

Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP Project
“Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries”
PIMS 01983 / SMA 34823
(2017-2024)



Evaluation Office of the United Nations Environment Programme
Distributed: May 2026



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Front cover: damage to key government buildings, November 2017, Mosul, Syria
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Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries PIMS 1983 / SMA 34823
Project number: PIMS 1983
Date: 05/2026
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Acknowledgements

This Terminal Evaluation was prepared for UNEP by Mr. Victor Béguerie, as an external consultant.

The evaluator would like to express his gratitude to all persons met and who contributed to this evaluation, as listed in Annex III.

The evaluation team would like to thank the project team and in particular Messrs Hassan Partow, and Muralee Thummarukudy for their contribution and collaboration throughout the evaluation process. Sincere appreciation is also expressed to the UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Branch staff who took time out of their busy schedules to provide generous comments to the draft report. The evaluator would also like to take this opportunity to thank all the interviewed project partners and beneficiaries for their sincere feedback on the project.

Lastly, the evaluator would like to thank Ms. Pauline Marima from UNEP Evaluation Office for her professional guidance throughout the evaluation process as well as Ms. Mercy Mwangi for her administrative and logistical support.

The evaluation consultant hopes that the findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations will constructively contribute to the formulation of future phases and to the continuous improvement of any follow-up projects in other similarly affected countries and regions.

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Brief consultant biography

The author is an independent consultant with over fifteen years of professional experience in the evaluation of development projects and programmes, primarily across Africa. He has conducted independent evaluations on behalf of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international institutions, and research organizations.

In addition to his solid expertise in evaluation, he possesses a broad technical background encompassing plastic waste management, decentralized access to electricity and renewable energy. His professional experience includes assignments in complex and challenging contexts, notably in Liberia with the Red Cross and in Haiti, where he oversaw the Terminal Evaluation of a UNEP access-to-energy project.

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About the Evaluation

Joint Evaluation: No

Report Language(s): English

Evaluation Type: Terminal Evaluation

ABSTRACT: This report is a Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP project: “*Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries*”, implemented between 2017 and 2024. The project's overall goal was to save lives and reduce harmful impacts on human life, health, livelihoods, and to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts by rapidly providing affected countries and UN partners with the technical assistance and capacity to systematically and collaboratively address the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts. The evaluation sought to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency) and determine the sustainability of its results. The evaluation has two primary purposes: accountability and learning. Data collection methods included: in-depth interviews, survey questionnaires and document reviews. Data analysis was based on applying triangulated data to assess performance against a reconstructed Theory of Change and its causal pathways. With an overall performance rating of ‘Satisfactory’, the main findings include: i) the project demonstrated effective adaptive management, strong stakeholder engagement, and consistent fundraising success—confirming a clear demand for UNEP’s environmental assistance in crisis contexts; (ii) it demonstrated UNEP’s contribution to broader shifts in disaster and waste management approaches, with evidence of sustainability and replicability; and (iii) the request-based mechanism remains under-recognized; weak institutional prioritization, reduced capacity, funding constraints, and unclear positioning on disaster/conflict work, hindered the project’s full potential and future scalability. The main recommendations to UNEP are: (i) An internal tracking system should be put in place to systematically register all received requests and their chain of actions. (ii) The actual communication strategy should be clarified to be in line with how it was designed. (iii) The agreed SOPs of the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund should be followed and made operational to improve its efficiency.

Source(s) of Funding by Country:

Norway

Germany

Sweden

Japan

Switzerland

Source(s) of Funding by Institution Type: (indicate all that apply)

Foundation/NGO Yes

Private Sector No

UN Body Yes

Multilateral Fund Yes

Environment Fund Yes

Key words (max five words): [\[A standard list of terms is being compiled by UNEP and will replace this ‘free word’ space.\]](#)

Primary data collection period: 27 October 2025 until 10 December 2025

Field mission dates:

Geneva from 5 to 7 November 2025

Bonn from 9 to 10 December 2025

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

CEOBS	Conflict and Environment Observatory
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EA	Expected Accomplishment
FMO	Finance Management Officer
GCF	Green Climate Fund
HYPREP	Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project
IGAD/ICPAC	International Authority on Development Climate Prediction and Application Centre
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPMR	Integrated Planning, Management and Report
JEU	Joint Environment Unit
JSB	Japanese Supplementary Budget
LESST	Libya Electricity Sector Stabilization and Transition Support
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
MTS	Medium Term Strategy
N/A	Not Applicable
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PERSGA	Organization for Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
PIMS	Programme Information and Management System
PM	Project Manager
PoW	Programme of Work
PRC	Project Review Committee (UNEP committee that approves new projects)
ProDoc	Project Document (must be reviewed by PRC before any project can be undertaken,)
RDNA	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
REA	Rapid Environment Assessment
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SMA	Strategic Management Application
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNEA	United Nations Environment Assembly
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNRCO	UN Resident Coordinator Office
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USD	United States Dollar

Project identification table

Table 1. Project Identification Table

UNEP SMA ID:	PIMS 1983 / SMA 34823	Grant ID (if applicable):	
UNEP Management (Division/Branch/Unit):	Ecosystems Division / Disasters and Conflicts Branch		
Implementing Partners:	IOM; UNDP; Conflict and Environment Observatory; PAX; Zoi Environment Network		
Sources of Funding:	<i>Country(ies):</i> Norway, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland	<i>Institution¹ Name/Type:</i> <i>Environment Fund, UNDP Libya, IGAD/ICPAC, UNDRR, SDG Fund</i>	
Relevant SDG(s):	The overall aims are to reduce exposure to disasters (SDG 1.2, 3.9, 12.4, 12.8), improve the resilience of communities (SDG 1.3, 9.1, 11.b, 17.7), ensure sustainability (SDG 9.1, 9.4, 11.b, 12.2, 12.5, 12.8, 14.1) and promote peace, justice and strong institutions (16.6, 16.7, 16.10). Environment is addressed indirectly in many other targets, as it forms an underlying dimension of several SDG goals.		
MTS (all that apply):	2014-2017; 2018-2021; 2022-2025	UNEP approval date:	08/09/2017
POW Direct Outcome(s) number/reference (applicable for projects approved from 2022):	<i>POW Direct Outcome:</i> Chemicals and Pollution Action 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.13	MTS 2025 Outcome(s) number/reference (applicable for projects approved from 2022):	<i>MTS 2025 Outcome:</i> Chemicals and pollution action outcomes 1, 2 and 3
Sub-programme:	Chemicals and Pollution Action (previously under Disasters and Conflicts)	Programme Coordination Project (if relevant):	
Expected start date:	June 2017	Actual start date:	08/09/2017
Planned completion date:	December 2018 ²	Actual operational completion date:	30/04/2024
Planned project budget³ at approval:	<i>Planned Core Funding (regular budget, Environment Fund, etc.):</i> Cash: In-kind: USD 190,000		
	<i>Planned Extra-budgetary Funds⁴:</i> Cash: USD 400,000		
	Total Planned Budget: USD 590,000⁵		
Secured budget⁶	<i>Secured Core Funding (regular budget, Environment Fund, etc.):</i> Cash: USD 1,188,952 In-kind: USD 241,000		
	<i>Secured Extra-budgetary Funds:</i> Cash: USD 7,221,205 In-kind: USD 25,000		
	Total secured budget as of 24/04/2025 (Revision 8): USD 8,676,157		
Actual expenditures reported (cash only):	Actual Core Funding expenditures reported as of 30/04/2024 (source: REA-Project Evaluation - Final Budget): N/A ⁷		
	Actual Extra-budgetary Funds expenditures reported as of 30/04/2024		

¹ Indicate where funding institutions are any/all of the following: Foundation/NGO; Private Sector; UN Body; Multilateral Fund; Environment Fund; Other.

² As per the Project Document.

³ Total budget may include: Regular Budget, Environment Fund, Extra-Budgetary, including 'softly-earmarked' etc.

⁴ Extra-budgetary funds may include co-finance (cash/in-kind).

⁵ There was a duplication of the USD 70,000 from the Environment Fund in the original budget of the Project Document. They were mentioned both as cash and in-kind contributions. They were actually only in-kind contributions.

⁶ From last project/budget revision.

⁷ The share financial data did not allow to distinguish the expenditures per their source of funding.

UNEP SMA ID:	PIMS 1983 / SMA 34823	Grant ID (if applicable):	
	(source: REA-Project Evaluation - Final Budget): N/A		
	Total actual expenditures reported as of 30/04/2024 (source: REA-Project Evaluation - Final Budget):USD 7,725,247.09		
First disbursement:	3 October 2017	Planned date of financial closure:	
No. of formal project revisions:	8	Date of last approved project revision:	24/04/2024
No. of Steering Committee meetings:	N/A ⁸	Date of Last Steering Committee meeting:	N/A
Mid-term Review/ Evaluation⁹ (required or not required):	UNEP requirement:	Y	Mid-term Review/ Evaluation actual date: June 2021
	Donor requirement:	N	
Terminal Evaluation (planned date):	Prodoc: June 2018 Revision 8: "A terminal evaluation will be carried out at the end of the proposed extension period in cooperation with the Evaluation Office in accordance with standard procedures"	Terminal Evaluation actual date:	July 2025 – March 2026
Coverage - Country(ies):	Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Benin, Colombia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen	Coverage - Region(s):	Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, West Asia
Dates of previous project phases:	N/A	Status of future project phases:	Follow-up project entitled: "Prevention, Response, and Recovery of Conflicts, Disasters and Incidents Related to Pollution" started in November 2024 for 4 years duration

⁸Even though the ProDoc mentioned a steering committee, however, this was never formed.

⁹ UNEP projects of more than four years require an MTR. See the Evaluation in the Project Cycle section in the [Evaluation Office's operational manual](#).

Executive Summary

Project background

1. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) project "Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries" (REA, PIMS 01983 / SMA 34823) was implemented between September 2017 and April 2024. The project aimed "to save lives and reduce harmful impacts on human life, health, livelihoods, and to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts by rapidly providing affected countries and United Nations (UN) partners with the technical assistance and capacity to systematically and collaboratively address the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts". The rationale for the project rested on the recognition that disasters and conflicts cause severe immediate and long-term damage to the environment – with both direct effects such as chemical spills, fires and destruction from weapons, and indirect effects such as pressure from displaced populations – and that these impacts are systematically neglected in crisis response frameworks.
2. The project operated on a demand-driven model, responding upon request from member states and UN partners through four core intervention types: Rapid Environmental Assessments; Technical Assistance and Capacity Building; Demonstration Projects; and Development of Strategic Tools (guidelines, action plans, and standard operating procedures (SOPs)). It was coordinated by UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts Branch of the Ecosystems Division.
3. The project started with a secured budget of USD 590,000 primarily from Norway for a planned duration of 18 months. Through 8 revisions, the project extended to 80 months and secured a total budget of USD 8,676,157 from nine additional donors – principally Japan (44.2%, through the Japanese Supplementary Budget, dedicated to debris recycling in Iraq), Sweden (13.9%), Norway (13.5%) and UNEP's Environment Fund (13.7%). Total actual expenditures reached USD 7,725,247 (92% of the consumable budget). Over its lifetime, the project delivered 47 interventions in 21 countries across Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, West Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The project has been followed-up by a successor project entitled "Prevention, Response, and Recovery of Conflicts, Disasters and Incidents Related to Pollution" approved in November 2024.

This evaluation

4. The evaluation, conducted from July 2025 to March 2026, sought to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine the sustainability of its results. It assesses performance against nine evaluation criteria¹⁰ and assigns a score from a six-point scale¹¹. The evaluation has two primary purposes: accountability and learning.
5. Data collection methods included: semi-structured online interviews (44 conducted between 27 October and 28 November 2025), in-person field missions to Geneva (5–7 November 2025) and Bonn (9–10 December 2025), online questionnaires to training participants, and systematic document reviews. Stakeholders consulted included UNEP project leads and other UNEP staff, UN System partners (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN-Habitat, United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (PAX, Zoi Environment Network, Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)), mobilised experts, national beneficiaries, and donors. Data analysis was based on applying triangulated data to assess performance against a reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) and its causal pathways. In addition to the nine evaluation

¹⁰ (1) Strategic Relevance, including Complementarity; (2) Quality of Project Design; (3) Nature of External Context; (4) Effectiveness (incl. availability of outputs and achievement of outcomes); (5) Financial Management; (6) Efficiency; (7) Monitoring and Reporting; (8) Sustainability and/or scaling up of results and (9) Factors Affecting Project Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues.

¹¹ The six-point scale is as follows: Highly Satisfactory (HS); Satisfactory (S); Moderately Satisfactory (MS); Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU); Unsatisfactory (U); Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). Sustainability and/or scaling up of results is rated from Highly Likely (HL) down to Highly Unlikely (HU) and Nature of External Context is rated from Highly Favourable (HF) to Highly Unfavourable (HU). The ratings against each criterion are 'weighted' to derive the Overall Project Performance Rating. The greatest weight is placed on the achievement of outcomes, followed by dimensions of sustainability.

criteria, the evaluation addressed seven strategic questions formulated by the UNEP Evaluation Office in conjunction with the project team.

Key findings and performance ratings

6. The project has demonstrated strong performance in the areas of strategic relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and stakeholder engagement, as well as notable examples of sustainability and scaling-up of results. Areas that may have benefited from further attention include monitoring and reporting (including the systematic tracking of requests and their follow-up chain of actions), and public communication. Despite efforts in developing a wide range of communication products, the planned involvement of UNEP's Communication Division did not materialise, hampering the project's external visibility.

Table 2. Summary of project ratings

Criterion	Rating
Strategic Relevance	HS
Quality of Project Design	S
Nature of External Context	HU
Effectiveness	S
Financial Management	S
Efficiency	S
Monitoring and Reporting	MU
Sustainability and/or scaling-up of results	L
Factors Affecting Performance	S
Overall Project Performance Rating	S

7. **Strategic relevance.** The project was fully aligned with UNEP's three successive Medium Term Strategies (MTS 2014–2017, 2018–2021 and 2022–2025) and their corresponding Programmes of Work. It contributed to key international policy frameworks including United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) Resolutions 2/15, 3/1 and 6/12 (which explicitly mandate UNEP to support countries affected by conflict and disasters), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Priorities 1, 2 and 4), and multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17). The project's demand-driven mechanism ensured inherent alignment with the national priorities of all 21 beneficiary countries.

8. **Effectiveness.** Both project outputs were fully achieved. Output A (environmental assessments) was estimated at 94% against a 90% target, covering a wide thematic range: conflict and disaster debris, oil spills, contaminated sites, Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) and Rapid Damage Needs Assessments (RDNAs), air pollution, droughts, maritime disasters, and Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19) waste management. Output B (technical advice and support) achieved an average response time of 21 days (against a 60-day target), with 90% of eligible requests fulfilled. Output B highlights include debris recycling pilots in Iraq (Mosul and Kirkuk), capacity building through in-person and online trainings reaching hundreds of participants, and the establishment of the Gaza Debris Management Working Group with UNDP as well as the Kirkuk Debris Management Working Group with UNAMI. The project outcome (countries' increased ability to include environmental priorities in recovery plans) was satisfactorily achieved, with Indicator 1 at 92% (target: 95%) and Indicator 2 at 95% (target: 93%). In several instances, progress exceeded expectations: some interventions led not only to the integration of environmental recommendations into recovery plans, but to their concrete implementation – as demonstrated by Iraq's nationally adopted recycled aggregate standards (December 2025) drawing on project lessons, India's mainstreaming of the PDNA process nationally since 2024, and the catalysing of subsequent fully funded projects like in Libya and Pakistan.

9. **Efficiency.** The project effectively leveraged existing UN mechanisms, local institutions and expert networks to implement well-coordinated interventions based on the principles of subsidiarity. Under the OneUN modality Key partnerships were developed with IOM (Iraq), UN-Habitat (Lebanon), UNDP (Libya, Syria, Palestine), UNAMI and UNSMIL, which were especially useful in places where

UNEP is a non-resident agency. The collaboration with the Joint Environment Unit (JEU) was genuinely complementary. The project initiated two significant coordination platforms: the Green Recovery Platform for Ukraine and the Gaza Debris Management Working Group (chaired by UNEP and UNDP), both establishing new benchmarks for coordinated environmental responses in conflict zones, or in the case of the Kirkuk Debris Management Working Group, in post-conflict situations. Evidence indicates that interventions led by UNEP staff, rather than external consultants, consistently generated stronger follow-up and sustainability outcomes (See Lessons Learned).

10. **Monitoring and reporting.** The monitoring of project interventions lacked consistency: there was no systematic tracking system to register requests received and their chain of follow-up actions. Output and outcome indicator values were estimated globally rather than calculated from disaggregated data, and the estimations lacked sufficient supporting evidence. The planned one-page summaries per intervention were never produced because the Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) system could not host them and no alternative was developed. These shortcomings are partly explained by the limited staff time officially dedicated to the project (10% for the Project Manager (PM); 5% for other team members). On the reporting side, semi-annual PIMS and then Integrated Planning, Management and Report (IPMR) reports and an Operational Project Closure Report were consistently produced, with no major contradictions between reporting documents and interview evidence. Additionally, donor specific progress reports were prepared for the 2 Japan-funded projects in Iraq, which were highly appreciated by the donor, including the Ambassador of Japan, who personally visited the project sites in Kirkuk and Mosul.

11. The **Sustainability and/or scaling-up of results** is rated Likely. Despite challenges in systematically tracking long-term results, multiple concrete examples of sustainability, replication and scaling up were gathered. Debris recycling, initiated in Iraq, was replicated in other countries, notably in Azerbaijan and Gaza. Iraq's Central Organisation for Standardization and Quality Control finalised national recycled aggregate standards in December 2025, drawing on the project's lessons and extending circularity to the broader construction sector. India mainstreamed the PDNA process nationally in 2024. Libya's solar feasibility study catalysed the Libya Electricity Sector Stabilization and Transition Support (LESST) project (a fully funded UNEP-UNDP initiative). The 2022 Pakistan PDNA catalysed a Green Climate Fund (GCF) funded National Action Plan. The bioremediation initiative in Iraq was replicated in at least one other oil field. A disaster waste management training manual, published by UNEP West Asia in 2025, institutionalises capacity-building content for wider regional use.

12. **Factors affecting performance.** **Project management** was effective: the transition between the two PMs was smooth; the team demonstrated strong adaptability across difficult contexts; and leadership of interventions was optimised based on each team member's expertise and regional knowledge. **Stakeholder participation and cooperation** is rated Highly Satisfactory, with extensive engagement with national stakeholders beyond environment ministries, regular capacity assessments, and in-country workshops. **Gender** was addressed in a culturally appropriate manner (e.g. cash-for-work schemes for women groups in debris interventions; a quota for women's participation in trainings). **Communication and public awareness** is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory: despite an ambitious strategy involving UNEP's Communication Division at design, implementation was made on an ad hoc basis with limited strategic outreach, hampering the project's overall external visibility.

Summary responses to key strategic evaluation questions

13. **Q1 – Quality and relevance of UNEP's technical advice in mobilising uptake:** Four factors consistently drove uptake: the credibility that UNEP's impartial expertise lent to environmental priorities in crisis recovery discussions; the timeliness of assessments delivered early enough to influence planning decisions; the relevance of recommendations adapted to local context and capacity; and the quality of in-country communication through multi-stakeholder meetings and dissemination events.

14. **Q2 – Most effective model for UNEP's rapid environmental assistance:** The request-based mechanism proved its validity through seven years and eight successive revisions – each revision triggered by new country requests. Key improvements identified: (i) a dedicated full-time project coordinator with both administrative and technical expertise; (ii) a baseline budget derived from

historical average expenditure rather than starting from zero at each revision; (iii) a formal internal expert roster across UNEP divisions, with prior UN security training requirements.

15. **Q3 – Enhancing partnerships with the private sector and other UN agencies:** A pre-vetted roster of private companies (by sector and geography), identified in advance rather than in the midst of a crisis, would improve UNEP's clean-up response capacity. The Gaza Debris Management Working Group model – co-chaired with UNDP with regular meetings and clear terms of reference (ToR) – as well as the Kirkuk Debris Management Working Group – co-chaired with UNAMI – represent a replicable framework for future coordinated UN interventions. UNDP's operational footprint at country level should be systematically leveraged as an implementation partner.

16. **Q4 – Expanding the resource base:** UNEP should raise funds not only to cover intervention costs but also to fund coordination and monitoring staff time. The UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund's agreed SOPs must be operationalised, with disbursement timelines respected. Pre-approved intervention templates, approvable at division director level, would allow faster mobilisation of emergency funding. Outreach to non-traditional donors (Gulf States, emerging economies, Public-Private Partnerships) and exploration of crowdfunding models used by other UN entities could broaden the resource base.

17. **Q5 – Gender equity and women's empowerment:** Demonstrated examples of women's successful involvement in debris activities should be visually documented and promoted in similar contexts, following the same demonstration logic that proved effective for technical solutions: showing that inclusive approaches work in practice is the most powerful lever for replication.

18. **Q6 – Increasing engagement of other parts of UNEP:** A formal internal expert roster, with division-head agreements to release willing staff for defined periods and prior UN security training, would enable broader UNEP technical expertise to be deployed in conflict and disaster contexts, beyond the Disasters and Conflicts Branch alone.

19. **Q7 – Alternative arrangements beyond traditional project structures:** A pre-approved multi-year project envelope based on historical average expenditure, and simpler internal approval mechanisms for emergency fund mobilisation, would reduce the burden of successive revisions and enhance UNEP's agility. Plugging into existing UN emergency funding channels (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)'s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Flash Appeals, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) or the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF)) through pre-approved proposal templates is another avenue worth pursuing.

Conclusions summary

20. Overall, the project performed at the Satisfactory level. The continuous stream of successful fundraising efforts and project revisions to respond to new country requests clearly demonstrates that the proof of concept of the REA project is valid. Donors and member states consistently sought and valued UNEP's rapid environmental expertise in crisis contexts.

21. The main achievements of the project were its debris-related interventions, which established UNEP as a leading expert in conflict-related debris management – a rapidly growing challenge driven by urban conflicts and large-scale infrastructure destruction. The project also demonstrated, for the first time, that UNEP can conduct effective environmental assessments during active conflicts (not only post-conflict), as illustrated by operations in Ukraine and Gaza, including the pioneering establishment of the debris management working group in Gaza, co-chaired with UNDP as well as in Kirkuk, (co-chaired with UNAMI, the De-mining Unit of the Federal Police and the Environmental Engineering College at the University of Kirkuk).

22. Despite UNEA Resolution 6/12 reinforcing UNEP's mandate on disaster and conflict, environmental assistance to crisis-affected countries does not appear central to UNEP's institutional strategy and tends to be treated as a reputational risk rather than an advocacy opportunity. And this request-based mechanism crystallises UNEP's uncertain position. Based on the interviews conducted, it appears that this mechanism is not well known and that promoting it would be beneficial to expand UNEP's reach. Nevertheless, on one hand, some interviewees see a risk in promoting it given the limitation of funds and the false expectations it may create among potential beneficiaries. On the other hand, some consider that creating expectations from member states, and creating a need would ease fundraising effort.

Lessons Learned

23. Lesson 1: The way UNEP deploys its staff and experts has an important bearing on the effectiveness and sustainability of its interventions. Interventions led by UNEP staff consistently demonstrated more success and stronger follow-up than those led by external consultants. Staff bring the institutional UN background, are better placed to advocate for additional support, and are more easily deployable in terms of visa and security arrangements. Countries visited by the UNEP Executive Director (Ukraine, Iraq) benefitted from longer-term support due to increased and sustained funding.

24. **Lesson 2: Demonstrations are highly effective in showcasing the viability of environmental solutions.** Concrete, real-world demonstrations (debris recycling and bioremediation in Iraq) build trust and confidence in proposed approaches, enabling replication and scaling. Even where physical demonstrations are not possible, sharing visual evidence (videos, photos) can create the necessary traction, as shown with Azerbaijan. A capacity-building component is essential to ensure technological and practice transfer is sustainable over time.

25. **Lesson 3: Robust partnerships with UN agencies are essential for achieving tangible results.** As a non-resident agency with minimal in-country presence, UNEP's ability to deliver on the ground depends critically on collaboration with operationally strong partners (UNDP, IOM, UN-Habitat, UN Resident Coordinator Office (UNRCO)). These partnerships bridge the gap between UNEP's normative and advisory role and on-site execution, and ensure that project results are measurable and demonstrable.

26. **Lesson 4: UNEP can successfully operate in active conflict zones and achieve significant results.** The project demonstrated that effective UNEP engagement is possible during active conflicts, not only post-conflict. A senior advisor deployed to the UN Resident Coordinator's office in Ukraine enabled UNEP to establish a strong presence and develop a substantial activity portfolio. The Gaza Debris Management Working Group co-leadership model is replicable in other high-intensity conflict contexts.

27. **Lesson 5: Effective coordination between national and local levels of government is essential for sustainability.** Limited or conflicting relationships between national and sub-national actors can hinder the adoption and scaling of UNEP interventions. Proactive liaison efforts between central and local government authorities – as demonstrated in Iraq, Libya and Azerbaijan – were instrumental in achieving more sustainable and institutionalised outcomes.

Recommendations

28. Recommendation 1: An internal tracking system should be put in place to systematically register all received requests and their chain of actions. No register with the list of requests received and fulfilled throughout the project exists. Given the nature of the output and outcome indicators (number of days, percentage of requests met), a systematic tracking tool would allow for their accurate measurement rather than global estimation. A suggested template is presented in Annex X of the report. Clarity should also be established on what constitutes an 'eligible request received' and 'technical advice initiated' for harmonised future reporting.

