GEF PROJECTS			
Financial management components:		**Rating**	**Evidence/ Comments**
1. Adherence to UNEP's/GEF's policies and procedures:		**S**	
Any evidence that indicates shortcomings in the project's adherence[29] to UNEP or donor policies, procedures or rules		No	The evaluation was able to verify that UNEP's human resource management, procurement and other critical rules and procedures
2. Completeness of project financial information[30]:			
Provision of key documents to the evaluator (based on the responses to A-H below)		**HS**	
A.	Co-financing and Project Cost's tables at design (by budget lines)	Yes and N/A	Full budget provided, but co-financing not applicable
B.	Revisions to the budget	Yes	No detailed breakdown provided, but the total sums allocated to the three activities included in the revision of December 2017 were provided
C.	All relevant project legal agreements (e.g. SSFA, PCA, ICA)	Yes	All provided
D.	Proof of fund transfers	Yes	The evaluator felt that it would not be relevant to the TE to review all fund transfers, but he requested and received proof of transfers from UNEP to UNOPS, and reviewed the financial reports provided by co-execution partners
E.	Proof of co-financing (cash and in-kind)	N/A	
F.	A summary report on the project's expenditures during the life of the project (by budget lines, project components and/or annual level)	Yes	Provided in Interim Financial Statements
G.	Copies of any completed audits and management responses *(where applicable)*	N/A	No audit conducted
H.	Any other financial information that was required for this project (list):	No	
3. Communication between finance and project management staff		**HS**	

[29] If the evaluation raises concerns over adherence with policies or standard procedures, a recommendation maybe given to cover the topic in an upcoming audit, or similar financial oversight exercise.

[30] See also document 'Criterion Rating Description' for reference

NON-GEF AND GEF PROJECTS		
Financial management components:	**Rating**	**Evidence/ Comments**
Project Manager and/or Task Manager's level of awareness of the project's financial status.	High	Demonstrated by documentation provided and by responses and clarifications provided during online interviews.
Fund Management Officer's knowledge of project progress/status when disbursements are done.	High	Demonstrated by responses and clarifications provided during online interviews
Level of addressing and resolving financial management issues among Fund Management Officer and Project Manager/Task Manager.		See below. No specific issues were identified, only questions that the financial management personnel have addressed adequately
Contact/communication between by Fund Management Officer, Project Manager/Task Manager during the preparation of financial and progress reports.	High	This assessment is based on information provided by relevant personnel in interviews
Project Manager, Task Manager and Fund Management Officer responsiveness to financial requests during the evaluation process	Yes	All requests for additional financial data and documents and for responses to specific questions were answered adequately, completely and promptly, including through online interviews
Overall rating	**HS**	

Annex V. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (as presented in the Inception Report)

Criterion	Questions to be considered	Stakeholders
Relevance	Alignment with Government of Norway's strategic priorities and with its standard agreement with UNEP	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
	Relevance and contribution to the expected accomplishments of UNEP's subprogrammes on Disasters and Conflicts and Ecosystems Management	UNEP Haiti, Subprogramme managers
	Alignment with national policies and strategies and coherence with programmes and priorities of national institutions, degree of country ownership of project design and interventions	Ministry of the Environment, ANAP
	Relevance to regional policies and strategies, e.g., SPAW Protocol	UNEP ROLAC and Cartagena Convention Secretariat
	Relevance to human development and natural resource management needs and priorities in targeted region, degree of stakeholder ownership of project design and interventions	All project partners and beneficiaries
	Coherence with other development initiatives in targeted region	IDB, AFD, Ministry of the Environment
	Overall coherence of CSI, with focus on phase 2, and place of MGS1 within overall CSI	UNEP, main project partners
	Consideration of external context in project design	UNEP, main project partners
	Relevance of approaches (e.g., ecosystem-based approach) to project objectives and to local needs and priorities	UNEP, main project partners
	Relevance of UNEP's role and overall approach	UNEP, main project partners
Impact	Delivery of outcomes as per project document	UNEP, main project partners
	Likelihood of, and requirement for, impact at community, sector and landscape level	UNEP, main project partners
	Uptake and replication of project design, approaches, methods and partnerships in other initiatives	UNEP, main project partners, other funders, other agencies
	Evidence of any negative impacts (on resources, capacities, partnerships, others)	UNEP, main project partners
	Impact of project on equity, power relations and empowerment of women, girls and vulnerable groups	UNEP, main project partners, vulnerable groups
	Suitability of M&E systems and procedures, availability of baseline data, availability of reporting on outcomes, results, impacts and cross-cutting issues	Donor, UNEP Haiti Office, CMB, partners
Effectiveness	Delivery of outputs as per project document and revision	UNEP, main project partners
	Effectiveness of communications, awareness and understanding of project and its intended impact, degree of support by partners and beneficiaries	Project beneficiaries
	Effectiveness of coordination and collaboration with other agencies, synergies, exchange of expertise	UNEP Haiti Office, IDB, AFD
	Extent to which ecosystem-based approach was actually applied	UNEP, main project partners

Criterion	Questions to be considered	Stakeholders
	Are there other models and operational partnership that could have been more effective? What was, and could have been, UNEP's added value?	UNEP, main project partners
Efficiency	Roles in project management, suitability of arrangements, suitability of management systems and procedures, quality of project management and supervision	UNEP Haiti Office, CMB
	Adherence to financial and other management systems and procedures	UNEP Haiti Office, CMB
	Adherence to monitoring and evaluation systems and procedures, including reporting	UNEP Haiti Office, CMB
	Cost-effectiveness and timeliness of outputs and implementation arrangements, in design and in actual implementation	UNEP Haiti, CMB, project partners
Effectiveness & efficiency	Impact of Hurricane Matthew (2016) on project, and response of project team and partners	UNEP Haiti, project partners
	Impact of COVID-19 crisis on current project activities, analysis in relation to Haiti Office's response to and handling of other constraints and crises	UNEP Haiti Office
	Contribution of project partners to effectiveness and efficiency	UNEP Haiti, project partners
Sustainability	Inclusion of sustainability and scaling-up considerations and requirements in project design	UNEP Haiti, project partners
	Extent to which the project outcomes and outputs are politically, institutionally and financially sustainable and could be scaled-up	UNEP Haiti, MdE, ANAP, CIAT, project partners
	Extent to which MGS2 and other projects have sustained and complemented activities and outcomes of MGS1	UNEP Haiti, project partners
	Requirements for sustainability and for implementation of management plans	UNEP, MdE, ANAP, civil society partners, communities
Equity	Extent of stakeholder participation in project design and execution	UNEP, Project partners and beneficiaries
	Consideration of human rights issues in project design and execution	UNEP, Project partners and beneficiaries
	Integration of gender and other equity issues and dimensions in project design	UNEP, Project partners and beneficiaries
	Risk of corruption, degree to which risk was considered and managed, evidence available	UNEP Haiti Office and CMB

Annex VI: ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluand Title:

Macaya Grand Sud Phase I (PIMS 01870)

All UNEP evaluations are subject to a quality assessment by the Evaluation Office. This is an assessment of the quality of the evaluation product (i.e. evaluation report) and is dependent on more than just the consultant's efforts and skills.