29. **Recommendation 2: The actual communication strategy should be clarified to be in line with how it was designed.** UNEP Communication Division was supposed to have a leading and strategic role in the project communication as stated in the Project Document (ProDoc), but this never materialised. A meeting between the follow-up project team, the Branch Communication Officer and Communication Division should be organised to clarify the use of the 5–10% communication budget per intervention and the actual role of each actor. Either the communication strategy is realigned with the ProDoc, or this change should be formally stated in a project revision.

30. Recommendation 3: The agreed SOPs of the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund should be followed and made operational to improve its efficiency. The creation of this Fund was a needed step forward to more efficiently respond to requests from member states, but complaints and frustrations arose because its SOPs are not followed, resulting in limitation of funds and lengthy disbursement procedures – with some payments pending for 4 to 6 months at the time of the evaluation. This Fund crystallises UNEP's uncertain position regarding disaster and conflict response. Its proper operationalisation is essential to ensure UNEP's credibility and delivery capacity as a rapid-response environmental assistance provider.

1 THE PROJECT

1.1 Context

1.1.1 Intervention context

31. Disasters and conflicts cause severe immediate and long-term damage to the environment, with serious implications for future sustainable development in affected areas. These impacts may be direct, such as oil and chemical spills, fires, and destruction from weapons and military operations, or indirect, such as the pressure from displaced populations whose coping strategies can lead to deforestation and other forms of degradation. Beyond the tragic loss of life, the resulting damage to water, soil, and air can harm human health for many years. It is therefore essential to address these impacts after crises occur. Rapid assessment of environmental damage helps protect people from pollution, ensures prompt and safe clearance of conflict and disaster debris, and supports communities in rebuilding safely.

32. Under the project "222.2 Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries", United Nation Environment Program (UNEP)'s support to member states and United Nations (UN) partners was provided upon request, following a demand-driven model and delivered through several core types of interventions, used either alone or in combination:

- **Rapid Environmental Assessments:** conducting evaluations to provide impartial, science-based information and recommendations, including leveraging established UN assessment mechanisms to guide response and recovery efforts.
- **Technical Assistance and Capacity Building:** Supporting clean-up interventions, environmental rehabilitation, and the enhancement of technical expertise to ensure long-term recovery and sustainable management.
- **Demonstration Projects:** Collaborating with UN partners to design and implement pilot projects that showcase sustainable and affordable solutions, facilitating their replication and scaling for broader impact.
- **Development of Strategic Tools:** Creating action plans, guidelines, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to strengthen crisis response, recovery efforts, and preparedness for future emergencies.

33. The Project Document (ProDoc) was signed on 8th of September 2017 for an initial duration of 18 months and a secured budget of USD 590,000. Eventually the project went through 8 revisions, and ended in April 2024, for a total duration of 80 months and a secured budget of USD 8,676,157. UNEP's Disaster and Conflict Branch (based in Nairobi¹²) of the Ecosystems Division held overall responsibility for project coordination, implementation and reporting.

34. Over the course of the project, a total of 47¹³ interventions were conducted (Annex V). 2 were at a global level, 2 at a regional level (West Asia) and 43 were at a national level in 21 different countries. The national level interventions were carried out in 8 countries in Africa, 5 countries in Asia and the Pacific, 5 countries in West Asia, 2 countries in Europe, and 1 country in Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 3 below details the geographic repartition of the national level interventions.

¹²The main office has been transferred from Geneva to Nairobi since 2022.

¹³Considering that the conflict debris related intervention in Lebanon was not completed under the project under evaluation (but under the subsequent project), it has been decided not to include it in this evaluation exercise.

Table 3. Geographical repartition of the national level project interventions (number of interventions in brackets)

Region	Countries
Africa (10)	Benin (1), Libya (2), Mauritius (1), Nigeria (2), Somalia (1), South Africa (1), South Sudan (1) and Sudan (1)
Asia and the Pacific (8)	Afghanistan (2), India (3), Pakistan (1), Papua New Guinea (1) and Sri Lanka (1)
Europe (8)	Azerbaijan (2) and Ukraine (6)
Latin America and the Caribbean (2)	Colombia (2)
West Asia (15)	Iraq (7), Lebanon (1), Palestine (4), Syria (2) and Yemen (1)

35. The following thematic areas were covered by the project interventions (number of interventions in brackets): conflict and disaster debris (10), floods and cyclones related Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) or Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment (DLNA) (4), maritime disasters (4), multi-thematic environmental assessments for conflict zone (4), oil spills and decommissioning of abandoned oil rigs (4), pandemics (4), development of environmental information management systems (3), conflict related PDNAs or Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA) (3), air pollution (2), contaminated site assessment (2), drought (2), fish kills (1), landslides (1), nature based solutions for drought mitigation (1), recovery policy support (1) and renewable energy (1).

1.1.2 Institutional context

36. The project was first part of UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme of the Medium Term Strategies (MTS) (2014-2017) and (2018-2021), contributing to the Expected Accomplishment (EA) (b) "The capacity of countries to use natural resource management to support sustainable recovery from natural and man-made disasters is improved" of the Program of Work (PoW) (2016-2017) and to the EA (b) "Emergency response and post-crisis recovery plans integrate environmental considerations to increase the sustainability of recovery" of the PoW (2018-2019). From 2022 with the MTS (2022-2025), the project fell under the Chemical and Pollution Action.

37. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, a project health check was conducted in April 2020 as a starting point for a Mid-term Evaluation (MTE). Eventually the MTE was conducted internally by a third party - Senior UNEP staff member of the Disasters and Conflicts Branch, and the MTE Report was submitted in June 2021. The health check concluded in the "very good health" of the project. And the MTE rated the project as follows:

- *Strategic Relevance: Highly Satisfactory*
- *Effectiveness: Highly Satisfactory*
- *Efficiency: Highly Satisfactory*
- *Sustainability: Satisfactory*
- *Impact: Highly Satisfactory*

38. The project is being followed-up by a similar request-based UNEP project managed by the Response and Recovery Unit of the Disasters and Conflicts Branch. This project entitled "Prevention, Response, and Recovery of Conflicts, Disasters and Incidents Related Pollution" was approved in November 2024 for a duration of 48 months (4 years).

1.2 Results Framework

39. The project objective was "to save lives and reduce harmful impacts on human life, health, livelihoods, and to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts by rapidly providing affected countries and UN partners with the technical assistance and capacity to systematically and collaboratively address the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts".

40. The project was output-based and had a simple results framework articulated around two outputs, leading to one outcome and two impacts (no intermediate states were mentioned in the ProDoc or its revisions) as summarised in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Summary of project's latest approved results framework (source: Revision 8 - 04/2024)

	Results Statement
Project objective	To save lives and reduce harmful impacts on human life, health, livelihoods, and to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts by rapidly providing affected countries and UN partners with the technical assistance and capacity to systematically and collaboratively address the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts
Impact 1	Harmful impacts on human life, health and livelihoods, and threats to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts are reduced
Impact 2	Vulnerability to conflicts and disasters from environmental drivers is reduced
Intermediate state	None
Project outcome	Countries and international partners vulnerable to or affected by conflicts and disasters which have access to UNEP Environment's expertise are able to include environmental priorities in their plans and programmes for prevention, response and recovery
Outputs	A- Assessment of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities by UNEP Environment in support of a response or recovery framework as requested by national authorities. B- Rapid delivery of technical advice and support as requested for crisis response and preparing recovery plans

1.3 Project Implementation Structure, Partners and Stakeholders

41. The project's demand-driven approach did not allow for fixed implementation structures or predetermined partners. Instead, each intervention required its own tailored implementation setup and specific partners, adapted to the context.

42. Nevertheless, within UNEP and the wider UN system, some overarching rules and responsibilities remained consistent. UNEP's **Disasters and Conflicts Branch** held overall responsibility for coordinating, implementing, and reporting on the project, usually acting as the technical lead, while **UNEP's regional offices** offered political guidance and supported liaison with **UN Resident Coordinator Offices (UNRCO)**, **UN Country Teams**, and national governments. The **UNEP Executive Office** provided high-level political backing and resource mobilization, especially for interventions in politically sensitive contexts such as Palestine and Ukraine (initially the Executive Office Special Assistants were also assigned a role in their geographical areas until their position was suppressed in 2019).

43. It should be noted that the ProDoc planned for the establishment of a Project Steering Committee, but it never materialized.

44. Because UNEP has a relatively limited in-country presence, it collaborated closely with UN entities that have strong operational capacity on the ground. The **International Organization for Migration (IOM)** was a key implementing partner for debris recycling activities in Iraq, **UN-Habitat** played a central role in the Beirut Port debris management intervention, and **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)** was heavily involved in activities in Libya, Syria, and Palestine. UN Missions, such as the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)** and the **United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)**, also contributed by offering strategic direction and facilitating engagement with national authorities, or acting as a liaison, by being UNEP's eyes and ears on the ground.

45. The project also drew on the tripartite mechanism co-led by the World Bank, the European Union, and the UN for PDNAs and RDNAs. Through this mechanism, the project supported evaluations of environmental damage and identification of priority recovery needs in several contexts, such as India in 2018 and 2019 and Pakistan in 2022, following cyclones and major flood events.

46. Additionally, the project worked closely with the **UNEP/ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Joint Environment Unit (JEU)**, despite the absence of a formal collaboration mechanism or predefined procedures. This partnership was needs-driven and focused mainly on conducting joint assessments. Furthermore, **non-governmental organizations (NGOs)** with expertise and a track-record in environmental impact monitoring and assessment were engaged to support evaluation of environmental risks and damages. Thus, PAX, Zoi Environment Network, Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) or GRID-Arendal were implementing partners for some interventions in Ukraine. **Specialised government and academic institutions** for laboratory analysis and research also collaborated for some project interventions, such as the Swiss government (Spiez Laboratory) for the contaminated site assessment interventions in Iraq and Ukraine, the Engineering College at the University of Kirkuk for quality assessment of debris in Kirkuk or the Université de Genève for the Mass fish kill related intervention in Iraq in 2018.

47. By their requests, **national governments** were the instigators and the primary beneficiaries of the project interventions. The Ministry of Environment was typically the main national focal point. For pilot and demonstration projects, local authorities and municipalities were also key players.


48. **Communities affected** by disasters and conflicts were consulted to better assess how the crisis impacted their lives in order to better design the intervention. Their involvement was key to ensure the sustainability of the recovery plans.

49. The **private sector** played a critical role for piloting and scaling up the debris recycling intervention in Azerbaijan and Salah-al-Din (Iraq).

50. Finally, given the nature of the project, **donors** were a key stakeholder group of the project (Norway, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, International Authority on Development Climate Prediction and Application Centre (IGAD/ICPAC), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), UNDP Libya and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Fund). Their support enabled the project to be extended for more than 5 additional years.

51. If considered according to the suggested Johari window (below), project stakeholders can be categorized as follows:

Figure 1: Stakeholder map



1.4 Changes in Design during Implementation

52. The project had 8 revisions, including 6 project extensions, essentially to incorporate new sources of funding for additional requests from member states and hence extend the duration of the project. As mentioned above, the project was initially designed to last 18 months, and to end in December 2018.

53. Table 5 below summarizes the revisions of the project.

Table 5. Details of the project revisions

Revision	Date of approval	Additional funds (USD)	Project end date
1	05 September 2018	365,084 from Norway	12/2019
2	27 November 2018	417,860 Germany 76,000 as in-kind contributions ¹⁴	End of March 2020
3	29 May 2019	133,156 from IGAD/ICPAC 119,232 from Sweden ¹⁵	No change
4	12 May 2020	110,000 from Norway 252,554 + 29,881 from Japan 230,000 from UNDP Libya	31 December 2021
5	19 March 2021	90,000 from Environment Fund 100,000 from Norway 650,000 from Sweden 1,422,145 from Japan	30 June 2022
6	28 December 2021	199,000 from Norway 271,568 from Sweden	30 June 2023
7	05 July 2023	770,000 from Environment Fund 2,128,143 from Japan 166,000 from Sweden 80,000 from SDG Fund 106,582 from Switzerland	30 April 2024
8	24 April 2024	328,952 from Environment Fund 40,000 from UNDRR	No change

54. It should be noted that the project's results framework remained almost unchanged throughout the 8 revisions of the project. Revision 3 however added an Output C dedicated to the development of a climate information services in South Sudan. This output was then incorporated into Output B in Revision 5 and onwards.

55. Revision 6 also resulted in a change in the target of the 2 indicators of the project outcome. The target of Indicator 1 (*Percentage of admissible country requests for prevention, response and recovery support met by UNEP*) became 95% against 90% initially. And the target of Indicator 2 (*Percentage of post-crisis recovery plans in countries having received UNEP support integrating at least one environmental recommendation*) became 93% against 85% initially.

1.5 Project Financing

56. The project, as previously noted, underwent several successive revisions that enabled it to secure additional funding to address new requests from member states. Eventually, the project budget reached USD 8,676,157. 97% of the budget were cash contributions (including USD 1,188,952 from the Environment Fund), and 3% were In-kind contributions.

57. The project managed to fundraise USD 8,010,157 as Extra-budgetary Funding. The main donor of the project was Japan through UNEP's first engagement with the Japanese Supplementary Budget (JSB) with USD 3,382,723, dedicated to the debris recycling interventions in Iraq (44,2% of the total budget), followed by Sweden with USD 1,206,800 (13,9%) and Norway with USD 1,174,084 (13,5%). Table 6 below summarizes the funding sources of the project.

¹⁴From Environment Fund (USD 16,000), Regular Budget (USD 35,000) and UN System in Somalia (USD 25,000).

¹⁵Not mentioned in the Revision 3, but appears in the Excel document of the financial data shared for Revision 4. Initially mentioned as USD 117,972 in the financial document for Revision 4, and then as USD 119,232 for Revision 5 and onwards.

Table 6. Project funding sources

Funding source	Planned funding¹⁶	% of planned funding	Secured funding	% of secured funding
<i>All figures as USD</i>				
<i>Cash</i>				
Funds from the Environment Fund			1,188,952	13,7%
Funds from the Regular Budget				
Extra-budgetary funding (listed per donor):				
Norway	400,000	67,8%	1,174,084	13,5%
Germany			417,860	4,8%
IGAD/ICPAC			133,156	1,5%
Sweden (SIDA)			1,206,800	13,9%
Japan			3,832,723	44,2%
UNDP Libya			230,000	2,7%
Switzerland			106,582	1,2%
SDG Fund			80,000	0,9%
UNDRR			40,000	0,5%
Sub-total: Cash contributions	400,000	67,8%	8,410,157	97%
<i>In-kind</i>				
Environment Fund staff-post costs	70,000	11,9%	86,000	1%
Regular Budget staff-post costs	120,000	20,3%	155,000	1,8%
Extra-budgetary funding for staff-posts (listed per donor):				
UN System in Somalia			25,000	0,3%
Sub-total: In-kind contributions	190,000	32,2%	266,000	3%
<i>Co-financing</i>				
Co-financing cash contribution				
Co-financing in-kind contribution				
Total	590,000		8,676,157	

¹⁶At approval (Project Document, 2017).

2 EVALUATION METHODS

2.1 UNEP's Evaluation Approach

58. In line with UNEP Evaluation Policy and the UNEP Programme and Project Management Manual, the evaluation was undertaken at operational completion of the project to assess performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency) and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability. The evaluation has two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote operational improvement, learning and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned.

59. As guided by the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR), the evaluation has been carried out using a set of 9 commonly applied evaluation criteria which include: (1) Strategic Relevance, (2) Quality of Project Design, (3) Nature of External Context, (4) Effectiveness (incl. availability of outputs; achievement of outcomes and likelihood of impact), (5) Financial Management, (6) Efficiency, (7) Monitoring and Reporting, (8) Sustainability and (9) Factors Affecting Project Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues (see Annex II: Evaluation Framework for more details on each evaluation criterion).

60. Most evaluation criteria are rated on a six-point scale as follows: Highly Satisfactory (HS); Satisfactory (S); Moderately Satisfactory (MS); Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU); Unsatisfactory (U); Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). Sustainability and Likelihood of Impact are rated from Highly Likely (HL) down to Highly Unlikely (HU)¹⁷ and Nature of External Context is rated from Highly Favourable (HF) to Highly Unfavourable (HU). The ratings against each criterion are 'weighted' to derive the Overall Project Performance Rating. The greatest weight is placed on the achievement of outcomes, followed by dimensions of sustainability.

61. The UNEP Evaluation Office has developed detailed descriptions of the main elements required to be demonstrated at each level (i.e. Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory) for each evaluation criterion. The evaluator has considered all the evidence gathered during the evaluation in relation to this matrix to generate evaluation criteria performance ratings.

62. In addition to the 9 evaluation criteria outlined above, the evaluation addresses a number of **strategic questions** that were formulated in the evaluation ToR. These questions were posed by the UNEP Evaluation Office in conjunction with members of the Project Team, and are listed below and answered from Para 143 to 158:

- **Q1:** To what extent has the quality and relevance of UNEP's technical assessment and advice helped to mobilize uptake?
- **Q2:** Project design: What lessons can be learned about the most effective model for UNEP to be able to continue offering rapid environmental assistance in a relevant and timely manner?
- **Q3:** Operational modalities: How can UNEP enhance partnerships with the private sector and other UN Agencies to participate in clean-up operations in future?
- **Q4:** How can UNEP expand its resource base—both in funding and technical expertise—to better support countries in addressing the environmental impacts of disasters and conflicts?
- **Q5:** What opportunities exist for improving gender equity and the empowerment of women in future interventions of this nature?
- **Q6:** How feasible is it for other parts of UNEP to increase their engagement in providing substantive technical assistance to countries affected by conflicts and disasters?

¹⁷ Given the nature of most of the project interventions, the likelihood of impact will not be assessed.

- **Q7:** What alternative arrangements can UNEP explore to enhance its agility and responsiveness to requests from conflict- and disaster-affected countries beyond traditional project structures?

63. This evaluation adopted a participatory approach, consulting with project team members, partners and beneficiaries at several stages throughout the process. Central to the evaluation was the analysis and reconstruction of the project's Theory of Change (ToC). Consultations with the Project Manager (PM) were held during the evaluation inception phase to arrive at a nuanced understanding of how the project intended to drive change and what contributing conditions ('assumptions' and 'drivers') would need to be in place to support such change. The reconstructed ToC, supported by a graphic representation and narrative discussion of the causal pathways, was discussed further with respondents during the data collection phase, and refined as appropriate. The final iteration of the ToC is presented in this final evaluation report and has been used throughout the evaluation process.

64. The main target audiences for the evaluation findings are UNEP, and more particularly the Disasters and Conflicts Branch and UNEP Regional Offices as well as its main project partners (UNDP, IOM, UN-Habitat, PAX, Zoi Environment Network, CEOBS and the JEU).

2.2 Data Collection

2.2.1 Primary data sources

2.2.1.1 Sampling strategy

65. Given the wide scope of the project (47 interventions in 21 different countries), it is difficult to have a full picture of all the potential respondents. Nevertheless, they can be grouped into three main categories:

- **Category 1:** Individuals and entities involved in the implementation/delivery of the project interventions; including:
 - *UNEP project intervention leads;*
 - *Other UNEP members (such as staff from Disaster and Conflict Branch, Regional offices, In-country UNEP presence, Communication Division, Consultants);*
 - *UN Partners (UNRCO, UNAMI, UNSMIL, UNDP, UN-Habitat, IOM);*
 - *NGO Partners (Zoi Environment Network, PAX, CEOBS, GRID-Arendal, Halo Trust);*
 - *Academic institutions (Universities or laboratories);*
 - *Mobilised experts.*
- **Category 2:** Direct national beneficiaries who initiated the request for the project intervention and/or benefited from it (national or local governments, training participants etc.);¹⁸
- **Category 3:** Main donors (Japan, Norway and Sweden).

66. The sampling strategy was designed to maximise both the response rate and the relevance of the information collected.

67. For Categories 1 and 3, an exhaustive approach was adopted because most UNEP leads, other UNEP staff, UN partners, NGOs and donors were involved in more than one intervention. Including all of these stakeholders in the primary data collection was expected to generate insights across the full portfolio of interventions and to facilitate the identification of additional relevant contacts at national level.

¹⁸It should be noted here that in Syria and Libya there was no recognised government, the request came directly from UNDP Syria and Halo Trust respectively and UNEP engaged directly with these international entities. They can thus be considered as direct beneficiaries for these operational interventions.

68. For Category 2 (national beneficiaries), several constraints were anticipated, notably the age of the project (initiated in 2017) and the relatively short duration of many interventions, which often did not allow for the institutionalisation of contacts, particularly in countries where only a single intervention was implemented. In response, a purposive sampling strategy was developed, taking into account geographical coverage, thematic focus, and the diversity of intervention types, while prioritising more recent interventions with a higher likelihood of yielding relevant responses.

69. Moreover, to leverage synergies among interventions within the same country, the sampling was conducted at the country level rather than at the level of interventions. Countries benefiting from multiple interventions were prioritised to further facilitate identification of additional relevant national stakeholders.

70. Given the current political situation in Afghanistan, Palestine and Sudan, it was considered unlikely to successfully engage with local authorities. Project interventions in these countries were not prioritised in the sampling strategy.

71. The following beneficiary countries (Table 7) were selected for in-depth primary data collection among the national project beneficiaries. The two regional interventions were selected to be included in the sample. However, the global interventions were not selected due to the difficulty to identify specific beneficiaries.

Table 7. Planned list of sampled countries for consultation with national project beneficiaries (number of interventions in brackets)

Region	Countries	% of interventions
Africa (10)	Libya (2), Nigeria (2), South Sudan (1)	50%
West Asia (15)	Iraq (7), Yemen (1), Syria (1)	60%
Asia and the Pacific (8)	India (3), Pakistan (1), Sri Lanka (1)	62,5%
Europe (8)	Ukraine (6), Azerbaijan (2)	100%
Latin America (2)	Colombia (2)	100%
Regional (2)	West Asia (1)	50%
Global (2)	-	0%

72. Overall, 30 interventions (64% of the total number) covering 12 different countries (57%) were being considered for further investigation with national project beneficiaries.

73. With this sampling strategy, two thematic areas were not considered: air pollution (due to the current situation in Afghanistan and Palestine) and pandemics (given the short interventions and the elapsed time between Covid-19 and the time of the evaluation).

2.2.1.2 Actual primary data collection

74. Primary data were collected primarily through online interviews. In total 44 online interviews were conducted between 27 October and 28 November 2025.

75. To complement the virtual data collection, an in person mission to Geneva was undertaken from 5 to 7 November 2025 to meet the PM and selected colleagues from UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Branch and UNEP Europe Office. A subsequent mission to Bonn was carried out from 9 to 10 December 2025 to consult the former PM, who played a central role in the project design and in the first three years of its implementation. In addition, online questionnaires were administered to selected participants in trainings delivered under the project to capture further perspectives from direct beneficiaries.

76. As detailed in Table 8 below, the exhaustive approach for the respondents of Category 1 turned out to be quite successful. Considering Category 3, contacts for donors in Norway and Sweden could not be obtained.

77. With regard to Category 2, despite requests to Category 1 interviewees, it was not possible for various reasons to obtain up-to-date contacts of national beneficiaries for Libya, South Sudan and Colombia.

Table 8. Evaluation respondents

Stakeholders - Individuals	A. Total number involved (M/F)	B. Number contacted (M/F)	Sample size (% B/A) ¹⁹	C. Total number responded Total (M/F)	Response rate (% C/B) ²⁰
Category 1					
UNEP project intervention leads	11 (9/2)	11 (9/2)	100%	10 (9/1)	91%
Other UNEP members	-	16 (10/6)	-	11 (7/4)	69%
UN Partners ²¹	-	20 (13/7)	-	10 (9/1)	50%
NGO Partners	-	8 (6/2)	-	6 (5/1)	75%
Specialised government and academic institution partners	-	1 (1/0)	-	0	0%
Experts mobilised	-	3 (3/0)	-	3 (3/0)	100%
Category 2					
National beneficiaries (including UNDP Syria and Halo Trust)	-	33 ²² (27/6)	-	12 ²³ (10/2)	36%
Category 3					
Main donors	3	2 (2/1)	-	1 (1/0)	50%

2.2.2 Strategies for inclusivity

78. Some contacts of national beneficiaries were obtained thanks to interviews with other national project stakeholders. Several follow-up emails were necessary to engage with some project stakeholders and to finally organise online interviews in order to improve the overall response rate. This perseverance allowed to collect the insights from most of the project stakeholder groups. As shown in Table 9 below, eventually the primary data collection covers 17 interventions (36% of the total number), and 8 different countries (38%).

Table 9. Effective list of sampled countries with consultation with national project beneficiaries (number of interventions in brackets)

Region	Countries	% of interventions
Africa (10)	Libya (1)	10%
West Asia (15)	Iraq (3), Palestine (1), Syria (1)	33%
Asia and the Pacific (8)	India (2), Pakistan (1), Sri Lanka (1)	50%
Europe (8)	Ukraine (6)	75%
Latin America (2)	-	0%
Regional (2)	West Asia (1)	50%
Global (2)	-	0%

2.2.3 Secondary data sources

¹⁹ Percentage of people involved in the project who were contacted.

²⁰ Percentage of people contacted who responded.

²¹ To maximise the chances of responses, several people from the same UN agency were contacted. In the end, none of the UN Resident Coordinators could be interviewed, but responses from all the main operational UN partners could be gathered (IOM, UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNAMI and UNSMIL).

²² Including 5 training participants (3 male and 2 female).

²³ Including 2 training participants (2 male).