	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Final Report Rating
Substantive Report Quality Criteria		
Quality of the Executive Summary: The Summary should be able to stand alone as an accurate summary of the main evaluation product. It should include a concise overview of the evaluation object; clear summary of the evaluation objectives and scope; overall evaluation rating of the project and key features of performance (strengths and weaknesses) against exceptional criteria (plus reference to where the evaluation ratings table can be found within the report); summary of the main findings of the exercise, including a synthesis of main conclusions (which include a summary response to key strategic evaluation questions), lessons learned and recommendations.	Final report: The Executive Summary is an accurate reflection of the report.	**5.5**
I. Introduction A brief introduction should be given identifying, where possible and relevant, the following: institutional context of the project (sub-programme, Division, regions/countries where implemented) and coverage of the evaluation; date of PRC approval and project document signature); results frameworks to which it contributes (e.g. Expected Accomplishment in POW); project duration and start/end dates; number of project phases (where appropriate); implementing partners; total secured budget and whether the project has been evaluated in the past (e.g. mid-term, part of a synthesis evaluation, evaluated by another agency etc.) Consider the extent to which the introduction includes a concise statement of the purpose of the evaluation and the key intended audience for the findings?	Final report: The introduction provides the reader with an appropriate description of the evaluand. It is supported by the Project Identification Table (table 1)	**5**
II. Evaluation Methods A data collection section should include: a description of evaluation methods and information sources used, including the number and type of respondents; justification for methods used (e.g. qualitative/ quantitative; electronic/face-to-face); any selection criteria used to identify respondents,	Final report: This section was completed prior to UNEP introducing strengthened guidance on Evaluation Methods sections. The evaluation was supported by the UNEP Evaluation Offices suite of support tools,	**4.5**

case studies or sites/countries visited; strategies used to increase stakeholder engagement and consultation; details of how data were verified (e.g. triangulation, review by stakeholders etc.). Methods to ensure that potentially excluded groups (excluded by gender, vulnerability or marginalisation) are reached and their experiences captured effectively, should be made explicit in this section. The methods used to analyse data (e.g. scoring; coding; thematic analysis etc.) should be described. It should also address evaluation limitations such as: low or imbalanced response rates across different groups; gaps in documentation; extent to which findings can be either generalised to wider evaluation questions or constraints on aggregation/disaggregation; any potential or apparent biases; language barriers and ways they were overcome. Ethics and human rights issues should be highlighted including: how anonymity and confidentiality were protected and strategies used to include the views of marginalised or potentially disadvantaged groups and/or divergent views. Is there an ethics statement?	which include a full description of each criterion, a weighted table for calculating the overall performance of the project and a matrix detailing the expectations underpinning each point of the ratings scale for each criterion. In the annexes the list of respondents provides an overview of the gender profile of this group and the evaluation framework is made available.	
III. The Project This section should include: • *Context:* Overview of the main issue that the project is trying to address, its root causes and consequences on the environment and human well-being (i.e. synopsis of the problem and situational analyses). • *Results framework*: Summary of the project's results hierarchy as stated in the ProDoc (or as officially revised) • *Stakeholders:* Description of groups of targeted stakeholders organised according to relevant common characteristics • *Project implementation structure and partners:* A description of the implementation structure with diagram and a list of key project partners • *Changes in design during implementation:* Any key events that affected the project's scope or parameters should be described in brief in chronological order • *Project financing:* Completed tables of: (a) budget at design and expenditure by components (b) planned and actual sources of funding/co-financing	Final report: All elements are presented appropriately.	**5.5**
IV. Theory of Change The *TOC at Evaluation* should be presented clearly in both diagrammatic and narrative forms. Clear articulation of each major causal pathway is expected, (starting from outputs to long term	Final report: The reconstructed TOC is presented, along with Drivers and Assumptions.	**4.5**

impact), including explanations of all drivers and assumptions as well as the expected roles of key actors. This section should include a description of how the *TOC at Evaluation*[31] was designed (who was involved etc.) and applied to the context of the project? Where the project results as stated in the project design documents (or formal revisions of the project design) are not an accurate reflection of the project's intentions or do not follow UNEP's definitions of different results levels, project results may need to be re-phrased or reformulated. In such cases, a summary of the project's results hierarchy should be presented for: a) the results as stated in the approved/revised Prodoc logframe/TOC and b) as formulated in the *TOC at Evaluation. The two results hierarchies should be presented as a two-column table to show clearly that, although wording and placement may have changed, the results 'goal posts' have not been 'moved'.*		
V. Key Findings **A. Strategic relevance:** This section should include an assessment of the project's relevance in relation to UNEP's mandate and its alignment with UNEP's policies and strategies at the time of project approval. An assessment of the complementarity of the project at design (or during inception/mobilisation[32]), with other interventions addressing the needs of the same target groups should be included. Consider the extent to which all four elements have been addressed: i. Alignment to the UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS) and Programme of Work (POW) ii. Alignment to Donor/GEF Strategic Priorities iii. Relevance to Regional, Sub-regional and National Environmental Priorities iv. Complementarity with Existing Interventions	Final report: All sub-categories are well discussed. An additional element, Technical Relevance, is also presented but not inlcuded in the rating for Strategic Relevance as it is beyond UNEP's standard scope for this criterion.	**5**
B. Quality of Project Design To what extent are the strength and weaknesses of the project design effectively summarized?	Final report: A summary of the project design's overal strength and identified weaknesses is	**4.5**

[31] During the Inception Phase of the evaluation process a *TOC at Evaluation Inception* is created based on the information contained in the approved project documents (these may include either logical framework or a TOC or narrative descriptions), formal revisions and annual reports etc. During the evaluation process this TOC is revised based on changes made during project intervention and becomes the *TOC at Evaluation*.

[32] A project's inception or mobilization period is understood as the time between project approval and first disbursement. Complementarity during project implementation is considered under Efficiency, see below.

	presented. The full assessment was presented in the Inception Report.	
C. Nature of the External Context For projects where this is appropriate, key external features of the project's implementing context that limited the project's performance (e.g. conflict, natural disaster, political upheaval[33]), and how they affected performance, should be described.	Final report: Haiti is recognised as a complex context in which to deliver development projects given the risk of natural disasters. COVID-19 affected the Terminal Evaluation by restricting the travel of the Principal Evaluator, although he was ably supported by two in-country consultants and, at the end of the Terminal Evaluation, the country was again hit by disasters.	**5**
D. Effectiveness **(i) Outputs and Project Outcomes:** How well does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of the a) availability of outputs, and b) achievement of project outcomes? How convincing is the discussion of attribution and contribution, as well as the constraints to attributing effects to the intervention. The effects of the intervention on differentiated groups, including those with specific needs due to gender, vulnerability or marginalisation, should be discussed explicitly.	Final report: Concise discussions, supported by tables, at both output and outcome levels are presented. Access to a diverse population was constrained by the COVID-19 pandemic.	**4.5**
(ii) Likelihood of Impact: How well does the report present an integrated analysis, guided by the causal pathways represented by the TOC, of all evidence relating to likelihood of impact? How well are change processes explained and the roles of key actors, as well as drivers and assumptions, explicitly discussed? Any unintended negative effects of the project should be discussed under Effectiveness, especially negative effects on disadvantaged groups.	Final report: Detailed discussion of the likelihood of future developments, although the assumptions and drivers from the reconstructed TOC are not discussed explicitly.	**4.5**
E. Financial Management This section should contain an integrated analysis of all dimensions evaluated under financial management and include a completed 'financial management' table.	Final report: All elements of financial management are well covered. Annex IV provides further detail.	**5**

[33] Note that 'political upheaval' does not include regular national election cycles, but unanticipated unrest or prolonged disruption. The potential delays or changes in political support that are often associated with the regular national election cycle should be part of the project's design and addressed through adaptive management of the project team.

Consider how well the report addresses the following: • *Adherence* to UNEP's financial policies and procedures • *completeness* of financial information, including the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used • *communication* between financial and project management staff		
F. Efficiency To what extent, and how well, does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of efficiency under the primary categories of cost-effectiveness and timeliness including: • Implications of delays and no cost extensions • Time-saving measures put in place to maximise results within the secured budget and agreed project timeframe • Discussion of making use during project implementation of/building on pre-existing institutions, agreements and partnerships, data sources, synergies and complementarities with other initiatives, programmes and projects etc. • The extent to which the management of the project minimised UNEP's environmental footprint.	Final report: Good discussion of efficiency.	**5**
G. Monitoring and Reporting How well does the report assess: • Monitoring design and budgeting *(including SMART results with measurable indicators, resources for MTE/R etc.)* • Monitoring of project implementation *(including use of monitoring data for adaptive management)* • Project reporting *(e.g. PIMS and donor reports)*	Final report: All elements of Monitoring and Reporting are covered.	**5**
H. Sustainability How well does the evaluation identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to undermine or contribute to the persistence of achieved project outcomes including: • Socio-political Sustainability • Financial Sustainability • Institutional Sustainability	Final report: Good discussion of sustainability	**5**
I. Factors Affecting Performance	Final report:	