79. The main secondary data sources were the ProDoc, the eight project revisions, periodic reports submitted by the project team through Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) and then Integrated Planning, Management and Report (IPMR), the MTE, and the Operational Project Closure Report. These sources offered key information on the project's design, implementation progress, and reported results.

80. Additionally, project deliverables, related publications, and various mission reports were systematically reviewed to gain a more detailed understanding of the operational activities carried out under the project. This desk review supported the contextualisation of primary data and enabled triangulation of information across multiple sources.

81. Communication materials produced for the project were also reviewed to enrich the analysis. This documentation provided further insights into the project's visibility, messaging, and outreach to different stakeholder groups.

2.3 Data Analysis

82. The evaluation matrix, as shown in Annex II, has served as a guiding framework for analysing the collected data, verifying their robustness, and deriving the main evaluation findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned. It structured how evidence was organized, interpreted, and linked to the evaluation questions and criteria.

83. Practically, an Excel-based database was used to collate responses and facilitate comparison of feedback, evidence, and information across sources. By comparing results from all available data, the evaluator was able to corroborate evidence, and identify inconsistencies, thereby operationalizing data triangulation.

84. This systematic cross-checking and triangulation of information drawn from both primary and secondary sources ensured that the evaluation findings did not rest on a single viewpoint but were supported by converging lines of evidence. Consultation with a broad range of project stakeholders further reinforced the credibility and depth of the evaluation results.

2.4 Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

85. As mentioned above, the sampling strategy was designed to overcome anticipated data collection challenges stemming from the anteriority of the project and the brief duration of its activities which limited the institutionalization of contacts. Despite this and efforts to follow-up with potential national beneficiary respondents, it must be admitted that the response rate of the project beneficiary remains low 36%, and does not allow for a full geographic representation of the project; especially in Africa where only one beneficiary could be consulted, as well as in West Asia, where input came from one third of the interventions.

86. To mitigate this limitation and also because it was not possible to obtain up-to-date contacts for some initially sampled countries, national beneficiaries from Palestine were consulted based on the availability of their contact information.

87. Language barrier issues arose with certain beneficiaries, notably local authorities in Iraq; these were addressed by translating emails into Arabic via online tools and distributing written questions instead of holding virtual interviews.

88. Given the remote nature of the evaluation and the project's characteristics, gathering primary data from marginalized or vulnerable groups proved unfeasible. Still, special care was given to assess how well their perspectives were captured in project implementation, via examination of the different project reports and publications.

2.5 Ethical Considerations

89. Throughout this evaluation process and in the compilation of the Final Evaluation Report, efforts have been made to represent the views of both mainstream and more marginalised groups. Data were collected with respect for ethics and human rights issues. All information were gathered

after prior informed consent from people, all discussions remained anonymous, and all information was collected according to the UN 'Standards of Conduct' and in line with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2016).

3 THEORY OF CHANGE

90. The project was predominantly output-based. Most activities involved conducting assessments and offering technical advice, rather than carrying out direct, long-term operational interventions on the ground. Additionally, practical interventions were limited to demonstration pilots or trials. This is why the project's main expected outcome is the increased ability of affected countries to include environmental priorities in their recovery plan.

91. In emergency situations, where environmental issues are frequently neglected, successfully elevating the importance of these priorities and assisting countries in recognizing and exploring potential environmental solutions can be considered as a significant achievement. However, the actual implementation and the replicability of these environmental solutions go beyond the scope of the project under evaluation and mainly rely on factors beyond the project's sphere of influence. **Therefore, longer-term results will not be treated as usual in this Terminal Evaluation: the sustainability criteria will not consider its usual 3 components (Socio-political, financial and Institutional Framework) but will instead assess the sustainability and/or scaling up of results at a broader level, and the likelihood of impact achievement will not be assessed in this evaluation.**

Table 10. Justification for reformulation of results statements

Formulation in original project document(s)	Formulation for Reconstructed ToC at Evaluation (RTOC)	Justification for Reformulation and /or consultant's explanatory notes on the interpretation of the result
(LONG LASTING) IMPACT		
IMPACT 1: Harmful impacts on human life, health and livelihoods, and threats to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts are reduced		No change
IMPACT 2: Vulnerability to conflicts and disasters from environmental drivers is reduced		No change
INTERMEDIATE STATES		
None	None	
PROJECT OUTCOMES		
Countries and international partners vulnerable to or affected by conflicts and disasters which have access to UN Environment's expertise are able to include environmental priorities in their plans and programmes for prevention, response and recovery	Outcome 1: Countries and international partners vulnerable to or affected by conflicts and disasters which have access to UN Environment UNEP's expertise are able to include environmental priorities in their plans and programmes for prevention, response and recovery	Given the nature of the interventions undertaken and the unstable context they are implemented in, the project outcome is limited to the increase of the ability of countries to include environmental priorities, and not to their actual inclusion
OUTCOME INDICATORS		
1. Percentage of admissible country requests for prevention, response and recovery support met by UN Environment (baseline: 67%, target: 95%)	Outcome Indicator 1: Percentage of admissible country requests for prevention, response and recovery support met by UN Environment UNEP (baseline: 67%, target: 95%)	Minor editorial change
2. Percentage of post-crisis recovery plans in countries having received UN Environment support integrating at least one environmental recommendation (baseline: 75% target: 93%)	Outcome Indicator 2: Percentage of post-crisis recovery plans in countries having received UN Environment UNEP support integrating at least one environmental recommendation	Minor editorial change

Formulation in original project document(s)	Formulation for Reconstructed ToC at Evaluation (RTOC)	Justification for Reformulation and /or consultant's explanatory notes on the interpretation of the result
	(baseline: 75% target: 93%)	
OUTPUTS		
A. Assessment of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities by UN Environment in support of a response or recovery framework as requested by national authorities	Output A: Assessments of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities are made available by UN Environment UNEP in support of a response or recovery framework as requested by national authorities and/or UN partners	Reformulated to highlight the availability of the requested assessments and to include UN partners as initially stated in the ProDoc by "international partners"
B. Rapid delivery of technical advice and support, as requested, for crisis response and preparing recovery plans	Output B: Rapid delivery of technical advice and support, as requested, for crisis response and preparing recovery plans are provided to national authorities and/or UN partners	Reformulated to highlight the delivery of UNEP's support to national authorities and/or UN partners
OUTPUT INDICATORS		
A. Percentage of eligible requests for environmental assessments met by UN Environment, through a scoping or technical mission (Target: 90%)	Output Indicator A. Percentage of eligible requests for environmental assessments met by UN Environment UNEP, through a scoping or technical mission (Target: 90%)	Minor editorial change
B1. # days between an eligible request received and technical advice or support initiated where funding already in place (baseline: TBD, target: 60 days)		(Output Indicator B1) No change
B2. Percentage of eligible requests for technical advice, environmental assistance or support in preparing recovery plans met by UN Environment (baseline: 82%, target: 90%)	Output Indicator B2. Percentage of eligible requests for technical advice, environmental assistance or support in preparing recovery plans met by UN Environment UNEP (baseline: 82%, target: 90%)	Minor editorial change

Table 11. Justification for reformulation / expansion of drivers and assumptions

Formulation in original project document(s)	Formulation for Reconstructed ToC at Evaluation (RTOC)	Justification for Reformulation
DRIVERS (D)		
National governments are aware of environmental crisis response mechanism and tools		(D1) No change
Environmental dimensions of crises are better understood by partners and stakeholders		(D2) No change
	D3: Funding is in place or mobilized to respond to requests in a rapid manner	(D3) Although previously indicated as a ToC Assumption, the evaluation has considered it as a driver since fundraising was a key aspect of the project.

Formulation in original project document(s)	Formulation for Reconstructed ToC at Evaluation (RTOC)	Justification for Reformulation
	D4: Gender equality, human rights and the voices of indigenous or marginalised groups are considered in the project interventions	D4 added following UNEP Evaluation Office's recommendation ²⁴
ASSUMPTIONS (A)		
UN Environment's expertise to provide impartial environmental assistance in disasters / conflicts is recognized	A1: UN Environment UNEP's expertise to provide impartial environmental assistance in disasters / conflicts is recognized	Minor editorial change
Members states continue to demonstrate the political will and commitment to address the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters, or that this will increase.		(A2) No change
Major United Nations and other international policy processes continue to prioritize addressing the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters.		(A3) No change
Security situation in affected countries allows access to relevant areas when requested		(A4) No change
Funding is in place or mobilized to respond to requests in a rapid manner		Considered as a driver since fundraising was a key aspect of the project
	D5: Despite the crisis situation, national and local authorities share information and coordinate their action	A5 added based on early lesson learned mentioned in Revision 1

92. Two outputs are considered under this project. **Output A** refers to the "Assessments of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities are made available by UNEP in support of a response or recovery framework as requested by national authorities and/or UN partners". **Output B** refers to the "Rapid delivery of technical advice and support, as requested, for crisis response and preparing recovery plans are provided to national authorities and/or UN partners". And one **Outcome** "Countries and international partners vulnerable to or affected by conflicts and disasters which have access to UNEP's expertise are able to include environmental priorities in their plans and programmes for prevention, response and recovery".

93. For national governments to include environmental priorities in their recovery plans following UNEP's assistance, they must continue to demonstrate the political will to address the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters (**Assumption 2**) and recognize UNEP's expertise (**Assumption 1**). Awareness of environmental crisis response mechanisms and tools (**Driver 1**) is essential for output availability, with UNEP regional offices playing a crucial role in ensuring this awareness. Assumption 1 also partially conditions output availability and influences countries' willingness to request UNEP support.

94. Due to UNEP's limited presence on the ground, the project was designed to collaborate closely with UN agencies and international organizations that have strong operational presence and implementation capacity. The assumption that these entities shall continue to prioritize addressing

²⁴ If the project design document contains commitments on human rights and gender equality that are not reflected in the results framework, the commitment must appear as Driver.


the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters (**Assumption 3**) is vital for the outputs' realization, success, and uptake by national governments. Additionally, security situations permitting access to affected areas are critical assumptions for output delivery (**Assumption 4**), although new technologies now allow for online support.

95. Funding availability for rapid responses is a key driver of project success (**Driver 3**), with UNEP's Executive Office playing a direct role and the project communication strategy playing an indirect one by increasing UNEP's visibility. The two outputs aim to provide tailored technical advice, data, and tools to help national governments better understand environmental crisis dimensions (**Driver 2**) and appreciate the benefits of integrating these priorities into recovery plans, thereby promoting official recognition and acceptance of environmental considerations by national authorities.

96. Conflicts and disasters disproportionately impact the poorest communities and most vulnerable and marginalised groups who are more susceptible to disease, natural hazards and environmental degradation. Ensuring that project interventions consider these populations' needs (**Driver 4**) is key to reach the two project impacts (Harmful impacts on human life, health and livelihoods, and threats to ecosystems from disasters and conflicts are reduced; Vulnerability to conflicts and disasters from environmental drivers is reduced).

97. A diagrammatic representation of the project's ToC at evaluation is shown in Figure 2 overleaf:

Figure 2: Theory of Change at evaluation



4 EVALUATION FINDINGS

4.1 Strategic Relevance

4.1.1 Alignment to UNEP MTS, POW and Strategic Priorities

UNEP strategic document	Alignment with UNEP's mandate and thematic priorities ²⁵	Level of alignment
MTS	MTS (2014-2017) The project was fully aligned with the objective of the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme of the MTS 2014-2017 to promote a transition within countries to the sustainable use of natural resources and efforts to reduce environmental degradation, to protect human wellbeing from the environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts. The 5 project interventions conducted in 2017 contributed to its 2 EAs (<i>Risk reduction and Response and recovery</i>). MTS (2018-2021) The project was also fully aligned with the objective of the Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme of the MTS 2018-2021: "Countries increasingly prevent and reduce the environmental impacts of disasters and conflicts, while building resilience to future crises". MTS (2022-2025) Even though there was no longer a Sub-programme dedicated to Disasters and Conflicts, the project contributed to the Outcomes 1 (<i>Human health and environmental outcomes are optimized through enhanced capacity and leadership in the sound management of chemicals and waste</i>)²⁶, 2 (<i>Waste management is improved, including through circular processes, safe recovery of secondary raw materials and progressive reduction of open burning and dump sites</i>)²⁷ and 3 (<i>Releases of pollutants to air, water, soil and the ocean are reduced</i>)²⁸ of the Chemicals and Pollution Action. It was also aligned with the Outcome 3 (<i>Nature conservation and restoration are enhanced</i>)²⁹ of the Nature Action. The project was also aligned with the "leave no one behind" commitment of UNEP increasing its focus on the special needs of disaster and conflict affected states.	Full
POW	POW (2016-2017) The project fell under the scope of the POW (2016-2017) of the Disasters and Conflicts Subprogramme 2, and especially its (b)(ii) indicator of achievement "Increased percentage of national recovery plans that prioritize environment and natural	Full

²⁵Given that 8 revisions were approved through the lifespan of the project (Revisions 1 and 2 in 2018, Revision 3 in 2019, Revision 4 in 2020, Revisions 5 and 6 in 2021, Revision 7 in 2023 and Revision 8 in 2024), assessing the alignment of the project with UNEP's mandate (MTS and POW) during the full duration of the project seems relevant.

²⁶With the regional training on disaster waste management conducted in 2022 in West Asia for instance.

²⁷With the debris recycling interventions in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Gaza for instance.

²⁸With the assistance provided for the maritime disasters in Mauritius (2022) or Yemen (2024) for instance.

²⁹With the wastewater recycling intervention in wetlands in Iraq in 2023 for instance.

UNEP strategic document	Alignment with UNEP's mandate and thematic priorities ²⁵	Level of alignment
	resource management needs based on UNEP assistance". POW (2018-2019) The project was fully aligned with the objective of the Resilience to disasters and conflicts Sub-programme 2 of the POW (2018-2019) which eventually became the objective of the Resilience to Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme of the MTS 2018-2021. POW (2022-2025) The project contributed to the performance indicator (iii) of the Nature Action (Number of countries and national, regional and subnational authorities and entities that incorporate, with UNEP support, biodiversity and ecosystem-based approaches into development and sectoral plans, policies and processes for the sustainable management and/or restoration of terrestrial, freshwater and marine areas. It also contributed to the 4 quantitative performance indicators of the Chemicals and Pollution Action ((i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)).	
Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building	N/A	
South-South Cooperation	South-South cooperation was not at the core of the project. Nevertheless, some project interventions contributed to it, especially the 2 regional ones. A notable initiative was support for Red Sea region countries in partnership with the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA). The project supported the development of a regional oil pollution contingency plan for the stranded super tanker FSO Safer and providing training on oil spill preparedness and response, strengthening regional capacity to address environmental risks. Besides, the training in Disaster waste for West Asia brought together 16 national experts from 6 affected countries (Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon) to discuss best practices and solutions. Evidence of post-intervention collaboration of these participants have been gathered: a WhatsApp group was created among the participants and UNEP Regional Office for West Asia to enable communication and information-sharing. This WhatsApp group was also used for collaboration and support during country visits to other members' countries. Another example of direct South-South cooperation, was the project's facilitation of peer learning between Iraq and Azerbaijan, enabling Iraqi debris management experts to share their experiences and lessons learned in debris recycling with Azerbaijani specialists working on debris planning and management in conflict affected areas. This collaboration included in-country field assessments, material testing, and exploring end-use applications for recycled materials. Additionally, the NGO BINAA For Development registered in Turkey and founded by Syrian engineers, entrepreneurs and expats takes part as an observer in the Gaza Debris Management Working Group.	Full

4.1.2 Alignment to Donor Strategic Priorities

Donor or partner strategic document	Alignment with donor or partner strategic priorities	Level of alignment
Bilateral country donors	Sweden (SIDA) and Norway have been long term partners of UNEP in terms of disaster and conflict related activities. Concerning Germany, Japan and Switzerland, the request-based mechanism and the constant fundraising efforts it implies ensured alignment with recent donor priorities.	Full

4.1.3 Relevance to Global, Regional, Sub-regional and National Priorities

Strategic document or agreement	Alignment with global, regional, sub-regional, national environmental priorities	Level of Alignment
Sustainable Development Goals (2015)	The project aimed to contribute to the achievement of SDG at the environment / crisis nexus as follows: to reduce exposure (SDG 1.3, 3.9, 12.4, 12.8), to improve the resilience of communities (SDG 1.3, 9.1, 11.b, 17.7) to ensure sustainability (SDG 9.1, 9.4, 11.b, 12.8, 12.c, 17.7) and to promote peace, justice and strong institutions (16.6, 16.7, 16.10). Environment is also addressed indirectly in many other targets, as it forms an underlying dimension of several SDG.	Full
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030	The Framework emphasises the need for multi-hazard risk analysis (Priority 1 and 2), preparedness for effective response and the need to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (Priority 4). All these 3 priorities are at the core of the project. The Sendai Framework is mentioned in MTS (2018-2021) as providing "the justification and context for the prevention work of UNEP, recognizing that sustainable ecosystem management is an important mechanism for reducing risks from natural and technological disasters". And in the MTS (2022-2025) as follows: "By focusing on the special needs of countries that are vulnerable to, or affected by, disaster and conflicts, UNEP will assist Member States in fully implementing the Sendai Framework".	Full
UN Environmental Assembly (UNEA) Resolution 2/15 on "Protection of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed Conflict" (2016)	The resolution stresses "the critical importance of protecting the environment at all times, especially during armed conflict, and of its restoration in the post-conflict period". Operational paragraph 7 "Requests the Executive Director of the UNEP, in partnership with governments, scientific institutions, United Nations agencies, civil society and other relevant stakeholders, within available resources and in conformity with the mandate of the Programme, to continue providing enhanced assistance to countries affected by armed conflict and countries in post-conflict situations, including those affected by the unintended collateral impacts of related human displacement, at their request, for post-crisis environmental assessment and recovery".	Full
UNEA Resolution 3/1 "Pollution mitigation and control in areas affected by armed conflict or	The mandate given to UNEP in resolution 3/1 is particularly seen in operative paragraphs 8 and 9. Op.8 asks UNEP to "dispatch urgent assistance missions to affected areas, as appropriate and upon the affected State's request, within available resources and in conformity with the mandate of the UNEP, in order to undertake field-based and post-crisis environmental assessment and recovery with a view to assisting affected States in	Full

Strategic document or agreement	Alignment with global, regional, sub-regional, national environmental priorities	Level of Alignment
terrorism" (2017)	controlling pollution resulting from armed conflict or terrorism". And Op.9 asks UNEP "Within available resources and in conformity with the Programme's mandate, to explore ways of improving the Programme's work on pollution threats arising from armed conflict or terrorism".	
National priorities	The request-based mechanism of the project ensured full alignment with recent environmental priorities of the beneficiary countries.	Full

4.1.4 Complementarity with Existing Interventions/ Coherence

Other initiatives by UNEP or other organisations	Complementarity (including collaboration, coordination and overlap or duplication)	Level of Alignment
UN Country teams and UNDP Country offices	They are identified in the ProDoc as "key partners for engaging / working with national authorities in response. The Country Offices and Regional Offices will be consulted and asked to provide support in establishing contacts, linking to ongoing environmental and disaster risk reduction initiatives and in jointly implementing priority actions. The close involvement of a UNDP Country Office will also help facilitate relevant links to overarching UN in-country strategies and plans, including ensuring coherence with the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs)". This demonstrates an anticipation of identified benefits to collaboration with other UN agencies working in the project area.	Full
UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	The ProDoc mentions that OCHA through the UNEP/OCHA JEU "was directly involved in the elaboration of this project". Table 6 of the ProDoc lists OCHA through the JEU as a key partner, highlighting the potential co-deployment of OCHA and UNEP Regional office staffs in technical missions. Nevertheless the complementarities and benefits for collaboration between the project and the JEU are not deeply presented in the ProDoc.	Partial
Tripartite arrangement for Post-Crisis Needs Assessments	The project pursued UNEP's contribution to the Tripartite agreement for Post Conflict and Most Disaster Needs Assessment between the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union.	Full

98. The Complementarity with Existing Interventions/Coherence is rated Satisfactory because the ProDoc does not explicit, at design, how the project and the JEU would work together and benefit from each other.

Rating for Strategic Relevance: [Highly Satisfactory](#)

Rating for Alignment to UNEP MTS, POW and Strategic Priorities: [Highly Satisfactory](#)

Rating for Alignment to Donor Strategic Priorities: [Highly Satisfactory](#)

Rating for Relevance to Global, Regional, Sub-regional and National Priorities: [Highly Satisfactory](#)

Rating for Complementarity with Existing Interventions/Coherence: [Satisfactory](#)

4.2 Quality of Project Design

99. Project design **strengths** include its governance and supervision agreements involving the strengths both technical and political of various UNEP entities (Divisions, Executive Office and regional offices). The implication of other UN agencies and UN Resident Coordinator and UN Country Teams in the project is also a strength to contextualize and optimize the project interventions, hence improving its efficiency. The stakeholder analysis in the ProDoc is thorough and gives an overview of all the potential project stakeholders from the various UN Agencies and UN country-based entities relevant for the project to affected communities. The monitoring plan with six-monthly Progress & Financial Reports, one page document related to each intervention and the communication strategy with a dedicated budget per project intervention and the active involvement of UNEP Communication Division represent other strengths of the project design.

100. Considering the usual Evaluation Framework of the Quality of Project Design, some **weaknesses** could be identified. But they mainly relate to the unusual, uncertain and unpredictable nature of the project, which makes the project unique and different from the typical UNEP projects. Complementarity with UNEP-OCHA JEU is briefly mentioned. While this complementarity was considered self-evident at the time of design – as the JEU was directly involved in the project's preparation and confirmed its engagement during implementation – a more explicit articulation of the respective roles, modalities of coordination and mutual benefits in the ProDoc would have strengthened the partnership framework. The same goes with UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC). Likewise, scenarios of complementarities with UNEP country offices in potential difficult contexts (Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan and South Sudan) could have been mentioned. Additionally, the TOC presented in the ProDoc is limited. It does not explain the causal pathways between the outputs, outcome and impact. And the roles of the stakeholders' groups are not described. Finally, the overall resource mobilization strategy and the fundraising efforts to reach its target of USD 1,000,000 were not presented in detail despite their central role in the project.

Table 12. Summary of quality of project design assessment ratings

	SECTION	RATING (1-6)	Summary Assessment
A	Project Preparation	5	The ProDoc provides a clear problem and situation analysis outlining potential, though unpredictable, interventions due to the project's request-based nature. The stakeholder analysis is comprehensive, with UN OCHA's JEU directly involved in developing the project, while other stakeholders contributed indirectly through past experiences and UN forums like UNEA. Affected communities are included, with attention to gender and vulnerability considerations. The ProDoc also includes a gender analysis with concrete actions. Because of the project's unpredictable scope, no costed workplan is included.
B	Risk identification and Safeguards	5	The ProDoc risk log clearly outlines financial, organizational, and external risks, along with suitable mitigation strategies. However, the risks are not ranked by overall risk rating, which would have helped indicate their relative importance.
C	Governance and Supervision Arrangements	5	Section 4 of the ProDoc clearly defines the implementation arrangements, outlining the distinct roles and responsibilities of all UNEP entities involved, including the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch, Regional Offices, Technical Divisions, and the Executive Office. Due to the project's flexible nature, the ProDoc also presents different action scenarios to guide potential interventions.
D	Partnerships	5	Given the nature of the project, Section 4.5 of the ProDoc only presents an overview of key partners in general terms. The actual partners would depend on the nature and geography of the interventions.
E	Strategic Relevance	4	Section 2 shows the project's alignment with UNEP's Programme of Work and key policy frameworks. Complementarity with other initiatives is only briefly mentioned: the UNEP-OCHA JEU and UNDAC are cited but not described in depth, and scenarios of potential synergies with UNEP long-term country programmes (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, South Sudan) and with the World

	SECTION	RATING (1-6)	Summary Assessment
			Bank/EU/UN PDNA and RDNA mechanisms are not elaborated.
F	Logical Framework and Causality	4	The ProDoc presents 2 impacts, 1 outcome, and 2 outputs, but lacks a narrative explaining the causal pathways linking them. Relevant drivers and assumptions appear in the ToC diagram, though without detailed explanation, and stakeholder roles are not specified. The outcome focuses on enhancing countries' capacity to integrate environmental priorities rather than their actual adoption, deviating somewhat from UNEP's typical outcome definition but fitting given the emergency context. Most indicators include baseline data, and all have defined targets.
G	Financial Planning	4	Table 3 of the ProDoc provides a clear overview of the project's secured funds. Section 2.1 on Resource Mobilization lacks detail on strategies for flexible fund mobilization. More specific directions would have strengthened it.
H	Efficiency	5	Section 6 briefly outlines the project's cost-effectiveness. The ProDoc emphasizes the key roles of UNEP regional offices, UN Country Teams, Regional Humanitarian Coordinators, and UN Resident Coordinators for contextualizing interventions. The project went through 8 revisions which included 6 extensions. These revisions and extensions were justified by the allocation of new funds to pursue ongoing support or to respond to new requests from national authorities and/or international partners.
I	Monitoring	5	Section 7 outlines the monitoring plan, requiring six-monthly Progress & Financial Reports and one-page documents per intervention uploaded to PIMS to demonstrate efficient fund use. Table 8 details data collection methods, frequency, budget, and responsibilities, noting all budgets are in-kind.
J	Sustainability / Replication and Catalytic Effects	5	Section 10 covers sustainability and replicability, stressing capacity-building for national governments and other organizations. Subsection 5.1 outlines a communication strategy for disseminating results, lessons learned, and recommendations. No exit strategy was needed given the project's nature.
K	Learning, Communication and Outreach	6	Section 5 presents a clear, ambitious communication strategy, emphasizing UNEP Regional Offices and Communication Division roles, with detailed target audiences and tools. Subsection 5.2 details knowledge management for sharing project information, including story maps for each assessment
	Total (Weighted) Score:	4,81	(Full analysis in the Inception Report, available from the Evaluation Office.)