These factors are <u>not</u> discussed in stand-alone sections but are **integrated in criteria A-H as appropriate**. Note that these are described in the Evaluation Criteria Ratings Matrix. To what extent, and how well, does the evaluation report cover the following cross-cutting themes: • Preparation and readiness • Quality of project management and supervision[34] • Stakeholder participation and co-operation • Responsiveness to human rights and gender equity • Environmental and social safeguards • Country ownership and driven-ness • Communication and public awareness	All relevant cross cutting issues are presented, albeit not under the headings suggested.	**5**
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations **i. Quality of the conclusions:** The key strategic questions should be clearly and succinctly addressed within the conclusions section. It is expected that the conclusions will highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of the project and connect them in a compelling story line. Human rights and gender dimensions of the intervention (e.g. how these dimensions were considered, addressed or impacted on) should be discussed explicitly. Conclusions, as well as lessons and recommendations, should be consistent with the evidence presented in the main body of the report.	Final report: The conclusion highlights insights gained in the major questions the evaluation sought to addressin a synthesised manner.	**6**
ii) Quality and utility of the lessons: Both positive and negative lessons are expected and duplication with recommendations should be avoided. Based on explicit evaluation findings, lessons should be rooted in real project experiences or derived from problems encountered and mistakes made that should be avoided in the future. Lessons are intended to be adopted any time they are deemed to be relevant in the future and must have the potential for wider application (replication and generalization) and use and should briefly describe the context from which they are derived and those contexts in which they may be useful.	Final report: Relevant lessons are presented.	**6**
iii) Quality and utility of the recommendations: To what extent are the recommendations proposals for specific action to be taken by identified people/position-holders to resolve concrete	Final report: Actionable recommendations are made.	**6**

[34] In some cases 'project management and supervision' will refer to the supervision and guidance provided by UNEP to implementing partners and national governments while in others, specifically for GEF funded projects, it will refer to the project management performance of the executing agency and the technical backstopping provided by UNEP.

problems affecting the project or the sustainability of its results? They should be feasible to implement within the timeframe and resources available (including local capacities) and specific in terms of who would do what and when. At least one recommendation relating to strengthening the human rights and gender dimensions of UNEP interventions, should be given. Recommendations should represent a measurable performance target in order that the Evaluation Office can monitor and assess compliance with the recommendations. In cases where the recommendation is addressed to a third party, compliance can only be monitored and assessed where a contractual/legal agreement remains in place. Without such an agreement, the recommendation should be formulated to say that UNEP project staff should pass on the recommendation to the relevant third party in an effective or substantive manner. The effective transmission by UNEP of the recommendation will then be monitored for compliance. Where a new project phase is already under discussion or in preparation with the same third party, a recommendation can be made to address the issue in the next phase.		
VII. Report Structure and Presentation Quality		
i) Structure and completeness of the report: To what extent does the report follow the Evaluation Office guidelines? Are all requested Annexes included and complete?	Final report: The report is consistene with UNEP guidance	**6**
ii) **Quality of writing and formatting:** Consider whether the report is well written (clear English language and grammar) with language that is adequate in quality and tone for an official document? Do visual aids, such as maps and graphs convey key information? Does the report follow Evaluation Office formatting guidelines?	Final report: The report is well written.	**6**
OVERALL REPORT QUALITY RATING		**5**

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. The overall quality of the evaluation report is calculated by taking the mean score of all rated quality criteria.