Rating for Project Design: Satisfactory

4.3 Nature of the External Context

101. By nature, the project operated in difficult and unfavourable contexts, yet two external major events had a particularly strong influence on its implementation. First was the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. During the pandemic, the project delivered guidance on managing COVID-19-related waste and providing training and capacity-building support to countries, primarily through webinars and virtual engagements in order to overcome the global travel restrictions. Second, the rise in major international conflicts notably in Ukraine (since 2022) and the Middle East (since 2023) strengthened the importance and the value of remote technical assistance where direct access to the impacted zones was restricted or impossible.

102. Despite these challenging contexts and external events, the project successfully operated using adaptive management strategies and interventions. For example, despite the major access restrictions related to the war in Gaza, it pioneered debris management working groups in Gaza,

establishing a new benchmark for coordinated responses in conflict zones as well as in Kirkuk, in a post-conflict situation.

103. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some project interventions had to be cancelled because of security, logistics, timing constraints or changing government priorities. For example, following a cyclone impacting Bangladesh, a team was mobilised to undertake an assessment mission but its deployment was delayed due to inclement weather conditions, and then due to elections it was eventually cancelled.

Rating for Nature of the External Context: **Highly Unfavourable**

4.4 Effectiveness³⁰

4.4.1 Availability of Outputs

Output A:	Assessments of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities are made available by UNEP in support of a response or recovery framework as requested by national authorities and/or UN partners Indicator A. Percentage of eligible requests for environmental assessments met by UNEP, through a scoping or technical mission. (Target: 90%)																												
Performance against Indicator and Target:	Indicator A: Estimated at 94%																												
Sources of Information /Evidence:	Details of the progress of the availability of project outputs and their indicator were presented in the six-monthly reports uploaded on PIMS and IPMR, as well as in the internal Mid-term Evaluation and the Operational Project Closure Report. Annex 1 of the MTE presents 2 case studies for environmental assessments conducted in Kerala and in Iraq under the project. The environmental assessments and their associated field mission reports (where applicable) were reviewed. Both the Internal Mid-term Evaluation (June 2021) and the Operational Project Closure Report (February 2025) mention an actual achievement of 100% (the internal MTE using data from January 2021). The 6 monthly reports uploaded on PIMS and then IPMR mentioned the following achievements (either as actual or estimated) throughout the project lifespan: <table><tr><th>Dec 2017</th><th>Jun 2018</th><th>Dec 2018</th><th>Jun 2019</th><th>Dec 2019</th><th>Jun 2020</th><th>Dec 2020</th></tr><tr><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>75%</td><td>90%</td></tr><tr><th>Jun 2021</th><th>Dec 2021</th><th>Jun 2022</th><th>Dec 2022</th><th>Jun 2023</th><th>Dec 2023</th><td></td></tr><tr><td>90%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>95%</td><td></td></tr></table> First, based on the figures presented above, the actual achievement of 100% presented both in the Internal MTE and the Operational Project Closure Report is questionable. Second, the “Indicator Progress Remarks” of the 6-monthly reports give a good overview of the periodic achievements, but as suggested by the mention “estimate” of most of the indicator values and reinforced by the progress remark “Most requests for support have been met” associated with an indicator value of 75%, no systematic monitoring system seemed to have been in place to record disaggregated data per request for environmental assessments, and hence accurately measure this indicator. Averaging all the indicator values from December 2017 to December 2023 gives a	Dec 2017	Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	90%	Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023		90%	90%	95%	90%	95%	95%	
Dec 2017	Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020																							
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	90%																							
Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023																								
90%	90%	95%	90%	95%	95%																								

³⁰As mentioned in Para 72, the Likelihood of Impact will not be assessed in this evaluation.

	value of 94%.
Other information, not related to the indicators, that demonstrates Output delivery:	Operational Project Closure Report (February 2025) details the different activities and outputs for each project intervention.
Narrative Assessment:	The various assessments of environmental impacts, needs, risks or opportunities conducted through the project covered a wide range of thematics and geographical areas (details in Annex V). Notably, the project contributed to 4 PDNAs, in India (the first for India), Pakistan, Somalia and Ukraine, and 3 RDNAs, in Ukraine and Gaza providing environmental recommendations for recovery and build back plans. Additionally, air pollution assessments were realized in Afghanistan and Palestine, debris quantification assessments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Azerbaijan and Palestine/Gaza, contaminated site assessments in Iraq and Ukraine, risk and need assessments related to droughts in Iraq and Somalia, oil related risk assessments related to oil spills in Benin, Colombia or related to maritime disasters in Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Yemen, or COVID-related environmental assessments in Afghanistan, South Africa and Sudan. In terms of timeliness, the rapidity of UNEP's response to conduct and publish these assessments varied across the interventions but was overall satisfactory. For instance, initial meetings with Azerbaijan representatives were organised in November 2021, a physical mission to the conflict-affected territories was then conducted in March 2022, because the government requested the mission to be scheduled after the winter period, and the assessment report was finalized in June 2022. In Benin, an official request to assess the environmental risks from old oil field installation was send on 21st of April 2017 to UNEP. This request was followed by a physical mission in July 2017, and the report was published in August 2017. For the PDNA in Odisha (India), the cyclone stroke on 3rd of May 2019, the PDNA team led by the government of Odisha was deployed on 24th of May and the PDNA including its environmental recommendations was published in June 2019. Finally, about the mass fish kill event in Iraq, an official request was sent to UNEP on the 8th of November 2018, and the final report of Université de Genève presenting the lab results and determining the causes of the event was shared in December 2018. This particular mission represents an exceptionally rapid response as it was initiated on the same day of the request thanks to the presence in the country of the PM.
Level of Achievement:	Fully

Output B:	Rapid delivery of technical advice and support, as requested, for crisis response and preparing recovery plans are provided to national authorities and/or UN partners Indicator B1. # days between an eligible request received and technical advice or support initiated where funding already in place (Target: 60 days) Indicator B2. Percentage of eligible requests for technical advice, environmental assistance or support in preparing recovery plans met by UNEP (Target: 90%)
Performance against Indicators and Targets:	Indicator B1. Estimated at 21 days Indicator B2. Estimated at 90%
Sources of Information /Evidence:	Details of the progress of the availability of project outputs and their indicator were presented in the six-monthly reports uploaded on PIMS and IPMR, as well as in the internal Mid-term Evaluation and the Operational Project Closure Report. Annex 1 of the Mid-term Evaluation presents 1 case study for technical support conducted in Colombia for the implementation of the environmental dimensions of the Peace Accords.

	Operational or technical reports, training manuals or lists of participants associated with technical support interventions and their associated field mission reports (when applicable) were reviewed. The Internal Mid-term Evaluation mentioned 30 days as actual achievement for indicator B1, and 100% for indicator B2 (with data from January 2021). The Operational Project Closure Report mentioned “typically within a week” for B1, and 100% for B2. The 6 monthly reports uploaded on PIMS and then IPMR mentioned the following achievements (either as actual or estimated) throughout the project lifespan: <table><tr><th></th><th>Jun 2018</th><th>Dec 2018</th><th>Jun 2019</th><th>Dec 2019</th><th>Jun 2020</th><th>Dec 2020</th></tr><tr><td>B1</td><td>30</td><td>40</td><td>0</td><td>30</td><td>30</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>B2</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>67%</td><td>67%</td><td>95%</td></tr><tr><th></th><th>Jun 2021</th><th>Dec 2021</th><th>Jun 2022</th><th>Dec 2022</th><th>Jun 2023</th><th>Dec 2023</th></tr><tr><td>B1</td><td>15</td><td>15</td><td>30</td><td>45</td><td>7</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>B2</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>90%</td><td>90%</td></tr></table> Once again, the figures mentioned in the Internal Mid-term Evaluation and the Operational Project Closure Report can be questioned. Additionally, the same remark about the lack of systematic monitoring of disaggregated data per request can be reiterated. Averaging values for indicators B1 and B2 from December 2017 to December 2023 gives 21 days and 90% respectively.		Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020	B1	30	40	0	30	30	7	B2	100%	100%	100%	67%	67%	95%		Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023	B1	15	15	30	45	7	7	B2	90%	95%	90%	95%	90%	90%
	Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020																																					
B1	30	40	0	30	30	7																																					
B2	100%	100%	100%	67%	67%	95%																																					
	Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023																																					
B1	15	15	30	45	7	7																																					
B2	90%	95%	90%	95%	90%	90%																																					
Other information, not related to the indicators, that demonstrates Output delivery:	The Operational Project Closure Report (February 2025) detailed the different activities and outputs for each project intervention.																																										
Narrative Assessment: <i>Discuss the nature and scale of outputs delivered, as well timeliness, quality, and utility to intended beneficiaries</i>	Like for the environmental assessments, the technical advice and support provided covered a wide range of thematics and geographical areas (details in Annex V). Overall, UNEP’s responses under Output B took the form of the following interventions used either alone or in combination: • Technical Assistance and Capacity Building: Supporting clean-up interventions, environmental rehabilitation, and the enhancement of technical expertise to ensure long-term recovery and sustainable management. • Demonstration Projects: Collaborating with UN partners to design and implement pilot projects that showcase sustainable and affordable solutions, facilitating their replication and scaling for broader impact. • Development of Strategic Tools: Creating action plans, guidelines, and SOPs to strengthen crisis response, recovery efforts, and preparedness for future emergencies. The project initiated and contributed to conflict-related debris recycling initiatives in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya and Gaza directly benefitting displaced population enabling their dignified return. Notably, Iraq’s first debris recycling centre was established in Mosul under the project where around 26,000 tons of debris were recovered and sorted, of which 42% were recycled. This initiative was then replicated in Kirkuk Governorate where 2 debris sorting and processing sites were set up (Al-Mansuriyah and Hawija Industrial Zone). In total, 8,030 m3 of sorted debris were processed in Al-Mansuriyah (84%) and Hawija (16%). Recycled aggregates were used in road construction, contributing to local reconstruction efforts, including the development of Iraq’s first asphalt road built with recycled materials in line with national road construction standards. These debris initiatives implemented a cash-for-work scheme benefitting vulnerable displaced people. Building on the success of these initiatives in Iraq and Azerbaijan, UNEP has																																										

	become recognized as a leading authority in conflict-related debris management – an emerging challenge fuelled by urban conflicts and large-scale infrastructure destruction. Through hands-on engagement, UNEP has deepened its technical expertise and forged strategic partnerships with key UN agencies, including IOM, UNDP, and UN-Habitat, to advance a coordinated and collaborative approach. A key milestone under this project is the establishment of the debris management working group in Gaza, co-chaired by UNEP and UNDP and in Kirkuk, by UNEP and UNAMI. Other innovative initiatives and demonstration projects were trialled in Iraq, including oil bioremediation and natural based wastewater recycling for wetlands both in Iraq. Additionally, the project delivered a series of capacity-building activities and trainings covering a wide range of topics. The project organized trainings and workshops in Iraq on contaminated site assessment (40 participants, 35 male and 5 women in Baghdad in 2018), and oil remediation (32 participants in Kirkuk in 2019) strengthening national capacities to identify, evaluate, and prioritize polluted locations. It also supported debris management trainings in Mosul in 2018 (52 participants, 47 male and 5 female) and Kirkuk in 2019 (around 65 consistent participants). A regional training on disaster waste management (whose training manual has been published for wider use in July 2025) was also organised in 2022 in Beirut gathering experts from 6 different West Asian affected countries (16 participants) as well as a debris management workshop in Aghdam in Azerbaijan in 2023 (around 45 participants). Contaminated site assessment trainings were also conducted for Ukrainian scientists from government institutions in 2022 (22 participants, 19 female and 3 male). Additional trainings in Ukraine focused on remote environmental monitoring techniques, supporting the use of modern tools and methods to track environmental impacts in conflict-affected areas. Additionally, following the PDNA in Kerala, trainings on Eco safe roads were conducted by a Nepalese expert in 2019. A training webinar on asbestos health and safety was also organized in 2020 following the Beirut Port explosion. A series of 3 global webinars on waste management during COVID-19 pandemic were given between April and August 2020 with 666 participants from 106 different countries. Finally, two training workshops were organized in partnership with PERSGA about oil spill preparedness, response and shoreline cleanup (virtual in January 2021 with 48 participants including 3 women; and in-person in May 2021, with 19 Yemeni responders held in Hurghada, Egypt). Considering the development of strategic tools, a report defining environmental areas for collaboration to support the peace accords in Colombia was developed in 2017, a regional oil spill contingency plan related to the FSO SAFER off the coast of Yemen was prepared in 2020, an air quality strategy was developed for Palestine in 2021. Additionally, debris scenario modelling was conducted for Azerbaijan and Syria for instance. In terms of timeliness, the rapidity of UNEP's response varied across the interventions but was overall satisfactory. For instance, following a meeting with Nigeria Minister of Environment requesting for UNEP's technical assistance for the closure of the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP), UNEP officially replied positively on the 24th of November 2023, and the support was initiated in January 2024 for 6 months. Likewise, the Government of Azerbaijan expressed interest in UNEP assistance in undertaking debris pilot project on the 4th of May 2022. UNEP's advisory support first materialised with a field mission early July 2022, followed by a presentation of UNEP's report to officials in March 2023. The debris recycling pilot project was initiated from the 18th of July 2023 in the territory of Kangarli village.
Level of Achievement:	Fully


Drivers to support transition from Outputs to the Project Outcomes	Assessment	Justification
D1. National governments are aware of environmental crisis response mechanism and tools	Partially in place	Evidence collected from interviews with representatives of UNEP's regional offices and national governments indicates varying levels of awareness regarding environmental crisis response mechanisms and tools, particularly in situations that do not involve an "immediate emergency". Awareness appears to be stronger in West Asia but would need to be improved in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Moreover, ongoing uncertainty about the future of the JEU, despite its widely recognized role in conducting urgent interventions, brings additional uncertainty.
D2. Environmental dimensions of crises are better understood by partners and stakeholders	In place	Especially for debris related interventions, interviews with partner UN agencies (UNDP, UN-Habitat or IOM) showed a better understanding of environmental dimensions of crises ("shift in mentality"). The fact that UNDP for instance requested for UNEP's assistance in Syria for recycling debris is a good example.
D3. Funding is in place or mobilized to respond to requests in a rapid manner	Partially in place	The experience of the project shows that the mobilization of additional funds was successful to fulfil new requests. In total, the project managed to fundraise more than 7 million dollars. The creation in 2024 of UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund to adequately address growing country requests should ease this fundraising effort despite its lengthy SOPs. Nevertheless, this fund is experiencing challenges due to the recent financial UN crisis, and its efficiency may be compromised.

Assumptions for the change process from Outputs to Project Outcomes	Assessment	Justification
A1. UNEP's expertise to provide impartial environmental assistance in disasters / conflicts is recognized	Holds	Based on interviews with UN Partners and national beneficiaries, UNEP's expertise is well recognized.
A2. Members states continue to demonstrate the political will and commitment to address the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters, or that this will increase.	Holds partially	This assumption is more likely to hold in countries where UNEP has had a long history. For countries where UNEP is not well established, it is more difficult. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that several environmental assessment interventions (Output A) were followed by technical assistance interventions (Output B) under the Rapid Environmental Assistance Project, demonstrating a political commitment. This was the case for Azerbaijan where the Environmental Scoping of the Conflict-Affected Territories intervention initiated early 2022 was followed by the Technical Advisory Support on debris management and recycling intervention later the same year with its pilot debris recycling project. The same goes with the state of Kerala in India which after the PDNA following the floods of the summer 2018, requested for an assessment and technical advisory support on monsoon related landslides. In Iraq, 4 post-conflict related project interventions took place in addition to 3 water related interventions. It all

Assumptions for the change process from Outputs to Project Outcomes	Assessment	Justification
		started by a request from the Government of Iraq through its ministry of Public Health and Environment in assessing and addressing the environmental impacts of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant conflict from 10 Jan 2017. The initial 2017 project intervention on Contaminated Site Assessment and Clean-up in Conflict-affected Areas, led to 3 dedicated debris management and recycling interventions, showing continued political will and commitment. Besides, through the years, additional requests from another ministry (the Ministry of Water resources) were received, also showing the recognition of UNEP's expertise.
A3. Major United Nations and other international policy processes continue to prioritize addressing the environmental causes and consequences of natural and man-made disasters.	Holds	UNEA Resolution 6/12 "Environmental assistance and recovery in area affected by armed conflict" adopted in February 2024 further enhances the mandate of UNEP on addressing the environmental impacts of the conflict and assisting the countries which are in need for technical support. Besides, the fact that UNDP Syria and UNSMIL requested for UNEP's assistance demonstrates that the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts are better considered across the UN system (a "shift of mentality" was mentioned by one relevant interviewee).
A4. Security situation in affected countries allows access to relevant areas when requested	Holds Partially	A limited number of project interventions (Bangladesh, Brazil, DRC) had to be cancelled due to various reasons including security ones, but these cases remained rare throughout the project lifespan. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that substantial work can still be carried out at an acceptable level through remote management. The use of digital communication tools, remote sensing technologies and virtual coordination mechanisms enabled the project to sustain robust engagement in conflict-affected and high-risk settings with little or no physical presence. Furthermore, leveraging environmental NGOs to enhance remote support capacities is another lesson from the project. By using their expertise, on-the-ground networks and flexibility, UNEP was able to strengthen its ability to gather near real-time data, scope environmental damage, and inform targeted interventions, even in areas where direct access was severely constrained, as illustrated by operations in Ukraine and Gaza.

104. A sample of relevant project stakeholders outside UNEP (18) was asked about the rapidity and the quality of the project interventions. The results are presented in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Assessment of the rapidity and quality of the project interventions



105. Overall, for 89% of the respondents the rapidity of UNEP's response was satisfactory. And 80% of the respondents assessed the quality of this response as Satisfactory (47% Highly Satisfactory). This demonstrates the ability of the project to mobilize funds and deploy the relevant experts in a timely manner. The quality of the technical expertise was acclaimed as well of the sustained support and commitment of the project team ("we requested certain follow-up supports and they were given without any hesitation"). Notably, the project team made efforts to present the results of the intervention to the national authorities, which gave credibility to the national environmental entities benefitting from the project intervention which helped convince higher level decision makers to take relevant measures.

106. The following quotes illustrate how some interventions were considered:

- **"The help I got from UNEP enabled me to fulfil my functions, and, and to meet my responsibilities. So, this was wonderful. I mean, this is how a UN agency should act."**
- "The technical capacities and adds-on from UNEP were very valuable".
- "The fact that we could get support from UNEP was great, because I think that it also shifted a bit on the mindset".

107. Nevertheless, some concerns were raised about the quality of the environmental recommendations of the PDNA in Pakistan which were too broad (considered as "hollow slogans" by one of the interviewees) and not tailored enough to the local administrative context to be actionable. Additionally, the fact that the transboundary air pollution was not deeply analysed in the Palestine Air Quality Strategy was mentioned. Due to this weakness, the national beneficiary did not endorse the strategy and this prevented any uptake and follow up actions. More continuous engagement with the project beneficiary throughout the development of this strategy could have avoided this.

108. As shown here, although there was variability in output delivery and activity implementation across the different interventions and partners involved, the availability of outputs can be assessed as Satisfactory.

4.4.2 Achievement of Project Outcomes

Outcome:	Countries and international partners vulnerable to or affected by conflicts and disasters which have access to UNEP's expertise are able to include environmental priorities in their plans and programmes for prevention, response and recovery Indicator 1. Percentage of admissible country requests for prevention, response and recovery support met by UNEP (Target: 95%) Indicator 2. Percentage of post-crisis recovery plans in countries having received UNEP support integrating at least one environmental recommendation (Target: 93%)																																																
Performance against Indicator(s) and Target(s):	Indicator 1: Estimated at 92% Indicator 2: Estimated at 95%																																																
Sources of Information /Evidence: <i>List specific source/s of information that demonstrate the uptake of outputs by intended beneficiaries</i>	The outcome indicators do not reflect any behaviour change, but rather the ability to change by the inclusion of an environmental recommendation in post-recovery plans. For this reason, in addition to interviews with beneficiaries, evidence could also be found in output reports. An actual achievement of 100% for indicator 1 was mentioned both in the Internal Mid-term evaluation and the Operational Project Closure Report. 100% and 95% were considered for indicator 2 in the Mid-term evaluation and the closure report respectively. The periodic monitoring reports also provided evidence as follows: <table><tr><th></th><th>Dec 2017</th><th>Jun 2018</th><th>Dec 2018</th><th>Jun 2019</th><th>Dec 2019</th><th>Jun 2020</th><th>Dec 2020</th></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>100%</td><td>90%</td><td>85%</td></tr><tr><th></th><th>Jun 2021</th><th>Dec 2021</th><th>Jun 2022</th><th>Dec 2022</th><th>Jun 2023</th><th>Dec 2023</th><th></th></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>90%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>95%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>90%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>90%</td><td>95%</td><td>95%</td><td></td></tr></table> Outcome Indicator 1 ("Percentage of admissible country requests for prevention, response and recovery support met by UNEP") seems to encompass Output A indicator ("Percentage of eligible requests for environmental assessments met by UNEP, through a scoping or technical mission") and Output B indicator 2 ("<i>Percentage of eligible requests for technical advice, environmental assistance or support in preparing recovery plans met by UNEP</i>"), nevertheless the estimations of the Outcome Indicator 1 presented in the PIMS or IPMR reporting do not seem to follow this logic, and are not linked to the estimations given for the output indicators. Following the values presented for the output indicators, the actual achievement for the outcome indicator 1 is estimated at 92%. Based on the table presented above, averaging the values for outcome indicator 2 gives an estimation of 95%.		Dec 2017	Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020	1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	95%	2	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	85%		Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023		1	90%	95%	90%	90%	95%	95%		2	90%	90%	95%	90%	95%	95%	
	Dec 2017	Jun 2018	Dec 2018	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	Jun 2020	Dec 2020																																										
1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	95%																																										
2	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	85%																																										
	Jun 2021	Dec 2021	Jun 2022	Dec 2022	Jun 2023	Dec 2023																																											
1	90%	95%	90%	90%	95%	95%																																											
2	90%	90%	95%	90%	95%	95%																																											
Narrative Assessment:	First, the fact that national governments endorsed some project outputs like PDNAs or RDNAs with their environmental recommendations is a good guarantee for the integration of environmental recommendation into post-crisis recovery plans. As an example, after the PDNA in Kerala, following one of its recommendations, a separate working group dedicated to biodiversity, climate change and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) were created at the local government level. It looked after the allocation of local government funds for climate change, biodiversity and DRR activities. As explained above, some environmental assessments were followed by technical assistance showing uptake of the assessments. Usually, UNEP was conducting post-conflict environmental assessments (like the ones conducted in Iraq in areas retaken from ISIS). This project proves that UNEP																																																

	is capable to conduct such assessments during wars (Ukraine and Gaza). And even though these assessments can be considered as "old the same day" since the destructions are still on going, they played a key role in putting the environment in the agenda of the recovery (Green Recovery Platform in Ukraine and Debris Management Working Groups in Gaza). The initial 2017 Technical Note on Environmental Issues in areas retaken from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), led to dedicated debris assessments in Mosul and Kirkuk, which eventually materialised by 2 projects funded by the Japanese Supplementary Fund to conduct pilot debris recycling projects; showing here that beyond the integration of debris recycling in the post-crisis recovery plan, actual implementation was conducted. Additionally, the 2022 PDNA in Pakistan helped elaborate the Resilient Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Framework (4RF) finalised in December 2022 by the Government of Pakistan (Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives) which emphasises a sustainable climate resilience with the adoption of environmental measures (<i>"The protection measures so chosen should be technically sound, locally feasible, economically viable, and environment-friendly"</i> (page 124), <i>"Fourth, green and resilient principles will be incorporated through a 'build back better' approach. The goal of building back better is to rapidly reduce the likelihood of mortality and morbidity in future events, and where possible, generate future growth opportunities. This approach will ensure that flood-affected communities, assets, infrastructure, and livelihoods will be less vulnerable and more resilient to climate change and disaster risks and more environmentally sustainable than before the floods"</i> (pages 35-36)). Besides, some project interventions highly contributed to the development of subsequent projects. This is the case for the feasibility study of a solar project in Libya which made possible the development and implementation of the Libya Electricity Sector Stabilization and Transition Support (LESST) co-led by UNEP and UNDP Libya. Likewise, the 2022 PDNA in Pakistan catalysed the Green Climate Fund (GCF)-funded National Action Plan. The leverage for subsequent projects was not always successful, for instance a proposal was submitted to the Lebanon Financing Facility by UN-Habitat with support from the project team about the management of the asbestos contained in the Beirut Port debris but was not accepted in the end.
Level of Achievement:	Partially given that the target for indicator 1 has not been met

109. Based on what is presented above, achievement of project outcome is rated Satisfactory. Government endorsement of key project outputs, such as PDNAs and RDNAs, supported the integration of environmental measures into post-crisis recovery plans. More notably, some environmental assessments led to tangible actions going beyond ability of inclusion but leading to actual implementation of environmental recommendations.

110. Output A effectively delivered diverse environmental assessments covering impacts, needs, risks, and opportunities across multiple themes (e.g., air pollution, debris, contaminated sites, droughts, oil risks, COVID effects) and regions. These included contributions to four PDNAs in India, Pakistan, Somalia, and Ukraine, and RDNAs in Ukraine and Gaza. Timeliness was generally satisfactory, though variability existed with rapid responses in a few weeks or months. The project team demonstrated readiness to deploy within 1 or 2 weeks. In situations where deployment was delayed, this was primarily due to factors beyond project control—such as the timing of the official country request, limited national capacities to receive the mission, or force majeure constraints including lack of security clearance or adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the Project Team managed to overcome in several occasions (like for the Sri Lanka and the Pakistan interventions) UN's standard requirement of a 21-day notification period for official travel. This underscores the flexibility and responsiveness of the project, even under procedural and logistical constraints.

111. Output B demonstrated strong results through rapid technical support. Highlights include debris recycling pilots in Iraq, first Mosul then replicated in Kirkuk and debris management expertise extended to Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya, and Gaza. Capacity building reached hundreds via in-person or online trainings.

112. Most of the key drivers being in place coupled with the validity of the assumptions supporting the change from outputs to outcome, proved instrumental in achieving the project's intended results. This alignment not only facilitated a satisfactory level of outcome attainment but, in several instances, demonstrated performance exceeding initial expectations evidenced by the capacity of national beneficiaries to move beyond the integration of environmental recommendations in recovery plans toward their concrete implementation and measurable behavioural change.

Rating for Effectiveness: *Satisfactory*

Rating for Availability of Outputs: *Satisfactory*

Rating for Achievement of Project Outcomes: *Satisfactory*

4.5 Financial Management

4.5.1 Adherence to UNEP's Financial Policies and Procedures

113. The Finance Management Officer (FMO) and the PM held regular meetings throughout the lifespan of the project to review the project's budget status in order to anticipate for potential fund mobilization. The project revisions were accompanied by updated budgets linked to additional source of funding.

114. Nevertheless, there seemed to have been some minor discrepancies in the reporting of the financial information of the project. First, the initial budget of the ProDoc presented a duplication of an amount from the Environment Fund. It was counted both as cash and in-kind. This duplication biased the project's initial budget. This duplication was rectified in Revision 2 and onwards even if the cash contribution remained in the excel financial documents but was not included in the calculation formulas. Other discrepancies could be noticed especially, in the amounts mentioned from one revision to another for Revisions 3, 4, 5 and 7. More notably, an additional Swedish funding in Revision 3 did not appear in the text document of the revision but only in its detailed budget. Additionally, while the total budget of the text document of Revision 3 mentioned USD 1,918,100, the detailed budget for the same revision mentioned USD 1,770,072. Finally, these Swedish funds appeared in the shared financial information of Revision 3 as USD 117,972, but as USD 119,232 from Revision 5 and onwards. For transparency reasons, acknowledging these discrepancies and correcting them in the following revisions would have been appreciated.

4.5.2 Completeness of Financial Information

115. Overall, the shared financial information was complete and detailed enough. It would have helped the evaluation to associate the funder program codes (SB-008456.01.02, etc.) to the name of the donors.

116. Because the initial financial system was not designed for it, financial information was not recorded per project intervention. It is important to note that this has been modified for the follow-up project.

Table 13. Financial management

Financial management components:		Rating	Evidence/ Comments
Adherence to UNEP's/Donor's policies and procedures:		MS	Moderately Satisfactory is given considering the minor discrepancies from one revision to another and their lack of acknowledgment or explanation in the following revision.
Any evidence that indicates shortcomings in the project's adherence ³¹ to UNEP or donor policies, procedures or rules		No	See para 95
Was first disbursement carried out within 9 months of UNEP's project approval date.		Yes	The project was approved on 8 th of September 2017 and the first disbursement happened on 3 rd of October 2017.
Were the procurement policies of UNEP and the donor(s) followed? (<i>where applicable</i>)		Yes	
Completeness of project financial information:		S	
Provision of key documents to the evaluator (based on the responses to A-H below)			
A.	Co-financing and Project Cost's tables at design (by budget lines)	Yes	Budget at design with budget lines per year with a duplication of fund biasing the presented figures.
B.	Revisions to the budget	Yes	Budget summary and annexes per budget line and per year for every revision
C.	All relevant project legal agreements (e.g. SSFA, PCA, ICA)	Yes	Legal agreements with CEOBS, IOM, PAX, UNDP and Zoi Environment Network
D.	Proof of fund transfers	N/A	
E.	Proof of co-financing (cash and in-kind)	N/A	
F.	A summary report on the project's expenditures during the life of the project (by budget lines, project components and/or annual level)	Yes	Summary of financial data with expenditures per budget line (Umoja class); - Summary per budget line and per year. - Summary per output. - Summary per funded program. - Summary with detailed data (funded program, output and budget lines).
G.	Copies of any completed audits and management responses (<i>where applicable</i>)	N/A	
H.	Procure documents, including the approved requisition document and Source Selection Plan (<i>where applicable</i>)	N/A	
I.	Any other financial information that was required for this project (list):	N/A	
Overall rating		S	

117. Overall, 92% of the consumable budget were spent. 68% (USD 5,231,818.29) were allocated to Output B related activities, compared to 32% (USD 2,493,428.80) for Output A.

³¹ If the evaluation raises concerns over adherence with policies or standard procedures, a recommendation maybe given to cover the topic in an upcoming audit, or similar financial oversight exercise.

Table 14. Actual project costs (USD)

	Consumable budget	Consumed budget	%	Available budget
Output A	2,874,919.27	2,493,428.80	87%	381,490.47
Output B	5,535,237.73	5,231,818.29	95%	307,112.70
Total	8,410,157.00	7,725,247.09	92%	688,603.17

118. For transparency reasons, discrepancies in the financial data should have been acknowledged in the formal project and/or budget revisions.

Rating for Financial Management: **Satisfactory**

Rating for Adherence to UNEP's Financial Policies and Procedures: **Moderately Satisfactory**

Rating for Completeness of Financial Information: **Satisfactory**

4.6 Efficiency

119. The project went through 8 revisions which included 6 extensions. These revisions and extensions were justified by the allocation of new funds to pursue ongoing support or to respond to new requests from national authorities and/or international partners. They also proved the relevance and necessity of such a project.

120. The project proved its ability to use and leverage existing roles, mechanisms or institutions to conduct its interventions. Collaborations with different UN agencies with strong local presence were developed in Libya (UNSMIL), Iraq (UNAMI and IOM), Syria (UNDP), Lebanon (UN-Habitat) for instance either as facilitator, liaison or implementing partners. Some of these collaborations were informal, notably with UNAMI and UN-Habitat and were good examples of how the One UN modality benefit activities throughout the UN System.

121. Collaborations with UN Country teams and UNEP Regional Offices were leveraged during the project. Nevertheless, evidence show that they could have been strengthened to improve the project efficiency. For example, an earlier involvement of the UNEP Regional Office in Latin America and the Caribbeans could have accelerated the response to the Peace agreement related intervention in Colombia. This would have avoided language barrier issues and eased the identification of key contacts. Additionally, one of the UNAMI staff assisting UNEP in Iraq experienced several push backs from the UN system in the country because UNEP activities in Iraq were not widely known and/or understood. A high-level presentation of UNEP activities to the UN Resident Coordinator could have facilitated their endorsement and wider acceptance.

122. The expertise of several actors was used throughout the project to maximise the cost-effectiveness of the interventions and avoid duplication of efforts. For instance, the laboratory of the Idleb University was used to test the recycled crushed debris. A regional land slide expert from Nepal was deployed in Kerala (India) to build on available local knowledge. The on-going activities of Zoi Environment Network, CEOBS and PAX on the monitoring of the environmental damages of the war in Ukraine were accompanied and used by the project. Even though, one of the three stakeholders felt some duplication of efforts because there was no joint outputs, and that UNEP could have had a stronger lead coordination role to avoid this, this feeling was not shared among most of the stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the environmental damages of the war in Ukraine.

123. Additionally, both the Green Recovery Platform for Ukraine and the Gaza Debris Management Working group were initiated under this project to better coordinate reconstruction efforts and hence strengthen their efficiency. Besides, the way the Debris Working Group operates was inspired by the cluster system in the humanitarian responses.

124. Furthermore, the Branch expert roster was occasionally used under this project like for the COVID-19 related interventions, or the oil spill intervention in Colombia. This roster covers a wide range of area of expertise and could be leveraged to ease the identification and rapid deployment of relevant external consultants. On some occasions, no expert could be identified through the roster,

and the position had to be advertised, which created some delays. **Additionally, from the interviews with the two PMs and as mentioned in the Operational Project Closure Report, interventions where UNEP staff were deployed as team leaders showed more success and follow-up actions. The examples of the 2 PDNAs in India were mentioned to highlight this. The PM was deployed in Kerala for the PDNA in 2018 and follow-up activities were organized in 2019 with an assessment and technical advisory support intervention led by regional expert assisted by a UNEP consultant. On the opposite, a recruited consultant was deployed in 2019 for the PDNA following the Cyclone Fani in Odisha and no follow-up activities were implemented. After the end of their assignment, it is unlikely for consultants to follow-up and push for additional support which UNEP staff are more able to do.**

125. The collaboration with the JEU was successful and complementary with clear roles and no duplication of efforts ("a very good way of working in tandem with the REA project manager" mentioned a former JEU staff). The intervention in Lebanon after the port explosion in 2020 was cited as a good example of complementarity between the two entities. A JEU staff was deployed with an UNDAC mission the day after the blast to carry out an immediate rapid environment assessment. The results of the findings and the initial recommendations were then used for longer term support to implement activities under this project. Besides, in some occasions depending on different context elements (unavailability of JEU capacity, requests being both sent to JEU and UNEP) and when relevant, the manager of this project was deployed like this was the case for the maritime disaster in Sri Lanka in 2021 where he was leading the mission with 3 JEU consultants, or in Arabic speaking countries and/or oil related emergencies.

Rating for Efficiency: Satisfactory

4.7 Monitoring and Reporting

4.7.1 Monitoring of Project Implementation

126. Overall, as mentioned in the Effectiveness Section, the monitoring of project interventions lacked consistency. There was no systematic record and tracking of the requests received and fulfilled or not. Some elements were registered in the "Indicator Progress Remarks" of the PIMS report but the information lacked accuracy and consistency. For instance, for December 2021 for Indicator 2 of Output B it is stated that "UNEP is responding to all requests for support received including in Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations and UN agencies". Nevertheless, the value of the indicator for the same period is 95% (and not 100% as the comment would have suggested). Likewise, for the Output A indicator, 75% is mentioned for June 2020 with the following Indicator Progress Remark: "Most requests for support have been met. This includes support for COVID-19 related assessments some of which are under discussion with UN partners." Listing the unmet requests and detailing the reasons why would have been important.

127. Eventually, the values of both output and outcome indicators were estimated with limited tangible elements about the means of verification, especially for the indicators related to the rapidity of the interventions. Whereas it would have been quite easily possible to properly track the project indicators (especially the output indicators and outcome indicator 1). These shortcomings can be explained by the limited percentage of staff time dedicated to the project of the PM (10%) and other key members of project team (5% each).

128. Furthermore, while the ProDoc mentioned a one-page document related to each intervention to be uploaded into PIMS as part of efforts to demonstrate and clearly communicate the efficient and effective response and use of funds, this did not materialize due to the inability to accommodate this document into PIMS. This could have been anticipated at project design, and alternative solutions could have been developed. Not only would these one-page documents have been useful to communicate about the project interventions, but they would also have been very helpful for the conduct of the terminal evaluation.

4.7.2 Project Reporting

129. The project reporting consisted of half-yearly PIMS reports (and later, IPMR), regular field missions with detailed summary of meetings, as well as itinerary and photographic evidence, and an Operational Project Closure Report.

130. As mentioned earlier in the Effectiveness Section and above, inconsistencies in the PIMS reports were noticed as well as inadequacies with the data mentioned in the Operational Project Closure Report. Nevertheless, no major inconsistencies have been noticed between the PIMS reports and the evidence gathered through interviews.

131. It should also be noted that dedicated Final Progress Project Reports including a Financial Report as annex were prepared for the two debris recycling projects funded by the JSB in Iraq³². These reports were highly appreciated by the donor and included gender disaggregated of the vulnerable targeted population (cash for workers among displaced population).

Rating for Monitoring and Reporting: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Rating for Monitoring of Project Implementation: *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

Rating for Project Reporting: *Moderately Satisfactory*

4.8 Sustainability and/or the Scaling-up of Results

132. Tracking the impact and sustainability of project interventions has proven challenging due to the lack of a follow-up process with both national and international partners. Nevertheless, evidence of project sustainability, replication and scaling up were gathered.

133. Notably, the success of the debris recycling interventions in Iraq initiated similar interventions in the country itself, in Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, and Gaza. It is important to note that in Azerbaijan, scaling-up was done by joint partnership between the government and private sector ventures. Besides, UNDP in Syria submitted different proposals incorporating debris recycling lessons learned from UNEP, showing the institutionalisation and potential replication and scaling up of the project intervention. Additionally, in Iraq, the Central Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, under the Ministry of Planning, finalized in December 2025 the national recycled aggregate standards. The new standards will establish a clear legal framework for producing recycled materials and significantly enhance market acceptance. These standards also extend well beyond conflict debris, introducing circularity into the wider construction sector as they are applicable to all demolition waste. The development of these standards drew on the successes and lessons learned from the debris recycling interventions in the country.

134. Still in Iraq, evidence show that the bioremediation initiative was replicated in at least one other oil field (Salman1) in the South of the country (Al-Mothana governorate), and plans were to extend it to another nearby oil field (Salman2). Likewise, a World Bank project as well as the North Oil Company and private oil company BP are building on the oil pollution mapping assessment prepared under this project to guide their activities. Not only does it show a sustained use of one of the project outputs, but the World Bank aspect also shows country ownership to obtain additional follow-up support.

135. Outside demonstration projects, the 2018 PDNA in Kerala was the first ever conducted in India, and in 2024, the national government of India decided to mainstream the PDNA process. Since then, after every major disaster, a PDNA is mandatory. Still in India, the staff of the Kerala State Disaster Management Authority (KSDMA) trained in Eco-safe road principles through this project in 2019 visited another city impacted by floods (Shimla in Himachal Pradesh) in 2021 to share their knowledge as part of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure. As well, in terms of training, a manual summarizing the disaster waste management training led by UNEP West Asia Regional Office in 2022, was recently published in 2025 by UNEP in order to share more broadly its content.

³²Based on the information gathered during the evaluation, such progress reports were not requested by the other project donors.

136. Furthermore, some project interventions materialised the seed-funding principle of the project, and were able to be followed by long-term fully funded projects. The current UNDP and UNEP joint LESST project is the result of the feasibility study conducted of this project. Likewise, the initial technical assistance and capacity building intervention led in Nigeria in 2017 for HYPREP was followed by a five year and 5 million USD UNEP project. The Green Recovery Platform for Ukraine can also be seen as such. The early monitoring of the environmental damages of the war placed the environment as a key component of the agenda enabling the Green Recovery Platform to have fundraised about 20 million USD so far.

137. Lastly, while the Bougainville Natural Resource Management Hub is no longer operational due to lack of maintenance, Papua New Guinea and UNDP replicated this online toolkit.

138. Although systematic post-project tracking was limited, evidence indicates that institutional and capacity measures have supported the continued use, replication, and scaling up of some project interventions. The debris recycling model piloted in Iraq was replicated in multiple countries and led to national recycled aggregate standards, embedding circular economy principles in Iraq's construction sector. Bioremediation and oil pollution assessment work in Iraq similarly informed national practices and new projects. Project approaches also influenced policy and planning processes, notably through the institutionalization of the PDNA in India and the expansion of related training initiatives. Furthermore, some seed interventions evolved into fully funded programmes such as the UNDP–UNEP LESST initiative in Libya, the UNEP HYPREP project in Nigeria, and the Green Recovery Platform in Ukraine, underscoring the project's sustainability.

Rating for Likelihood of Sustainability and/or scaling up of results: Likely

4.9 Factors Affecting Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues

4.9.1 Quality of Project Management and Supervision

139. The project had two PMs throughout its lifetime. Given that the second PM was already fully part of the project team, the transition was smooth and did not cause any troubles in the project implementation.

140. Eventually, no steering committee was created but this did not seem to have been an issue since at the beginning of the project a strong tripartite coordination between the PM, the Executive Office and the concerned UNEP regional director was in place.

141. Overall, the project team proved its ability to manoeuvre within different difficult contexts and adopted an adaptative management to reach its objectives. Specifically, the project team made efforts to promote good relationships between the national and local authorities to maximise the project intervention's uptake and sustainability. For instance, presentations or workshops were organized with both high-level representatives at the national and local level in Iraq or Azerbaijan (see Para 127 below for further details).

142. Besides, the Project Team showed its adaptability by allocating intervention leading roles to the most relevant UNEP staff (the PM, or a UNEP country office staff, or a UNEP regional office staff) based on their experience or expertise. For instance, the air pollution intervention in Palestine was led by a UNEP West Asia office staff because of his expertise in the topic. Likewise, the first PM was deployed for the PDNA in Kerala and the second to Iraq because of their personal knowledge of to these regions. Moreover, the majority of project partners and beneficiaries interviewed expressed strong appreciation for their smooth collaboration with the project team within the Branch or within the UNEP Regional Offices (Para 102). Additionally, the dedication and professionalism of the two PMs were emphasised during the interviews, as illustrated by this quote from a project beneficiary: "And I would say that the response of UNEP, and particularly, the project officer who was in charge, was really an example of how United Nations could support national governments".

4.9.2 Stakeholders Participation and Cooperation

143. First, to maximise collaboration and coherence of the interventions, the project made efforts to assess the capacities of some stakeholders. For instance, the capacities of the laboratory of the University of Idlib were assessed in terms of crushed debris analysis; likewise, a rapid institutional capacity needs assessment was conducted in 2018 for Iraq's Ministry of Health and Environment for environmental management in the oil and gas sector. Additionally, an assessment of the knowledge of the Ecosystem-based DRR training participants in Kerala was conducted before and after the training.

144. Furthermore, to strengthen the sustainability of the project interventions, the project team engaged with a wide range of national stakeholders, not limiting to UNEP country focal points within the Ministry of environment. In Lebanon, after the port explosion, direct discussions were held with the Lebanese army; likewise in Iraq, the oil bioremediation demonstration project involved a wide variety of stakeholders, farmer associations, National Oil Corporation, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Environment and local governments from all over the country were present.

145. Efforts were also made to regularly consult and engage with the project stakeholders both at the national and local level, either through regular field missions, workshops, trainings, presentations or sharing documents for comments. Debris management workshops were organised in Azerbaijan (Aghdam in March 2023) and in Iraq (Kirkuk in May 2019), an oil contaminated site assessment training workshop was conducted in Baghdad in September 2018, and in Kirkuk in September 2019 for instance. These regular and follow-up consultations were made possible when a UNEP staff was deployed rather than an external consultant, highlighting the fact that the person deployed influences the outcome of an intervention.

4.9.3 Responsiveness to Human Rights and Gender Equality

146. The project made a substantive contribution to the realization of the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment by delivering targeted advisory services and technical assistance to member states and local communities, including scientific assessments, remediation of contaminated sites, and the promotion of circular economy approaches to disaster and conflict debris management aimed at generating employment and enhancing livelihoods. In parallel, debris-related interventions facilitated the dignified return of displaced persons by enabling the reconstruction of housing, the re-establishment of economic activities, and the restoration of livelihoods, while cash-for-work schemes provided income-generating opportunities to vulnerable individuals, selected on the basis of clearly defined vulnerability and displacement criteria to ensure that support reached those most at risk. Additionally, awareness raising efforts in Gaza towards debris were focused on women led households whose children are more at risks around debris.

147. At the same time, the project's predominantly technical orientation, encompassing pollution and waste assessments, environmental monitoring, risk analysis, and remediation planning, offered only limited scope for directly and systematically addressing gender inequalities, as these activities are largely scientific in nature and primarily involve remote data collection (including using satellite or social media), laboratory analysis, and expert advisory outputs. Nevertheless, in those components requiring direct engagement with local communities, particularly debris recovery and recycling, the project sought to integrate gender considerations by allocating short-term employment opportunities to women wherever feasible (16% of the cash for workers were female in the debris recycling intervention in Mosul while due to prevailing traditional and cultural norms, it was not possible to include women in the Kirkuk debris recycling project as cash for worker despite several focus group discussions, awareness sessions and engagement with both men and women groups) and by promoting their representation in every capacity building activities or in debris management committees for instance, thereby strengthening their effective participation in planning and decision-making processes related to environmental rehabilitation and resource management.

4.9.4 Environmental and Social Safeguards

148. The project proactively promoted the integration of environmentally sustainable technologies and practices to lessen the environmental impact of disaster and conflict recovery operations. It employed measures such as debris recycling, bioremediation of contaminated areas, or the use of constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment. In addition, the project developed and publicly shared environmental guidelines and SOPs to support the safe and sustainable use of these technologies. Mitigation measures were also implemented to address identified negative impacts, including, for instance, dust control measures linked to debris recycling activities. Additionally, various environmental impact assessments were conducted under this project each one detailing recommendations and precautions for a sustainable recovery.

149. In interventions that required direct engagement with local communities, the project placed strong emphasis on safeguarding community well-being and minimizing the risk of social tensions. In Northern Iraq, where ethnic identity is particularly sensitive, potential locations for debris recycling activities were therefore identified so as to reflect a broad representation of ethnic groups, with eight areas initially shortlisted and three ultimately selected on the basis of transparent criteria such as accessibility and the volume of available debris. A participatory approach informed the project's interaction with local stakeholders, ensuring that community needs and concerns were systematically identified, discussed, and taken into account in the design and implementation of activities. For instance, for the community solar project feasibility study in Libya, a survey was conducted among communities to assess their interest so that the drivers of conflict would be better addressed in the project design.

4.9.5 Country Ownership and Driven-ness

150. Country ownership and driven-ness varied across the different project interventions, nevertheless, tangible evidence was gathered to demonstrate them. First, UNEP's main focal points were most of the time the Ministry of Environment or one of its departments. These institutions may have a minor role and a limited scope of actions in their country. Some examples like in Sri Lanka and Iraq tend to prove that UNEP's support gave credibility to such institutions and eased their ability to mobilize higher level decision makers.

151. Furthermore, in Ukraine, since the opening of UNEP Ukraine Office, the Ukrainian government with UNEP is organizing regular briefings with the diplomatic community to present them and explain the importance of UNEP's activities in the country. Thanks to this initiative, France has decided to allocate 1 million euros to UNEP for their activities in Ukraine.

152. In Lebanon as well, UNEP's activities towards asbestos in debris managed to create an environmental mindset within the Beirut Municipality at a very high level. This enabled the municipality to reach out to the Ministry of Environment to fasten the approval process to pursue recycling debris activities.

4.9.6 Communication and Public Awareness

153. Various project interventions had a public awareness component, and different awareness tools were produced under the project. For instance, air pollution factsheets and video clips were developed in Afghanistan. As part of the Gaza Debris Management Working Group, safety awareness videos were created both in English and Arabic regarding asbestos, rubble removal, building temporary shelters or damaged buildings. This group is a good example of how experiences were well shared between project partners and other stakeholders; indeed, it builds on outputs and lessons learned from different recent debris management interventions in Iraq, Lebanon or Syria. Furthermore, community awareness sessions were organized in Iraq regarding the treatment wetlands for wastewater recycling.

154. At design, the project had a strong communication strategy allocating a strategic role to UNEP Communication Division. Nevertheless, this never materialized throughout the project lifespan even despite a communication focused recommendation in the MTE of the project. Eventually, the communication of the project was made on ad hoc and case-by-case basis without a proper long-term strategy. Project interventions in Iraq about debris recycling or oil bioremediation, or in Ukraine

for instance were highly advertised as listed in Annex VIII. But they represent an exception even though an allocation of 5 to 10% to every project intervention should have been allocated to communication according to the ProDoc. On one hand, UNEP Communication Division mentioned that they don't recall having any strategic meetings with the project team even after the Mid-term Evaluation; on the other hand, the project team mentions that most of the project interventions were related to environmental risk assessments or technical advisory supports and hence did not represent relevant communication materials especially given the strong selectivity of the Communication Division (on-going exchanges for several months between the branch communication officer and the Communication Division were mentioned about a potential article on the waste water treatment project in Iraq). In all cases, some project partners complained about the invisibility of their work. And ultimately this limited publicity may have hampered the ability of the project to fundraise. Indeed, as highlighted during several interviews, donors are more likely to support projects for which they benefit from visibility and appreciation (and in some cases, donors explicitly request such visibility).

155. It is important to note that on-going conflicts are a sensitive topic and can explain UNEP's timidity in communicating about them. Nevertheless, the lexicon used by UNEP should be the same as the UN system. While the UN Secretary was using "war" to define the Russian invasion of Ukraine since March 2022, UNEP's first report on the environment impact assessment published in October 2022 used "conflict" in its title ("The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine – A Preliminary Review") which was criticised by Ukrainian project partners. Likewise, while this report was commissioned to be presented at the UN General Assembly, it was not finally shared during this event.

Rating for Factors Affecting Performance and Cross-Cutting Issues: *Satisfactory*

*Rating for Quality of Project Management and Supervision: *Satisfactory**

*Rating for Stakeholders Participation and Cooperation: *Highly Satisfactory**

*Rating for Responsiveness to Human Rights and Gender Equality: *Satisfactory**

*Rating for Environmental and Social Safeguards: *Satisfactory**

*Rating for Country Ownership and Driven-ness: *Satisfactory**

*Rating for Communication and Public Awareness: *Moderately Unsatisfactory**

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

156. Overall, the project performed at the Satisfactory level. The strongest performing aspects were its ability to successfully fundraise to fulfil additional requests from member states and effectively deliver in difficult contexts through adaptive management and strong engagement with national and local stakeholders. Despite efforts in developing a wide range of communication products – including stories, press releases, articles, videos or animations – on an ad hoc basis, the designed communication strategy of the project involving UNEP Communication Division from its onset did not materialise, which may have hampered these fundraising efforts by limiting the visibility of the project achievements.