At the end of the evaluation, compliance of the evaluation process against the agreed standard procedures is assessed, based on the table below. *All questions with negative compliance must be explained further in the table below.*

Evaluation Process Quality Criteria	Compliance	
	Yes	No
Independence:		
1. Were the Terms of Reference drafted and finalised by the Evaluation Office?	**Y**	
2. Were possible conflicts of interest of proposed Evaluation Consultant(s) appraised and addressed in the final selection?	**Y**	
3. Was the final selection of the Evaluation Consultant(s) made by the Evaluation Office?	**Y**	
4. Was the evaluator contracted directly by the Evaluation Office?	**Y**	
5. Was the Evaluation Consultant given direct access to identified external stakeholders in order to adequately present and discuss the findings, as appropriate?	**Y**	
6. Did the Evaluation Consultant raise any concerns about being unable to work freely and without interference or undue pressure from project staff or the Evaluation Office?		**N**
7. If Yes to Q6: Were these concerns resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both the Evaluation Consultant and the Evaluation Manager?	**N/A**	
Financial Management:		
8. Was the evaluation budget approved at project design available for the evaluation?	**Y**	
9. Was the final evaluation budget agreed and approved by the Evaluation Office?	**Y**	
10. Were the agreed evaluation funds readily available to support the payment of the evaluation contract throughout the payment process?	**Y**	
Timeliness:		
11. If a Terminal Evaluation: Was the evaluation initiated within the period of six months before or after project operational completion? Or, if a Mid Term Evaluation: Was the evaluation initiated within a six-month period prior to the project's mid-point?		**N**
12. Were all deadlines set in the Terms of Reference respected, as far as unforeseen circumstances allowed?	**Y**	
13. Was the inception report delivered and reviewed/approved prior to commencing any travel?	**Y**	
Project's engagement and support:		
14. Did the project team, Sub-Programme Coordinator and identified project stakeholders provide comments on the evaluation Terms of Reference?	**Y**	
15. Did the project make available all required/requested documents?	**Y**	
16. Did the project make all financial information (and audit reports if applicable) available in a timely manner and to an acceptable level of completeness?	**Y**	
17. Was adequate support provided by the project to the evaluator(s) in planning and conducting evaluation missions?	**Y**	
18. Was close communication between the Evaluation Consultant, Evaluation Office and project team maintained throughout the evaluation?	**Y**	
19. Were evaluation findings, lessons and recommendations adequately discussed with the project team for ownership to be established?	**Y**	

20. Did the project team, Sub-Programme Coordinator and any identified project stakeholders provide comments on the draft evaluation report?	**Y**	
Quality assurance:		
21. Were the evaluation Terms of Reference, including the key evaluation questions, peer-reviewed?	**Y**	
22. Was the TOC in the inception report peer-reviewed?	**Y**	
23. Was the quality of the draft/cleared report checked by the Evaluation Manager and Peer Reviewer prior to dissemination to stakeholders for comments?	**Y**	
24. Did the Evaluation Office complete an assessment of the quality of both the draft and final reports?	**Y**	
Transparency:		
25. Was the draft evaluation report sent directly by the Evaluation Consultant to the Evaluation Office?	**Y**	
26. Did the Evaluation Manager disseminate (or authorize dissemination) of the cleared draft report to the project team, Sub-Programme Coordinator and other key internal personnel (including the Reference Group where appropriate) to solicit formal comments?	**Y**	
27. Did the Evaluation Manager disseminate (or authorize dissemination) appropriate drafts of the report to identified external stakeholders, including key partners and funders, to solicit formal comments?	**Y**	
28. Were all stakeholder comments to the draft evaluation report sent directly to the Evaluation Office	**Y**	
29. Did the Evaluation Consultant(s) respond adequately to all factual corrections and comments?	**Y**	
30. Did the Evaluation Office share substantive comments and Evaluation Consultant responses with those who commented, as appropriate?	**Y**	

Provide comments / explanations / mitigating circumstances below for any non-compliant process issues.

Process Criterion Number	**Evaluation Office Comments**