157. The main achievements of the project were its debris-related interventions which enabled UNEP to be recognized as a leading expert in debris recycling, and whose assistance is now being requested by other UN agencies contributing to a global shift in mindset towards disaster- and waste management, as demonstrated by the Gaza Debris Management Working Group (which UNEP co-chairs with UNDP) and in Kirkuk (with UNAMI).

158. Even though most of the project interventions were limited in time and resources, examples of sustainability, replication and scaling up were noticed. And no unintended negative effects were identified.

159. The continuous stream of successful fundraising efforts and project revisions to incorporate additional requests clearly demonstrates that the proof of concept of the REA project is valid. Donors and member states are interested in requesting and receiving environmental assistance from UNEP experts in the wake of crises and emergencies.

160. Nevertheless, UNEP's work about disaster and conflict has always been linked to the sensitivity of its leadership. Despite UNEA Resolution 6/12 was adopted in February 2024, it does not seem that environmental management assistance to countries suffering from disasters and conflicts is central in UNEP's strategy and is more seen as a risk rather than an advocacy opportunity. The Resilience to Disaster & Conflicts subprogramme no longer exists since the MTS 2022-2025, suppressing the regional humanitarian coordinator position which was an important human resource under this project in the preparation and follow-up of the project interventions. Additionally, while the creation of the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund was needed to answer more efficiently to requests from member states, complaints and frustrations aroused due to limitation of funds and lengthy procedures (two examples of disbursements still pending for 4 to 6 months were mentioned during the interviews). As summarized by a UNEP staff, "UNEP Emergency fund was a beautiful idea that UNEP is successfully killing". Likewise, it feels that UNEP is "never fully in" when it comes to disaster and conflict. The opening of a UNEP office in Ukraine was a great initiative, but its limited staff capacities (4 people) make its actions limited, and even though UNDP, UN OCHA or World Food Program are present in accessible zones 20 to 50 kilometres from the front line, UNEP is not deployed in these zones while they are deeply affected by environmental damages.

161. This request-based mechanism crystallises UNEP's uncertain position about disaster and conflict. Indeed, based on the interviews conducted, it appears that this mechanism is not fully well known and that promoting it would be beneficial to expand UNEP's reach. Nevertheless, on one hand, some interviewees see a risk in promoting it given the limitation of funds and the false expectations it may create among potential beneficiaries. On the other hand, some consider that creating expectations from member states, and creating a need would ease fundraising efforts.

Responses to Key Strategic Questions

162. The evaluation ToR included a set of strategic question of interest to UNEP. Regarding **strategic Question 1** "To what extent has the quality and relevance of UNEP's technical assessment and advice helped to mobilize uptake?" - elements of response can be found in the sections on Effectiveness and Sustainability, and can be summarized by this sentence from an official letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka addressed to the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Colombo following the maritime disaster in 2021: "This Ministry is much thankful to all support extended through the Office of the Resident Coordinator as

well as through other specialized agencies of UN, particularly the arrangements to send an expert team through UNEP. The preliminary work done by UNEP experts' team was definitely a breakthrough in engagement with the ship owners and the insurance company." More broadly, the evidence gathered during the evaluation consistently points to four factors which helped mobilize uptake: the credibility that UNEP's name and expertise lent to environmental issues in recovery discussions; the timeliness of assessments delivered early enough to actually influence planning decisions; the relevance of recommendations adapted to local realities and to what national authorities could realistically implement; and the quality of in-country communication, in particular through multi-stakeholder meetings and local dissemination events.

163. **Strategic Question 2** focused on Project Design: "What lessons can be learned about the most effective model for UNEP to be able to continue offering rapid environmental assistance in a relevant and timely manner?" The project design as a request-based mechanism proved its validity over seven years and eight successive revisions — each triggered by new requests, which is in itself a strong proof of concept. Several improvements to the model were nonetheless identified during the evaluation.

164. The most frequently mentioned one concerns the need for a dedicated, full-time project coordinator. As it stood, the coordination function was assumed alongside multiple other responsibilities, which limited monitoring, follow-up and results tracking beyond the production of assessment reports. Ideally, this coordinator should also hold relevant environmental expertise to be able to contribute technically to interventions — not just manage them administratively.

165. A second recurrent observation is that the project suffered from its reactive approach to funding. Rather than starting from zero at each revision and fundraising intervention by intervention, a follow-up project could be designed around a realistic baseline budget derived from historical average expenditure, and fundraising efforts directed proactively against this envelope. This would reduce the administrative burden of successive revisions and allow the team to plan ahead with greater confidence.

166. Third, several interviewees underlined the value of deploying UNEP staff rather than external consultants when possible. Staff members bring the institutional UN background that external experts typically lack, are better placed to advocate for follow-on support internally, and are generally easier to deploy in terms of visa and security arrangements. Creating a formal internal expert roster — with agreements from division heads to release willing volunteers for a defined portion of their time — would formalise this without significant additional cost. The JEU's standby consultant model offers a useful reference in terms of pre-positioning vetted experts who can be contracted quickly when a request arrives.

167. **Strategic Question 3** referred to Operational modalities: "How can UNEP enhance partnerships with the private sector and other UN Agencies to participate in clean-up operations in future?" About the private sector, like UN OCHA is partnering with DHL for its disaster response, a pre-vetted private company could be identified for clean-up activities and more easily deployed when necessary. The key to conduct the due diligence work in advance rather than in the middle of a crisis, which means maintaining an up-to-date mapping of companies with relevant expertise by sector and geography. Likewise, agreements with relevant private companies could be explored to deploy their experts as volunteers — a model already used in other parts of the UN system, which can benefit both sides: UNEP gains deployable expertise at limited cost, while companies gain field exposure and the opportunity to showcase their solutions.

168. New technologies offer a further avenue worth exploring. Companies working on drone-based environmental monitoring, rapid water purification or air filtration systems are often looking for real-world testing opportunities, and a pre-agreed partnership framework would allow UNEP to access these tools while giving companies the visibility they seek. More broadly, UNEP's accumulated experience in debris management could be packaged as a replicable business model and made available to private sector actors in post-crisis contexts where commercial investment is viable — gradually embedding private companies in the debris recycling ecosystem rather than treating them purely as service providers.

169. Regarding partnerships with UN agencies, the Debris Management Working Groups in Gaza — co-chaired by UNEP and UNDP with regular meetings and clear ToR — and in Kirkuk (with UNAMI) offer a model worth replicating. Future interventions could build on this type of structured

coordination framework rather than relying on ad hoc arrangements. UNDP's stronger operational footprint at the country level makes it an indispensable implementation partner in many contexts, and the practice of using UNDP, UN Missions or OCHA's local presence to collect data on UNEP's behalf – as demonstrated in Ukraine near the front line – is a cost-effective modality that could be systematised. Over time, capacity building within national authorities and academia would reduce dependence on external UN support.

170. **Strategic Question 4** was about expanding the resource base: "How can UNEP expand its resource base—both in funding and technical expertise—to better support countries in addressing the environmental impacts of disasters and conflicts?" In terms of financial resources, while the project under review focused its fundraising efforts essentially on funding request-based interventions, UNEP could also make efforts to fundraise for the project itself, to cover some staff time for coordination and monitoring. This would allow a better tracking of results beyond the delivery of assessment reports. Additionally, modalities could be explored to open the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund directly to donor contributions. The fund was a needed step forward, but several interviewees expressed frustration about the slow pace of disbursements (two examples of disbursements still pending for 4 to 6 months were mentioned during the interviews), which undermines the very purpose of a rapid response mechanism. As summarized by one interviewee, the fund was "a beautiful idea that UNEP is successfully killing."

171. UNEP could also explore how other UN agencies like UN OCHA manage their request-based mechanisms and build on UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund to develop an exception mechanism outside the traditional project structure, to increase UNEP's flexibility to respond quickly. Plugging into existing UN emergency funding channels – such as OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) or Flash Appeals, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) or the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF) – through pre-approved proposal templates approvable at division director level is another avenue worth exploring. Targeted engagement with regional donors beyond traditional channels, particularly from the Gulf countries or from emerging economies (China, India, South Africa), could also be further explored. Besides, as UNICEF or the Red Cross are using crowdfunding to leverage private funds, UNEP could explore this source of funding, using disasters and conflicts as an advocacy opportunity.

172. In terms of human resources, within UNEP, an internal expert roster could be created to identify staff from across divisions interested in being deployed in conflict and disaster zones with relevant skills. These people should go through the UN Department for Safety and Security dedicated training to be ready to be deployed in such difficult environments. An example of a request from Somalia about medical waste was mentioned, the project team contacted the International Environmental Technology Centre to intervene but given the difficult context in Somalia, no further engagement could be put in place. Setting up a system which prepares UNEP staff to such contexts could prevent such situations and improve UNEP's ability to use and deploy its in-house technical expertise. Setting up such a system would be more easily implemented with core-funded staff, for whom a certain percentage of time could be formally allocated to disaster and conflict interventions, as part of UNEP's mandate to leave no one behind and target the most vulnerable also see para 147).

173. Regarding **strategic Question 5** on gender – "What opportunities exist for improving gender equity and the empowerment of women in future interventions of this nature?" – initial social and cultural barriers prevented women from fully participating in debris-related interventions. Now that concrete examples of women's successful involvement in such activities have been demonstrated and can be documented, they should be promoted in other similar contexts to help overcome these barriers. As demonstrations have proven to be UNEP's most effective tool for shifting mindsets on technical solutions, the same logic applies here: showing that it works, and showing it visually, is the most powerful lever available.

174. Elements of answer to **strategic Question 6** – "How feasible is it for other parts of UNEP to increase their engagement in providing substantive technical assistance to countries affected by conflicts and disasters?" – can be found in para 147 and 153.

175. **Strategic Question 7** referred to alternative arrangements beyond traditional project structures: "What alternative arrangements can UNEP explore to enhance its agility and responsiveness to requests from conflict- and disaster-affected countries beyond traditional project structures?" The fundamental tension is between UNEP's traditional project management framework – which requires defined activities, outputs and budget lines – and the inherently unpredictable,

demand-driven nature of rapid environmental assistance. It feels that the two are not fully compatible as they stand, and several adjustments could help bridge this gap.

176. First, a pre-approved project envelope with anticipated funding – based on historical average expenditure – would allow the successor project to start with a credible multi-year budget rather than from scratch. This single change would reduce the recurring revision cycle, ease planning, and make for a stronger fundraising proposition to donors (also see para 146).

177. Second, simpler and faster internal approval mechanisms for emergency funding mobilisation would help UNEP capture the narrow windows during which such funding is available. Pre-approved intervention templates by disaster type and environmental sector, approvable at regional or division director level, are the kind of practical shortcut that would make a real difference. UNEP could look at how the broader UN emergency funding architecture works and find ways to plug into it more systematically (also see para 171).

178. The table below provides a summary of the ratings and finding discussed in Chapter 4. The project demonstrates '**Satisfactory**' rating for its overall performance.

Table 15: Summary of project findings and ratings

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
Strategic Relevance		HS
1. Alignment to UNEP MTS, POW and Strategic Priorities	Full alignment and contribution to South-South Cooperation	HS
2. Alignment to UNEP Donor/Partner strategic priorities	Disasters and conflicts fully aligned with project donor priorities	HS
3. Relevance to global, regional, sub-regional and national environmental priorities	Contributions to various SDGs, and UNEA resolutions. The request based mechanism ensured full alignment with recent national environmental priorities.	HS
4. Complementarity with existing interventions/ Coherence	Complementarity identified at design with local UN entities. Benefits for collaboration with the JEU not detailed at design.	S
Quality of Project Design	The project design benefits from inclusive governance, broad UN coordination, solid stakeholder analysis, and structured monitoring and communication, supporting efficient, well-contextualized implementation. Weaknesses are mainly linked to the unusual nature of the project, which does not fully fit UNEP project design evaluation framework.	S
Nature of External Context	The project operated in difficult contexts shaped by COVID-19 and major conflicts, yet largely succeeded through adaptive remote assistance and pioneering coordinated responses, although some planned interventions were ultimately cancelled due to security, logistics, and shifting national priorities	Highly Unfavourable
Effectiveness		S
1. Availability of outputs	The project delivered timely and diverse environmental assessments across multiple themes and regions, including support to several PDNAs and RDNAs. It also showed strong rapid technical assistance and capacity building, notably through debris recycling pilots in Iraq and trainings that reached hundreds of participants.	S
2. Achievement of project outcomes	Government endorsement of key project outputs, such as PDNAs and RDNAs, supported the integration of environmental measures into post-crisis recovery plans. More notably, some environmental assessments led to tangible actions going beyond ability of inclusion but leading to actual implementation of environmental recommendations.	S
Financial Management		S

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
1. Adherence to UNEP's financial policies and procedures	Regular coordination between the FMO and PM kept budgets updated and aligned with new funding sources throughout the project. However, minor financial reporting discrepancies—such as an initial Environment Fund duplication and inconsistent Swedish funding figures across revisions—were not systematically clarified, affecting overall transparency.	MS
2. Completeness of project financial information	The available financial information was generally complete and sufficiently detailed, though linking funder program codes to donor names would have further supported the evaluation. Financial records were not tracked per project intervention due to system design. This limitation has been addressed in the follow-up project.	S
Efficiency	The project effectively leveraged existing UN mechanisms, local institutions, and expert networks to implement cost-effective, well-coordinated interventions, including initiating platforms like the Green Recovery Platform for Ukraine and the Debris Management Working Groups in Gaza and Kirkuk that enhanced reconstruction coordination and mirrored established humanitarian cluster practices.	S
Monitoring and Reporting		MU
1. Monitoring of project implementation	Monitoring of project interventions showed inconsistencies, with incomplete tracking of requests and estimation of indicators. Planned one-page summaries for each intervention were never produced because the system could not host them, and alternative solutions were not developed, reducing both monitoring quality and the usefulness of information for the terminal evaluation.	MU
2. Project reporting	Project reporting relied on semi-annual reports, detailed mission documentation, and an Operational Project Closure Report, with no major contradictions between these and interview evidence despite some noted inconsistencies. Additionally, dedicated reports for the two Japan-funded debris recycling projects in Iraq were produced and valued by the donor,	MS
Sustainability and/or scaling up of results	The project faced challenges in systematically tracking long-term results, yet multiple examples show sustained use, replication, and scaling up of its interventions across countries and institutions. Debris recycling, bioremediation, PDNAs, training outputs, and seed-funded pilots in places like India, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and Ukraine have informed new standards, compulsory procedures, large follow-up programmes, and replicated tools, demonstrating sustainability and multiplier effects.	Likely
Factors Affecting Performance		S
1. Quality of project management and supervision	The project benefitted from a smooth project management transition, effective informal coordination in place of a steering committee, and an adaptable team structure that allocated leadership of interventions to those with the most relevant expertise in challenging contexts.	S
2. Stakeholders' participation and cooperation	The project strengthened collaboration, sustainability, and effectiveness by assessing stakeholder capacities, engaging a broad range of national partners beyond environment ministries, and maintaining regular, in-depth consultations through missions, workshops, trainings, and document reviews, with outcomes often enhanced when UNEP staff led engagements rather than external consultants.	HS
3. Responsiveness to human rights and gender equality	The project strengthened the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment through technical assistance, environmental remediation, and circular debris management that supported livelihoods of vulnerable groups. Its largely technical orientation limited systematic gender integration, but gender considerations were incorporated where community engagement was central, for example by creating casual jobs for women where culturally accepted and promoting their participation in every training.	S

Criterion	Summary assessment	Rating
4. Environmental and social safeguards	The project promoted sustainable recovery via innovative environmental solutions debris recycling and bioremediation, supported by guidelines, SOPs, mitigation measures, and environmental assessments. It prioritized community safeguards through participatory approaches to address needs and minimize social tensions.	S
5. Country ownership and driven-ness	Country ownership varied but showed tangible accomplishments, as notably UNEP bolstered environment ministries' credibility to reach higher decision-makers.	S
6. Communication and public awareness	The project produced various awareness tools like factsheets, videos, and community sessions for interventions in Afghanistan, Gaza, and Iraq, while fostering experience-sharing through groups like Gaza Debris Management. Despite a planned communication strategy involving UNEP's Communication Division, execution was ad hoc with limited strategic outreach, leading to limited visibility hampering fundraising.	MU
Overall Project Performance Rating	The project proved its ability to effectively deliver environmental assessments and advisory support in difficult contexts with some evidence of sustainability and scaling up of results.	Satisfactory

5.2 Lessons Learned

Lesson Learned #1:	The way UNEP deploys its staff and experts has an important bearing on the effectiveness and sustainability of its interventions
Context/comment:	Generally, interventions where UNEP staff were deployed as team leaders showed more success and follow-up actions than the ones where external consultants were deployed. External experts can be too technical, and do not have the full UN background, and are less inclined to push for additional support. Additionally, countries visited by the UNEP Executive Director like Ukraine and Iraq benefitted from more long-term support due to increased and sustained funding.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Para 106 and 127

Lesson Learned #2:³³	Demonstrations are highly effective in showcasing the viability of environmental solutions
Context/comment:	Demonstrations provide tangible, real-world examples of best practices in action, allowing stakeholders to observe methods and outcomes first hand. This visual and practical exposure helps build trust and confidence in the proposed technological or approach, as participants can see concrete results rather than abstract concepts. Thereby, significantly help promote the adoption and scale up of innovative solutions as was particularly evidenced with the debris recycling and treatment wetland interventions in Iraq. Even where it is not possible to implement demonstrations, sharing visual examples of demonstrations (e.g. videos, photos) can also be effective in creating the necessary traction as in the case of Azerbaijan. At the same time, it is important to have a capacity-building component to empower local organizations and teams to enhance their technical skills, knowledge, and resources. By developing the necessary capabilities for sustainable implementation, the technologies and practices demonstrated have a better likelihood of being successfully transferred and maintained over time.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Para 115 and 116

³³From the Operational Project Closure Report

Lesson Learned #3:³⁴	Robust partnerships with UN agencies are effective in achieving and showcasing tangible results
Context/comment:	As a non-resident agency committed to maintaining a minimal footprint on the ground, it is particularly critical for UNEP to collaborate with UN organizations (e.g. UNDP, IOM, UN-Habitat, UN Missions) and other reliable partners that possess strong operational and engineering capabilities locally. These partnerships not only bolster the credibility of project initiatives but also enabled UNEP to access essential local expertise, technical know-how, and practical resources required for effective implementation. By working closely with UN agencies or missions that have well established field operations, the project successfully bridged the gap between UNEP's normative and technical advisory roles and on-site execution, ultimately ensuring that the project's efforts yield measurable and demonstrable outcomes.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Section 4.4.1 and Para 102, 103 and 107

Lesson Learned #4:³⁵	UNEP can successfully operate in active conflict zones and achieve significant results
Context/comment:	In the past, UNEP primarily engaged in post-conflict situations. However, this project demonstrated that effective engagement is also possible during active conflicts, particularly in protracted crises with severe environmental damage. A key example is the deployment of a senior advisor to the UNRCO in Ukraine, which helped UNEP establish a strong presence, mobilize resources, and develop a substantial portfolio of activities. This was followed by UNEP's publication of a desk-based preliminary assessment of the Ukraine conflict that helped reinforce the foundation for its engagement. This was further strengthened by a rapid environmental assessment of the Kakhovka Dam breach, despite its location on an active frontline. The experience in Gaza reinforced that this approach is not isolated but replicable in other conflict zones experiencing major escalations. In Gaza as well as in Kirkuk, UNEP conducted a preliminary environmental assessment of the conflict, carried out regular debris quantification assessments and scenario modelling, and, in collaboration with UNDP, established and formalized debris management working groups. This partnership also enabled the implementation of a pilot debris recycling initiative. The UN Humanitarian Country Team further validated these efforts by classifying debris interventions as high Programme Criticality (Level 1), highlighting their essential role in humanitarian relief and early recovery efforts.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2

Lesson Learned #5:³⁶	Effective coordination between various levels of government is essential for maximizing impact and facilitating scalability
Context/comment:	Limited or conflicting relationships between national and state-level actors can seriously hinder the adoption and scaling of UNEP interventions. This challenge is especially critical in disaster and conflict-affected settings, where governance structures are often strained. To address this issue, proactive measures must be implemented to facilitate information sharing and enhance internal coordination. For example, the project liaison efforts between central and local government authorities in Iraq, Libya, and Azerbaijan were instrumental in achieving more sustainable outcomes, underscoring the importance of aligning efforts across different levels of governance.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Para 123 and 127

³⁴From the Operational Project Closure Report

³⁵From the Operational Project Closure Report

³⁶From the Operational Project Closure Report

5.3 Recommendations

Recommendation #1:	An internal tracking system should be put in place to systematically register all the received requests and their flow of actions
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	No register with the list of requests received throughout the project exists. Output and outcome indicators were globally estimated while given their nature (number of days, percentage of met requests), a systematic tracking system of the requests and their following chain of actions would have allowed to support the calculation/estimation of the overall indicators. For the calculation/estimation of the Indicator B1: # days between an eligible request received and technical advice or support initiated where funding already in place, clarity may need to be given about what is meant by "eligible request received" as well as by "technical advice or support initiated", in order to harmonize the estimations. A suggested template is presented in Annex X.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Sections 4.7 and 4.8
Priority Level:	Important
Type of Recommendation	Project level
Responsibility:	Project manager of the follow-up project
Proposed implementation time-frame:	As soon as possible to be set up for the on-going follow-up project
Recommendation #2:	The actual communication strategy of the project should be clarified to be in line with how it was designed
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	UNEP Communication Division was supposed to have a leading and strategic role in the project communication. This never materialised. The follow-up project ProDoc still mentions a strong collaboration with the Communication Division. And a dedicated budget per intervention is also mentioned ("approximately 5-10%"). A meeting with the Project team of the follow-up project, the Disasters and Conflicts Branch Communication Officer and the Communication Division should be organized to clarify the situation and the actual use of the 5 to 10% of every budget's intervention destined to communication activities. Following the meeting, either the communication strategy aligns with the ProDoc, and project communication efforts should be strengthened to increase its visibility; or this change should be stated in a project revision.
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Section 4.9.6
Priority Level:	Important
Type of Recommendation	Project level
Responsibility:	Project manager of the follow-up project, Disasters and Conflicts Branch Communication Officer, and Director of UNEP Communication Division
Proposed implementation time-frame:	As soon as possible
Recommendation #3:	The agreed SOPs of the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund should be followed and made operational to improve its efficiency.
Challenge/problem to be addressed by the recommendation:	The creation of the UNEP Environmental Emergency Reserve Fund was needed to answer more efficiently to requests from member states, but despite a long process to agree on SOPs, complaints and frustrations aroused because they are not followed and result in limitation of funds and lengthy procedures. This fund crystallises UNEP's uncertain position about disaster and conflict, not being "fully in".
Cross-reference(s) to relevant paragraphs	Para 142 and 143
Priority Level:	Critical
Type of Recommendation	UNEP-wide
Responsibility:	UNEP Executive Office
Proposed implementation time-frame:	As soon as possible

Annex I. Response to Stakeholder Comments

Response to stakeholder comments received but not (fully) accepted by the evaluator(s), where appropriate

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response
	Comments about Monitoring and Reporting	
Page 29	The indicator clearly refers to estimates, and placing excessive emphasis on granular precision risks overlooking its broader purpose—namely, to convey the overall timeliness and rapidity of the response. Moreover, we operate under high pressure and severe time constraints, and documenting such detailed breakdowns is, in my view, secondary and risks detracting from the substantive work. It is not clear that the additional effort required would provide meaningful added value.	Given the nature of the output and outcome indicators (% of requests met, number of days), it is surprising that the project team has not created a tracking tool to accurately measure the indicators. Eventually, their measures rely on estimates with limited data to support them.
Page 40	The project followed the established monitoring system setup by UNEP under PIMS and IPMR, and all the requests received were indicated there. Some ineligible requests were received or where the country or UN System did not choose to pursue the request further, but these were very few. PIMS and IPMR do not include a systematic recording systems for this.	As detailed in Section 4.4.1, the estimations given in the PIMS or IPMR reports lacked consistency and accuracy. The Progress Remarks for instance mentioned for June 2019 "All requests for support that were received by UN Environment were met", or for June 2020 "Most requests for support received by UNEP were addresses" without detailing the origin of the requests or the ones which were not met and the reasons why. Additionally, the narrative of the Progress Remarks were sometimes not in line with the estimate given. Besides, it is unclear that all the received requests were listed in these reports. For instance, even though requests were received from Brazil and DRC, but interventions were not conducted, these requests are not mentioned in the PIMS or IPMR reports.
Page 41	This was indicated as such because while the responses were acted upon, there could have been delays for various reasons outside of project control and so were given lower mark. As indicated, these were taken as estimations and not hard figures..	For reporting reasons, these delays for reasons outside of project control could have been detailed. Triangulation of information is key for the credibility of any evaluation, and there is limited data to support these estimations.
Page 41	I think this overplaying this point, as these were meant to be estimates and indicative of the response situation.	Same as above
Page 41	This would represent an additional layer of reporting, which would be challenging for an overstretched team that is already working at full capacity. We currently provide detailed information through PIMS, CPR, and other UNEP reporting channels, as well as through end-of-project and donor reports. The outputs generated by each project are already quite comprehensive, and it is somewhat surprising that this dimension is not referenced, as it constitutes a central	Page 37 of the ProDoc mentioned "A one page document related to each intervention with be uploaded into PIMS as part of efforts to demonstrate and communicate clearly the efficient and effective response and use of funds". A project is evaluated against its ProDoc or its formal revisions.

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response
	component of our existing reporting framework.	
Page 41	Plus all the technical documents produced under the project and donor reports.	As per UNEP Evaluation Office, the technical documents under the project are considered as deliverables and are evaluated under the Effectiveness criteria. Reporting refers to the following: "UNEP has a centralised Information Management Systems (e.g. PIMS, GEF Portal, etc) in which project managers upload regular progress reports against agreed project milestones. This information will be provided to the Evaluation Consultant(s) by the Evaluation Manager. Some projects have additional requirements to report regularly to funding partners, which will be supplied by the project team (e.g. the Project Implementation Reviews and Tracking Tool for GEF-funded projects). The Evaluation will assess the extent to which both UNEP and donor reporting commitments have been fulfilled. Consideration will be given as to whether reporting has been carried out with respect to the effects of the initiative on disaggregated groups". The donor reports are mentioned in Para 112.
Page 50	I don't think this captures the scope and depth of the monitoring and reporting undertaken by the project, including all the technical reports which I consider to be the core part of the reporting. It also seems to place disproportionate emphasis on elements that are, as noted in the sectional comments, relatively minor in comparison to the project's broader efforts and outputs.	Same as above
Page 50	All the reporting requirements were addressed in my view.	Moderately Satisfactory due to the presence of inconsistencies as detailed in Section 4.4.1.
	Comments about Communication	
Page 45	I think this is understandable as the project dealt with completely separate incidents occurring across multiple thematic areas and geographies, each of which functioned largely as standalone activities. Given their diversity and independence, it would not have been feasible—or appropriate—to integrate them under a single project-level communication.	Page 32 of the ProDoc mentioned the following: "Approximately 5-10% of the project budget per intervention will be used for communications activities, however the ambition and scale of communications activities will aligned to the needs of each specific case." It is important to note that many communications and outreach materials and messages link in to other UN Environment commitments and projects. UN Environment's Communication Division will be closely associated with all external communications activities carried out under this project. A short, targeted communication plan will developed at the outset of each intervention to ensure communications activities are systematically planned to achieve the intended impact. Support from the Communication Division will include developing effective communication strategies, assisting in the design and core messaging of assessment reports, generating media interest in findings

Page Ref	Stakeholder comment	Evaluator(s) Response
		and follow-up and enhancing UN Environment's public profile and corporate image. In collaboration with regional offices, the Communications Division will be responsible for collating impact statistics on all kinds of communications, taking advantage of social media monitoring, their relationship with media monitoring agency Meltwater and other avenues." Eventually, when interviewing UNEP Communication Division's Director, he mentioned that his division was not involved at a strategic level. It is uncertain how the 5-10% of the project budget per intervention were used for their communication. A project is evaluated against its ProDoc or its formal revisions. No revision concerned the Communication strategy of the project.
Page 45	I think the evidence shows that the project sought to maximize opportunities by producing a diverse range of reporting products. However, the constraints related to organizational communication limited the extent to which these products could be utilized or disseminated. These limitations are systemic in nature and are beyond the remit of the project itself.	If the Communication Division was involved as described in the ProDoc, it is likely that these constraints would have had more chance to be overcome.
Page 45	The terminology used in these areas is determined at the UNEP institutional level and falls outside the scope of what an individual project can define or adjust.	This is what is meant by the paragraph. I'm not sure to understand.
Page 51	As noted, these are institutional constraints, and the project's communication efforts were in fact quite extensive—particularly considering the limited resources available.	Same as above.
	Other comments	
Page 33	This reflects a misunderstanding of the intended role and scope of the PDNA on the part of the respondent. The PDNA is designed to provide a national-level overview of damages, losses, and needs. Local-level issues are addressed in subsequent phases, including the development of the recovery strategy and the design of specific projects.	The environmental recommendations of the 2022 PDNA in Pakistan were considered as "hollow slogans" by one of the interviewees.

Annex II. Evaluation Framework

Evaluation Questions	Methods	Sources Of Information
Strategic Questions		
Q1: To what extent has the quality and relevance of UNEP’s technical assessment and advice helped to mobilize uptake?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews and with relevant UNEP project team and project partners.	Project documentation
Q2: What opportunities exist for improving gender equity and the empowerment of women in future interventions of this nature?		Interviews with relevant UNEP project team and project partners.
Q3: Operational modalities: How can UNEP enhance partnerships with the private sector and other UN Agencies to participate in clean-up operations in future?		
Q4: Project design: What lessons can be learned about the most effective model for UNEP to be able to continue offering rapid environmental assistance in a relevant and timely manner?		
Q5: How can UNEP expand its resource base—both in funding and technical expertise—to better support countries in addressing the environmental impacts of disasters and conflicts?		
Q6: How feasible is it for other parts of UNEP to increase their engagement in providing substantive technical assistance to countries affected by conflicts and disasters?		
Q7: What alternative arrangements can UNEP explore to enhance its agility and responsiveness to requests from conflict- and disaster-affected countries beyond traditional project structures?		
Strategic Relevance		
How does the project align with UNEP, Donors and Country (global, regional, sub-regional and national) strategic priorities? How well was the project designed in complementarity with relevant existing interventions to avoid duplication of effort?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team and UN project partners	Project documentation and all relevant frameworks and reports Interviews with relevant UNEP project team and UN project partners
Quality of Project Design		
How satisfactory was the project design? Was the project designed to depend on revisions for its pursuit?	Assessment / rating template completed. Triangulation of information gathered during interviews with relevant UNEP project team	Project document, project revisions, Project Review Committee report Interviews with UNEP project manager and PRC
Nature of External Context		
By nature, the project deals with difficult contexts; were there any instances that led to the project’s interventions being cancelled due to the external context?	Triangulation of information gathered during interviews with relevant UNEP project team and UN project partners	Interviews with relevant UNEP project team and UN project partners
Effectiveness		
Availability of Outputs		
How successful was the project in producing the programmed outputs and making them available to the intended beneficiaries? How successful was the project in responding fast to the requests?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and	Project documentation including correspondence, monitoring reports, project closure report and field mission reports.

Evaluation Questions	Methods	Sources Of Information
	national authorities Analysis of the sequence of the request correspondences	Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Achievement of Project Outcomes		
How successful was the project interventions and implementation in achieving the intended outcomes? Are the drivers and assumptions in place? Has there been any evidence of any negative effects of the project?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Project documentation including monitoring reports, project closure report and field mission reports. Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Financial Management		
Did the project financial management follow financial standards and UNEP financial management policies? Are the financial records complete, accurate and available? Has communication between the project manager and the FMO been effective, facilitating the planning and delivery of resources in a timely and efficient manner?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team	Financial project documentation Interviews with project managers and FMO
Efficiency		
Have the translation of inputs into outputs been achieved at the lowest possible cost (cost-effectiveness)? What efforts were made by the project team to use of/build upon pre-existing institutions, agreements and partnerships, data sources, synergies and complementarities with other initiatives, programmes and projects etc. during project implementation to increase project efficiency? How did the revisions link to additional funding impacted the rapidity of the responses? How efficient was the expert roster to ease the identification of capable experts?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team and project partners	Project documentation including monitoring reports, project closure report and field mission reports. Interviews with relevant UNEP project team and project partners
Monitoring and Reporting		
Monitoring of project implementation		
Was the monitoring system operating? Did it facilitate timely tracking of results and progress towards project objectives throughout the project implementation period?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team	Project documentation including monitoring reports, project closure report and field mission reports. Interviews with project managers
Project reporting		
How regularly and completely were project reports and tracking tools completed and submitted?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team	Project documentation including monitoring reports, project closure report and field mission reports. Interviews with project managers
Sustainability		

Evaluation Questions	Methods	Sources Of Information
To what extent are social or political factors supporting the continuation and further development of benefits realized through the project outcomes? What is the level of ownership, interest and commitment among government and other stakeholders to take the project outputs forwards? To what extent are the project outcomes dependent on future funding for the benefits they bring to be sustained? To what extent is sustainability dependent on institutional frameworks and governance?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Factors affecting project performance and cross cutting issues		
Quality of project management and supervision		
How effective and adaptative was the project management throughout the project implementation? Would the establishment of a steering committee as originally planned have improved the project supervision? What mechanisms were put in place to replace their role?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, and project partners
Stakeholder participation and cooperation		
How effective was communication and consultation with stakeholders throughout the project life and the support given to maximise collaboration and coherence between various stakeholders? To what extent were national and local authorities able to share information and coordinate their actions?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Responsiveness to human rights and gender equity		
How well did the project interventions respond to human rights and gender equity among the affected communities?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Environmental and social safeguards		
To what extent did the project adhere to the environmental and social safeguards laid out in UNEP policy? Were safeguard identification and mitigation plans being monitored and steps taken to minimize negative effects?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, and project partners
Country ownership and driven-ness		
To what extent all government ministries / public sector agencies that are essential for moving from outputs to project outcomes or from project outcomes to intermediate states took a leadership role in the execution of the project?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UN project partners and national authorities	Relevant project documentation Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, project partners and national authorities
Communication and public awareness		
What was the level of learning and sharing among project partners? What public awareness activities took place, and how effective were they in supporting the realization (and further sustaining) of project results? To what extent was the communication strategy of the project successful in attracting new donors?	Triangulation of information gathered during desktop review and interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UNEP Communication Division and donors	Project communication products Interviews with relevant UNEP project team, UNEP Communication Division and donors

Annex III. Stakeholders Consulted during the Evaluation

Stakeholders consulted during the evaluation

Organisation	Position	Role in the project	Gender
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Project Manager (2020-2024)	M
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	Director of the Coordination Office	First Project Manager (2017-2020)	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	FMO	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Afghanistan and Ukraine interventions	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Azerbaijan interventions	F
UNEP	Europe Regional Office	Ukraine interventions	F
United Nations Secretariat Joint Initiative	Senior Programme Advisor	Former Regional Conflicts and Disasters Sub-programme Coordinator for Africa	M
UNEP	Communication Division	Director	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Senior Debris Advisor	M
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	Head of Strategic Communications	Former UNEP Conflict and Disaster Subprogramme Coordinator	M
UNEP/GCF	National Technical Advisor for Pakistan's National Adaptation Plan	Pakistan intervention	F
UNEP/GCF	National Technical Officer for Pakistan's National Adaptation Plan	Pakistan intervention	M
UNEP		National Consultant for India landslide intervention	F
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch (former)	Papua New Guinea and Libya (energy) UNEP lead	M
UNEP/UNDP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Papua New Guinea UNEP lead	F
UNEP	Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office	Colombia UNEP lead	M
UNEP	South Sudan Office (former)	South Sudan UNEP lead	M
UNEP	Sudan Office (former) and Disasters and Conflict Branch (former)	Sudan UNEP lead and manager of the follow-up project	M
UNEP	Ukraine Office	Ukraine UNEP lead	M
UNEP	West Asia Regional Office	SFO Safer UNEP lead	M
UNEP	West Asia Regional Office	Palestine (Air quality) and Disaster waste training UNEP lead	M
IOM	Infrastructure Coordinator	Iraq interventions	M
JEU	Programme Manager Officer	Yemen intervention	M
JEU	Focal Point for Response	COVID-19, Lebanon and Mauritius interventions	F
UN-Habitat	Senior Engineer	Lebanon intervention	M
UN-Habitat	Head of Programme	Palestine (debris) interventions	M
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)	Associate Coordination Officer	Local Liaison in Iraq (debris and oil remediation) interventions	M
United Nations Assistance Missions in Iraq (UNAMI)	Coordination Officer	Regional Liaison in Iraq (debris) interventions in Kirkuk and Mosul, Oil Spill remediation in Kirkuk	M
UNDP Palestine	Co-Lead Debris Working Group	Palestine (debris) interventions	M
UNDP Palestine	Engineer	Palestine (debris) interventions	M
UNSMIL	Political Officer	Libya (energy)	M
National Institute of Science Education and Research	Coordinator, DST Centre for Policy Research	Expert	M
Institute of Himalayan Risk Reduction (IHRR)		Expert	M

Organisation	Position	Role in the project	Gender
World Maritime University (WMU) International Maritime Organization (IMO)	Special Advisor	Expert	M
Kerala State Disaster Management Authority	Member Secretary	National beneficiary (India)	M
Ministry of Public Health and Environment of Iraq	Minister	National beneficiary (Iraq)	M
Ministry of Water Resources		National beneficiary (Iraq, wastewater)	M
Ministry of Water Resources	Director General	National beneficiary (Iraq, Marshlands)	F
Palestine Environment Quality Authority	Deputy Chairperson	National beneficiary (Palestine)	M
Sri Lanka Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA)	Chairperson	National beneficiary (Sri Lanka)	F
Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Permanent representative of Ukraine to UNEP	National beneficiary (Ukraine)	M
Pakistan Ministry of Planning & Special Initiative	Senior Joint Secretary	National beneficiary (Pakistan)	M
Ukraine State Ecological Academy of Postgraduate Education and Management"	Head of Aquatic Ecosystems and Bioresources Department	Training participant	M
Greater Amman Municipality	Head of Environmental Protection Section	Training participant	M
HALO Trust	Head of Strategic Programming	Beneficiary (Libya) and NGO partner for Palestine (debris) intervention	M
UNDP Syria	Programme Officer	Beneficiary (Syria)	M
PAX	Project leader	NGO partner for Iraq (contaminated sites) and Ukraine (monitoring) interventions	M
Zoi Environment Network	Deputy Director	NGO partner for Ukraine (monitoring) intervention	M
Zoi Environment Network	Project management, analysis and communication	NGO partner for Palestine (air pollution) intervention	F
The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS)	Director	NGO partner for Ukraine (monitoring) intervention	M
GRID-Arendal	Senior Advisor	NGO partner for Ukraine (assessment) and Palestine (Gaza assessment) interventions	M
PERSGA	Coordinator – Sea-based pollution Programme	Partner for the FSO Safer intervention	M
Embassy of Japan in Iraq		Donor for Iraq (debris) interventions	M
Ukraine State Ecological Academy of Postgraduate Education and Management"	Head of Aquatic Ecosystems and Bioresources Department	Training participant	M
Greater Amman Municipality	Head of Environmental Protection Section	Training participant	M

Annex IV. Key Documents Consulted

Project planning and reporting documents

- Project Document, September 2017
- Project Revision 1, September 2018
- Project Revision 2, November 2018
- Project Revision 3, May 2019
- Project Revision 4, May 2020
- Project Revision 5, March 2021
- Project Revision 6, December 2021
- Project Revision 7, July 2023
- Project Revision 8, April 2024
- Project budget and budget revisions
- PIMS Multi-Year report (2017-2022)
- Project Progress report, June 2023
- Project Progress report, December 2023
- Operational Project Closure Report, February 2025

Project outputs – Overall

- Report of the UNEP Environmental Scoping Mission to the Conflict-Affected Territories of Azerbaijan, April 2022
- Mission de détermination de l'évaluation des risques – Les installations de production pétrolières abandonnées au Bénin, August 2017
- Environment for Peace - UN Environment's proposed contribution to the post conflict development of Colombia, April 2017
- Global support for effective crisis-related environmental response to the COVID-19 crisis, November 2021
- Report on the training workshop on spill preparedness, response & shoreline cleanup to accidental marine pollution for Yemenis oil spill responders, May 2021
- Report on the Regional Workshop on the Use of Dispersants in Marine Oil Spill Response, January 2021
- Kerala Post Disaster Needs Assessment – Floods and Landslides, August 2018
- Cyclone Fani, Odisha, Damage, Loss, and Needs assessment, June 2019
- Technical Note, Environmental issues in areas retaken from ISIL Mosul, Iraq, July-August 2017
- Final Report to the Embassy of Japan (Baghdad), Supporting returnees by creating emergency livelihoods through debris recycling in Mosul, December 2022
- Final Report - Scaling-up support for returnee emergency livelihoods through debris recycling interventions in conflict-affected areas of Iraq, April 2024
- Roadmap for Beirut debris management, May 2021

- Environmental risks related to grounded ship Yu Feng n°67, Republic of Mauritius, June 2023
- Summary of Key Activities and Outputs from Six Months of Advisory Support to HYPREP from January – June 2024
- Pakistan Flood, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, Main report, October 2022
- Palestine Pathways to cleaner air – Situation analysis and strategy, 2021
- Gaza Strip Interim Damage Assessment, Summary Note, March 2024
- Environmental impact of the conflict in Gaza Preliminary assessment of environmental impacts, 2024
- Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment Vol. I, II and III, 2017
- X-Press Pearl maritime disaster, Sri Lanka – Report of the UN Environmental advisory mission, July 2021
- Rapid Environmental Assessment: How COVID-19 Affects the Environment in Sudan, 2021
- Rapid Environmental Assessment of Kakhovka Dam Breach, Ukraine, 2023
- The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine – A Preliminary Review, 2022
- Disaster Waste Management in West Asia – A Training Manual, July 2025
- UN YEMEN – Technical Support Team Report – MV Rubymar, March 2024

Previous evaluations

- Project Health Review – Q1 2020, April 2020
- Internal Mid-term Evaluation, June 2021

Reference documents

- UNEP Medium Term Strategy (2014-2017)
- UNEP Medium Term Strategy (2018-2021)
- UNEP Medium Term Strategy (2022-2025)
- UNEP Program of Work (2016-2017)
- UNEP Program of Work (2018-2019)
- UNEP Program of Work (2020-2021)
- UNEP Program of Work (2022-2023)
- UNEP Program of Work (2022-2025)

Annex V. List of project interventions

Year	Region	Localisation	Details	Category
2019	Asia-Pacific	Afghanistan	Rapid air pollution assessment	Air pollution
2021	Asia-Pacific	Afghanistan	Assessment of COVID-19 Impacts	Pandemics
2022	Europe	Azerbaijan	Technical advisory support on debris management and recycling	Conflict and disaster debris
2022	Europe	Azerbaijan	Environmental Scoping of the Conflict-Affected Territories	Multi-thematic environmental assessments for conflict zone
2017	Africa	Benin	Environmental Risk Assessment from old oil field installations	Oil spills & decommissioning of abandoned oil rigs
2017	Latin America	Colombia	Supporting the Implementation of the Environmental Dimensions of the Peace Accords	Multi-thematic environmental assessments for conflict zone
2018	Latin America	Colombia	Rapid Environmental Assessment of the Lindame 158 oil well	Oil spills & decommissioning of abandoned oil rigs
2018	Asia-Pacific	India	Post-Flood Environmental Assessment and PDNA after Kerala Floods	Floods & cyclones PDNA
2019	Asia-Pacific	India	Cyclone Fani Disaster, Loss and Needs Assessment	Floods & cyclones DLNA
2019	Asia-Pacific	India	Assessment and technical advisory support on monsoon related landslides	Landslides
2017	West Asia	Iraq	Contaminated Site Assessment and Clean-up in Conflict-affected Areas	Contaminated site assessment
2018	West Asia	Iraq	conflict debris management and recycling	Conflict and disaster debris
2018	West Asia	Iraq	Mass Fish Kill Event	Fish kills
2019	West Asia	Iraq	Assessment of water shortage crisis and fire outbreak in southern marshes	Drought
2021	West Asia	Iraq	Mosul debris recycling centre	Conflict and disaster debris
2023	West Asia	Iraq	Mansuriya debris recycling system, Kirkuk	Conflict and disaster debris
2023	West Asia	Iraq	Treatment wetlands for wastewater recycling and pollution reduction	Nature-based solutions
2020	West Asia	Lebanon	Beirut Port Debris Management	Conflict and disaster debris
2020	Africa	Libya	Community-powered solar energy	Renewable energy
2024	Africa	Libya	Sirte/Misrate debris recycling pilot project	Conflict and disaster debris
2022	Africa	Mauritius	Yu Feng no. 67 maritime disaster	Maritime disasters
2017	Africa	Nigeria	HYPREP technical assistance and capacity building support project	Oil spills & decommissioning of abandoned oil rigs
2024	Africa	Nigeria	Remote technical assistance to HYPREP	Oil spills & decommissioning of abandoned oil rigs
2022	Asia-Pacific	Pakistan	Floods Post-Disaster and Needs Assessment	Floods & cyclones
2018	West Asia	Palestine	State of the Environment Reporting	Multi-thematic environmental assessments for conflict zone
2021	West Asia	Palestine	Air quality assessment and strategy	Air pollution
2023	West Asia	Palestine	Gaza debris management assessment and advisory support	Conflict and disaster debris
2024	West Asia	Palestine	Gaza Interim Damage Assessment	Conflict related PDNA or

Year	Region	Localisation	Details	Category
				RDNA
2021	Asia-Pacific	Papua New Guinea	Natural Resources Hub	Development of environmental information management systems
2017	Africa	Somalia	Drought Impact and Needs Assessment	Drought
2020	Africa	South Africa	Covid-19 rapid needs assessment	Pandemics
2020	Africa	South Sudan	Provision of Co- Produced Climate Information Services and Communications Strategy	Development of environmental information management systems
2021	Asia-Pacific	Sri Lanka	MS X-press maritime disaster	Maritime disasters
2021	Africa	Sudan	COVID-19 rapid environmental assessment	Pandemics
2023	West Asia	Syria	Earthquake debris assessment	Conflict and disaster debris
2024	West Asia	Syria	debris recycling technical assistance	Conflict and disaster debris
2022	Europe	Ukraine	Rapid Damage Needs Assessments	Conflict related PDNA or RDNA
2022	Europe	Ukraine	Trainings on contaminated site assessment	Contaminated site assessment
2022	Europe	Ukraine	monitoring of the conflict's environmental impacts	development of environmental information management systems
2022	Europe	Ukraine	Preliminary environmental assessment	Multi-thematic environmental assessments for conflict zone
2023	Europe	Ukraine	Kakhovka dam assessment	Conflict related PDNA or RDNA
2024	Europe	Ukraine	Green Recovery Platform	Recovery Policy Support
2024	West Asia	Yemen	MV Rubymar maritime disaster	Maritime disasters
2020	Regional	Red Sea	Oil Spill Contingency Planning for FSO Safer	Maritime disasters
2022	Regional	West Asia	Disaster waste management training (Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Yemen).	Conflict and disaster debris
2020	Global		COVID-19 Waste Management	Pandemics
2023	Global		Review of environment sector in Hydrometeorological Post Disaster Needs Assessments	Floods & cyclones PDNA

Annex VI. Evaluation Itinerary

Visit to Geneva from 4th to 7th of November, in-person interviews with the following people

Organisation	Position	Role in the project	Gender
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Project Manager (2020-2024)	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	FMO	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Afghanistan and Ukraine interventions	M
UNEP	Disasters and Conflict Branch	Azerbaijan interventions	F
UNEP	Europe Regional Office	Ukraine interventions	F
Zoi Environment Institute	Deputy Director	NGO partner for Ukraine (monitoring) intervention	M

Visit to Bonn from 8th to 11th of November, in-person interviews with the following person

Organisation	Position	Role in the project	Gender
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	Director of the Coordination Office	First Project Manager (2017-2020)	M

Annex VII. Environmental and Social Safeguards Assessment

ESS PLANNING AT PROJECT DESIGN	
List any ESS issues identified at project design (e.g. SS 1.7, SS 2.3, etc.) ³⁷	Will the proposed project activities involve dam safety operations? "Maybe, Dam stability assessments, especially for tailings dams, are sometimes requested by countries affected by disasters. " ESS 6.1 ("Maybe, significantly affecting communities, a temporary relocation might be required (as in the 2014 Haiyan and Estancia oil spill). In such cases, relocation will be carried out in accordance with humanitarian principles and guidance and under the overall direction of national/local authorities.") ESS 7.1 ("Maybe, in case of environmental crisis in such location ") ESS 7.2 ("Maybe, in case of environmental crisis in such location ")
For any ESS issues identified at project design, were <u>mitigation strategies</u> developed (Y/N)? (If yes, briefly describe)	No
Were any <u>gaps</u> in ESS issues identified at the evaluation inception phase (Y/N)? (If yes, briefly describe)	No

ESS MONITORING AT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION	
Is there evidence that the potential emergence of ESS issues was actively <u>monitored</u> during project implementation (Y/N)? ³⁸ (If yes, briefly describe)	No
Is there a justification for the absence of ESS monitoring (Y/N)? (If yes, briefly describe ³⁹)	No

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIVENESS DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION	
Identify the ESS issues/events <u>triggered</u> ⁴⁰ by the project. ⁴¹	None

³⁷ Select from the list of Environmental and Social Safeguards Risks in Table 1 of the template (tool 14, Safeguards Assessment Template).

³⁸ **Low risk:** Negative impacts minimal or negligible: no further study or impact management required.

Moderate risk: Potential negative impacts, but limited in scale, not unprecedented or irreversible and generally limited to programme/project area; impacts amenable to management using standard mitigation measures; limited environmental or social analysis may be required to develop an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). Straightforward application of good practice may be sufficient without additional study.

High risk: Potential for significant negative impacts (e.g. irreversible, unprecedented, cumulative, significant stakeholder concerns); Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) (or Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA)) including a full impact assessment may be required, followed by an effective comprehensive safeguard management plan.

³⁹ For instance, during COVID, access to the field may have been restricted

⁴⁰ 'Triggered' refers to environmental or social issues/events that are caused or exacerbated—directly or indirectly—as a result of the project's activities, interventions, or presence.

Describe <u>consequences</u> of ESS issues/events during project implementation.	
Describe the management response and identify supporting documentation. ^{42, 43}	
Were negative ESS effects offset by management response (Y/N)? (If yes, briefly describe)	

⁴¹ Select from the list of Environmental and Social Safeguards Risks in Table 1 of the template (tool 14, Safeguards Assessment Template).

⁴² For most low-moderate risk projects, good practice approach may be sufficient. Project should demonstrate safeguard management approach in the project activities, budget, risks management, stakeholder engagement or/and monitoring segments of the project document to avoid or minimize the identified potential risks without preparing a separate safeguard management plan.

⁴³ E.g., GEF Project Implementation Report (PIR), Progress Report, Minutes, etc.

Annex VIII. Communication and Outreach Tools

Date	Country	Media Outlet	Publication source	Headline + Link
12 September 2017	Afghanistan	UNEP	Global	Hard to Breathe: Afghanistan Air Pollution - Part 2
3 October 2017	Iraq	Circle of Blue	Global	Islamic State Occupation Wrecks Iraq Environment and Infrastructure
6 November 2017	Iraq	New Security Beat	USA	A Toxic Legacy: Remediating Pollution in Iraq
21 March 2018	Iraq	UN-Habitat, UNAMI	Iraq	Multi-stakeholder city-wide debris management master plan initiated in UNEP and UN-Habitat 2-day workshop in Mosul
23 March 2018	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Mosul: Picking up the pieces
26 March 2018	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Rising from the rubble: Iraq's Mosul takes steps to deal with war debris
12 November 2018	Iraq	UNEP	Global	War-torn cities in Iraq keen to boost reconstruction efforts by recycling debris
26 March 2019	Iraq	UNAMI	Iraq	UNEP assessment visit to Kirkuk
29 March 2019	Iraq	UNAMI	Iraq	It's not rubbish: UNEP experts assist Kirkuk with debris management
29 April 2019	Afghanistan	UNEP	Global	Gasping for air in Kabul
18 October 2019	Kerala	UNEP	Global	Promoting livelihoods through nature-based disaster risk reduction in India
23 October 2019	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Microbes offer hope of cleaning up Iraq conflict's pollution legacy
25 February 2020	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Environmental recovery in Iraq: Kirkuk bioremediation trial of oil contaminated soil
3 March 2020	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Environmental recovery in Iraq: Cleaning up conflict pollution using natural solutions
17 April 2020	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Iraq: Debris recycling to help displaced return, amidst COVID-19 outbreak risk
20 April 2020	Iraq	Middle East Monitor (MEMO)	Palestine	UN debris-recycling project enables IDPs return to northern Iraq
19 June 2020	Iraq	UNEP	Global	As conflict abates, Iraqi villages begin to tackle "huge" problem of rubble
24 June 2020	Iraq	Sustainability Times	France	Rebuilding a shattered Iraq, with the recycled debris of war
8 July 2020	COVID-19	UNEP	Global	Supporting Haiti's COVID-19 response
16 July 2020	Yemen	UNEP	Global	Briefing to the Security Council on the situation in Yemen
4 May 2021	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Circular solution to Mosul's conflict debris launched
July 2021	Sri Lanka	UNEP	Global	Oil, acid, plastic: Inside the shipping disaster gripping Sri Lanka
28 July 2022	Iraq	UNEP	Global	Mosul's recovery moves towards a circular economy
29 October 2022	Pakistan	UNDP	Pakistan	Pakistan floods 2022: Post-disaster needs assessment
8 February 2023	Ukraine	UNEP	Global	From disasters to conflicts: tackling the impact on people

Date	Country	Media Outlet	Publication source	Headline + Link
				and planet
22 February 2023	Ukraine	UNEP	Global	The toxic legacy of the Ukraine war
23 March 2023	Ukraine	UN	Ukraine	Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment United Nations in Ukraine
17 October 2023	Ukraine	UN	Ukraine	The Post Disaster Needs Assessment report of the Kakhovka Dam Disaster United Nations in Ukraine
14 February 2024	Ukraine	UN	Ukraine	Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released
7 March 2024	Iraq	UNAMI	Iraq	Rubble to Roads: IOM and UNEP support Kirkuk's Road to Recovery in Iraq
March 2024	Yemen	OCHA	Yemen	UN Yemen: Technical Support Team Report MV Rubymar -

ANNEX IX. Brief CV of the evaluator

Name	Victor BEGUERIE
Profession	Evaluation Specialist
Nationality	French
Country experience	Europe: France Africa: Burkina Faso, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Uganda Oceania: Tonga
Education	Ph.D. in Development Economics (Center for Studies and Research on International Development (CERDI), Clermont-Ferrand) – 2015 Thesis: "Impact of energy access on women and children living conditions in rural areas – Impact evaluation of the Multifunctional Platform Program in Burkina Faso" M.S. Project Analysis (CERDI, Clermont-Ferrand) – 2008 Development Economics (CERDI, Clermont-Ferrand) – 2007

Short biography

Mr. Victor BEGUERIE is an independent consultant with over fifteen years of professional experience in the evaluation of development projects and programmes, primarily across Africa. He has conducted evaluations on behalf of non-governmental organizations, international institutions, and research organizations.

In addition to his solid expertise in evaluation, Mr. BEGUERIE possesses a broad technical background encompassing plastic waste management, decentralized access to electricity and renewable energy. His professional experience includes assignments in complex and challenging contexts, notably in Liberia with the Red Cross and in Haiti, where he oversaw the Terminal Evaluation of a UNEP energy access project.

Between 2021 and 2023, Mr. BEGUERIE served as an Evaluation Officer within the Evaluation Office of UNEP. Since 2018, he has been actively engaged with the Kenyan environmental NGO The Flipflop Project, where he currently holds the positions of Head of Monitoring and Evaluation and Programme Manager.

Key specialities and capabilities cover:

- ▶ Evaluation
- ▶ Impact evaluation
- ▶ Programme and project management
- ▶ Plastic waste
- ▶ Decentralized access to electricity
- ▶ Renewable energy

Selected assignments and experiences

- ▶ 2018 – to date: The Flipflopi Project – **Monitoring & Evaluation and Project Management**
 - Development and tracking of Monitoring & Evaluation tools (data analysis)
 - Assessment of the living income of informal waste pickers in Lamu, Nairobi and Kisumu (Systemiq/Fair Circularity Initiative)
 - Active participation in the 3 Flipflopi sailing expeditions, involved in the micro plastic surveys
 - Uganda Country Coordinator for Lake Victoria Expedition
 - Search for financing (submission of proposals)
- ▶ 2021 – 2023: UNEP Evaluation Office – **Evaluation Officer**
 - Managing Terminal Evaluations of UNEP and GEF projects (hiring and training consultants, quality insurance of deliverables and follow up of implementation of recommendations)
- ▶ 2023 and 2017: Foundation for studies and Research on International Development (FERDI) – **Impact Evaluation Lead**
 - Impact evaluation of "Café Lumière" Project in Madagascar (evaluation design and management of baseline and follow-up surveys)
- ▶ 2020: UNEP – **Evaluation Consultant**
 - Terminal Review of the project UNEP/MEA DG ENV GPGC PCA – Integration of Statistical and Geospatial Information for Monitoring and Reporting of the Environmental Dimension of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs – Phase I: Development of an international standard methodology for data collection for SDG Global indicators
- ▶ 2009 – 2012: – **Impact Evaluation Lead** of the Multifunctional Platform Program of UNDP in Burkina Faso
 - Conducting baseline and follow up household surveys
 - Organization and monitoring of the surveys on the field (Sampling, formulation of questionnaires, field investigators training)
 - Data Analysis

ANNEX X. Recommendation 1 – Suggested template for internal tracking system of requests

[illegible]

ANNEX XI. Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report

Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report

Evaluand Title: Rapid Environmental Assistance for Crisis Affected Countries" PIMS 01983 (2017-2024)

All UNEP evaluations are subject to a quality assessment by the Evaluation Office. This is an assessment of the quality of the evaluation product (i.e. evaluation report) and is dependent on more than just the consultant's efforts and skills.

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
Section A: Executive Summary	Assessment	
1. Does the Executive Summary act as a concise, accurate standalone section, especially to inform decision-making? Consider how clearly and concisely the report presents: - a clear summary of the evaluation object - evaluation objectives, scope and methodology - the overall project evaluation rating - a summary of main evaluation findings, including key features of performance (strengths and weaknesses) - summary responses to key strategic evaluation questions - summary of main conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> All required elements are addressed satisfactorily <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The text provides a clear summary of the main findings, response to strategic questions, lessons learned and recommendations, It provides a good basis to support the overall project performance rating (Satisfactory)	5
Section B: The Project	Assessment	
2. Does the report clearly describe the key parameters, scale and complexity of the evaluand? Consider how well the report presents: - an overview of the main issue that the project is trying to address - timeline dates of project approval, duration, including and number of phases (where appropriate) - geographic coverage (regions/countries) - total secured budget and project financing, including a table with funding sources - implementing and funding partners - institutional context (i.e. UNEP sub-programme, Division, Branch etc) - implementation structure with diagram - UNEP results frameworks to which it contributes (e.g. PoW Direct Outcome) - summary of results framework as stated in the ProDoc (or as officially revised) - stakeholder groups organised according to relevant common characteristics - whether the project has been evaluated in the past (e.g. mid-term, by an external agency, etc.) - substantive or significant changes in design during implementation	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the project, context, structure, partners/ stakeholders, coverage, timelines, objectives and results framework,	6
Section C: Evaluation Methods and Theory of Change	Assessment	
3. Does the report present a clear, comprehensive and adequate description of the evaluation methodology? Consider how well it presents the following elements, and their adequacy based on the scope of the evaluation: - statement of the purpose of the evaluation and the key intended audience for the evaluation findings - data collection methods and information sources - justification for methods used (e.g. electronic/face-to-face interviews, qualitative/quantitative analysis) - criteria and sampling strategies used to select stakeholders for consultations, and for sites/countries visited - number and types of respondents (<i>including in a table broken down by gender</i>) - strategies used to increase stakeholder engagement and response rate	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The evaluation methodology has been clearly and comprehensively described. The limitations that hindered the methods applied have also been well described.	6

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
- methods used to include the voices/experiences of different and potentially excluded groups (e.g. women, marginalised) - data verification methods (e.g. triangulation) - data analysis methods (e.g. scoring, thematic analysis) - evaluation limitations and mitigation measures (e.g. how these were addressed by the evaluator) - consideration for ethics and human rights issues, including how anonymity and confidentiality were protected		
4. Does the report describe an assessment and reformulation of the Theory of Change, and present an adequate articulation of the TOC causal pathways that were used to assess project performance (<i>narratively and diagrammatically</i>)? Consider how well the report presents: - whether the project design included a TOC - how the <i>TOC at Evaluation</i>⁴⁴ was designed (e.g. who was involved, etc) - confirmation/reconstruction of results in accordance with UNEP definitions (<i>including reformulation table, which may have initially been presented in the Inception Report and should appear in the Main Evaluation report.</i>) - articulation of causal pathways - identification of drivers and assumptions - identification of key actors in the change process	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section on TOC assessment is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The TOC was developed through a consultative process and provides an adequate articulation of the project's causal pathways. The TOC has been presented in both diagrammatic and narrative formats. A clear comparison between the original and reformulated TOC has been included in table format.	5
Section D: Evidence and Analysis	Assessment	
5. Is the report based on sufficient and adequate data and clear and credible evidence? Consider how well the report presents: - sufficient evidence that is consistent throughout the report - evidence that is supported by data sources (e.g. quotes, reports, etc) - evidence that is explicitly triangulated, unless noted as having a single source - gaps in data are explained and justified - data sources that are reliable, adequate, sufficient for the scope of the evaluation	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The report is based on sufficient data and the limitations are well described. <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The evaluation findings are adequately corroborated with suitable examples from different data sources, providing clear and credible evidence.	6
6. Does the report include rigorous analysis and logical findings? Consider the extent to which the findings are: - supported by clear analysis that is consistent with the evidence presented - logical, clear and coherent - aligned with UNEP's Criteria Ratings Matrix - aligned with the evaluation framework - more than descriptions and provide insights into 'how' and/or 'why' the project performed a certain way - balanced, presenting both successes and weaknesses	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The report presents good analyses and logical findings <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The analyses are logical, coherent, and well-reasoned. The findings are consistent throughout the report. The report is balanced, identifying both successes and weaknesses in project implementation. The findings are insightful and provide a good overview of why the project performed as it did. Some factual errors and omissions were observed by reviewers during draft review, and these have been adequately addressed in the Final Report.	6
Section E: Evaluation Findings	Assessment	
7. Does the report present evidence and analysis of project Strategic Relevance with respect to UNEP, partner and geo-	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> Section on Relevance is complete	6

⁴⁴ During the Inception Phase of the evaluation process a TOC at Evaluation Inception is created based on the information contained in the approved project documents (these may include either logical framework or a TOC or narrative descriptions), formal revisions and annual reports etc. During the evaluation process this TOC is revised based on changes made during project intervention and becomes the TOC at Evaluation.

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
graphic policies and strategies at the time of project approval? Consider how well the report addresses: - Alignment to the UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS), Programme of Work (POW) and Strategic Priorities - Alignment to Donor/GEF/Partners Strategic Priorities - Relevance to Regional, Sub-regional and National Environmental Priorities - Complementarity with Existing Interventions: complementarity of the project at design (or during inception/mobilisation⁴⁵), with other interventions addressing the needs of the same target groups.	<u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> Th report has addressed all the sub-categories well and includes supporting examples as evidence	
Does the report present a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the Quality of Project Design, based on the detailed assessment presented in the Inception Report?	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> Section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> Design strengths and weaknesses are described and the overall rating for project design is adequately justified	*Not rated
Does the report recognise and describe, when appropriate, key features of the Nature of the External Context under which the project was implemented that limited the project's performance (e.g. conflict, natural disaster, political upheaval⁴⁶), and how they affected performance?	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> Section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> the project operated in difficult and unfavourable contexts, and this is clearly summarised	*Not rated
8. Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of the Availability of Outputs to the intended beneficiaries? Consider how well the report presents: - a convincing, evidence-supported and clear presentation of the outputs made available by the project compared to its approved plans and budget - assessment of the nature and scale of outputs versus the project indicators and targets - assessment of the timeliness, quality and utility of outputs to intended beneficiaries - identification of positive or negative effects of the project on disadvantaged groups, including those with specific needs due to gender, vulnerability or marginalisation (e.g. through disability).	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The assessment of Outputs is systematic, thorough, and addresses each output against their respective indicators and targets. Sufficient evidence has been provided to support the assessment of performance for each output, including the level of achievement.	6
9. Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of the Achievement of Outcomes, as a result of the uptake, adoption and/or implementation of outputs by the intended beneficiaries? This may include behaviour changes at an individual or collective level. Consider how well the report presents: - a convincing and evidence-supported analysis of the uptake of outputs by intended beneficiaries - assessment of the nature, depth and scale of outcomes versus the project indicators and targets - discussion of the contribution, credible association and/or attribution of outcome level changes to the work of the project itself - any constraints to attributing effects to the projects' work - identification of positive or negative effects of the project on disadvantaged groups, including those	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The report provides a well-reasoned and evidence-based assessment and addresses each Outcome individually and systematically against their respective indicators and targets. The assessment is balanced, addressing both the successes and challenges in the uptake, adoption and/or implementation of outputs by the intended beneficiaries. It is possible to get a sense of the contribution, credible association and/or attribution of outcome level changes to the work of the project itself.	6

⁴⁵ A project's inception or mobilization period is understood as the time between project approval and first disbursement. Complementarity during project implementation is considered under Efficiency, see below.

⁴⁶ Note that 'political upheaval' does not include regular national election cycles, but unanticipated unrest or prolonged disruption. The potential delays or changes in political support that are often associated with the regular national election cycle should be part of the project's design and addressed through adaptive management of the project team.

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
with specific needs due to gender, vulnerability or marginalisation (e.g. through disability).		
10. Does the report present an integrated analysis, guided by the causal pathways represented by the TOC, of all evidence relating to Likelihood of Impact? Consider how well the report presents: - an explanation of how causal pathways emerged and the resulting change processes - an explicit discussion of how drivers and assumptions played out - an explanation of roles played by key actors and change agents - identification of any unintended negative effects of the project, especially on disadvantaged groups, including those with specific needs due to gender, vulnerability or marginalisation (e.g. through disability).	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The project's delivered primarily out-put level results. Therefore, longer-term results have not been treated as usual in this evaluation. Consequently, the likelihood of impact achievement has not been assessed in this evaluation.	Not rated
11. Does the report present an integrated analysis of all dimensions evaluated under Financial Management and include a completed 'financial management' table? Consider how well the report addresses the following: <i>adherence</i> to UNEP's financial policies and procedures <i>completeness</i> of financial information, including the actual project costs and actual co-financing used and explanation of any variances between planned and actual expenditures	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The report presents an evidence-based assessment of the project's performance in financial management. A table has been included to show the assessment by sub-criteria including their corresponding evidence.	5
12. Does the report present an integrated analysis of all dimensions evaluated under Efficiency? Consider how well the report presents: - cost-effective or time-saving measures put in place to maximise results within the secured budget and agreed project timeframe - implications of any delays and no cost extensions - discussion of making use, during project implementation, of/building on pre-existing institutions, partnerships and complementarities with other initiatives, programmes and projects etc. - the extent to which the management of the project minimised UNEP's environmental footprint.	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The report covers all the required aspects of efficiency in sufficient detail and includes supporting evidence.	6
13. Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of the project's Monitoring and Reporting? Consider how well the report addresses the following: - the quality of <i>monitoring of project implementation</i> (including use of monitoring data for adaptive management) - the quality of <i>project reporting</i> (e.g. PIMS and donor reports)	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> Section would have benefitted from a more robust assessment of the sub-criterion on monitoring of project implementation to explain the extent to which project monitoring supported/ or failed to support a results-based adaptive management. Limitations in monitoring data also impacted on the extent to which the assessment of this criterion could have been done	5
14. Does the report present an integrated analysis of all dimensions evaluated under Sustainability (i.e. the endurance of benefits achieved at outcome level)? Consider how well the report addresses the following: - socio-political sustainability - financial sustainability - institutional sustainability	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The project's delivered primarily out-put level results. Therefore, longer-term results have not been treated as usual in this evaluation: the sustainability criterion is not categorised into the usual 3 components (Socio-political, financial and Institutional Framework) but has instead been assessed at a broader level <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The assessment of sustainability includes sufficient detail and supporting evidence to support the overall rating. The assessment also looks at the scalability of the interventions made in the project countries	6

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
15. Does the report present a well-evidence analysis of the Factors Affecting Performance, either in this section or in cross-referenced sections? <i>These factors are not always discussed in stand-alone sections and may be integrated in the other performance criteria as appropriate. However, if not addressed substantively in this section, a cross reference must be given to where the topic is addressed, and that entry must be sufficient to justify the performance rating for these factors.</i> Consider how well the report addresses the following cross-cutting issues: • quality of project management and supervision⁴⁷ • stakeholder participation and co-operation • responsiveness to human rights and gender equality • environmental and social safeguards • country ownership and driven-ness • communication and public awareness	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> All the factors affecting performance have been discussed in sufficient detail and are consistent with the findings presented in the report.	6
Section F: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations	Assessment	
16. Do the Conclusions present a summative assessment of the evaluand as a whole, reflecting on prominent aspects of the project's performance? Consider how well the conclusions: • provide a compelling narrative and integrated assessment of project project's performance (i.e. achievements and limitations) • add deeper insights and analysis beyond the findings under each individual criterion • are derived from the synthesized analysis of evidence gathered during the evaluation process • provide clear and succinct response to the key strategic questions • address the human rights and gender dimensions of the intervention explicitly (e.g. how these dimensions were considered, addressed or impacted on) • provide lessons that are rooted in real project experiences, describe the context from which they are derived, and do not duplicate recommendations	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The section is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The conclusion is concise, giving a clear overview of the project's performance. The key strategic questions are explicitly addressed within the conclusions section and provide an in-depth and cross-cutting rundown of the project. Gender dimensions are discussed. A table showing the summary of project ratings by criteria is presented. The lessons learned are anchored on actual findings presented in the report. The contextual background from which they are drawn is included to support the validity of the lessons presented	6
17. Does the report present Recommendations for specific action to be taken by identified people/position-holders to resolve concrete problems affecting the project or the sustainability of its results? Consider how well the recommendations: • are clearly formulated and logically derived from the findings and/or conclusions • are feasible to implement within the timeframe and resources available (including local capacities) and specific in terms of who would do what and when • include at least one recommendation relating to strengthening the human rights and gender dimensions of UNEP interventions • represent a measurable performance target in order that the Evaluation Office can monitor and assess compliance with the recommendations.	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The report provides four (4) recommendations <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The recommendations are clear, anchored on actual findings presented in the report, and specific in terms of who will do what and when.	5

⁴⁷ In some cases 'project management and supervision' will refer to the supervision and guidance provided by UNEP to implementing partners and national governments while in others, specifically for GEF funded projects, it will refer to the project management performance of the executing agency and the technical backstopping provided by UNEP. This includes providing the answers to the questions on Core Indicator Targets, stakeholder engagement, gender responsiveness, safeguards and knowledge management, required for the GEF portal.

Report Quality Criteria	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Report Rating
NOTES: (i) In cases where the recommendation is addressed to a third party, compliance can only be monitored and assessed where a contractual/legal agreement remains in place. Without such an agreement, the recommendation should be formulated to say that UNEP project staff should pass on the recommendation to the relevant third party in an effective or substantive manner. The effective transmission by UNEP of the recommendation will then be monitored for compliance. (ii) Where a new project phase is already under discussion or in preparation with the same third party, a recommendation can be made to address the issue in the next phase.		
Section G: Report Structure and Presentation	Assessment	
18. Is the report <i>well-structured and complete</i>? Does it: - follow the Evaluation Office structure and formatting guidelines - include all required sections and annexes, as applicable - not exceed 50 pages in length from the Executive Summary to the end of the Conclusion Does the report present information clearly and appropriately? Is it written: - in clear and accessible language - largely free from grammar, spelling and punctuation errors - in an adequate and professional tone - with the use of visual aids, such as maps, graphs tables and photos	<u>Coverage/omissions:</u> The report is complete <u>Strengths/weaknesses:</u> The report is well-structured. It is written in clear and professional language. Tables and charts have been used as visual aids. It is largely free of grammatical errors.	6
OVERALL REPORT QUALITY RATING		5.7 Highly Satisfactory

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion, with half-point increments allowed (e.g., 3.5 or 4.5). Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. The overall rating is based on a simple average of the ratings for each criterion.

* This criterion was not rated to avoid giving it disproportionate weight in calculating the overall score, as this section is typically brief. The remaining criteria are comprehensive and substantial enough to provide a balanced and meaningful overall rating for the report.

Rating the Report Quality Criteria

Rating (1-6)	Description
6	Provides all content with high quality.
5	Provides all content with minor weaknesses.
4	Provides most content with minor weaknesses.
3	Provides most content with significant weaknesses.
2	Omits substantive content with significant weaknesses.
1	Omits almost all content with major weaknesses.

At the end of the evaluation, compliance of the evaluation process against the agreed standard procedures is assessed, based on the table below. *All questions with negative compliance must be explained further in the table below.*

Evaluation Process Quality Criteria	Compliance	
	Yes	No
Consultant's independence:		
1. Were possible conflicts of interest of proposed Evaluation Consultant(s) appraised and addressed in the final selection?	Y	
2. Was the Evaluation Consultant given direct access to identified external stakeholders?	Y	
3. Did the Evaluation Consultant raise any concerns about being unable to work freely and without interference or undue pressure from project staff or the Evaluation Office?		N
4. If Yes to Q3: Were these concerns resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both the Evaluation Consultant and the Evaluation Manager?		
Project's engagement and support:		
5. Did the project make available all required/requested documents?	Y	
6. Did the project make all financial information (and audit reports if applicable) available in a timely manner and to an acceptable level of completeness?		N
7. Was adequate support provided by the project to the evaluator(s) in planning and conducting evaluation missions?	Y	
8. Were the project team, relevant UNEP senior staff, partners and interviewed stakeholders given an opportunity to provide comments on key deliverables, as appropriate (e.g. Terms of Reference, Inception Report and Draft Evaluation Report)?	Y	
Quality assurance of key deliverables:		
9. Were the Terms of Reference peer-reviewed?	Y	
10. Was the inception report peer-reviewed, including the Theory of Change?	Y	
11. Were evaluation preliminary findings presented to the project team in a format allowing discussion, before drafting the report?		
12. Was the draft report peer-reviewed?	Y	
Transparency and commenting:		
13. Was the inception report, including the (reconstructed) TOC, sent to the project team, relevant UNEP senior staff and partners, with a minimum of eight working days to comment?	Y	
14. Was the draft evaluation report sent directly by the Evaluation Consultant to the Evaluation Office?	Y	
15. Were all stakeholder comments to the draft evaluation report sent directly to the Evaluation Office?	Y	
16. Did the Evaluation Consultant(s) respond adequately to all factual corrections and comments?	Y	
17. Did the Evaluation Office share substantive comments and Evaluation Consultant responses with those who commented, as appropriate?	Y	
Financial Resources:		
18. Was the evaluation budget approved at project design available for the evaluation? If not, comment in the table below on the sufficiency of the funds made available.	Y	
19. Were the agreed evaluation funds readily available to support the payment of the evaluation contract throughout the payment process? If not, comment in the table below.	Y	
Timeliness:		
20. If a Terminal Evaluation: Was the evaluation initiated within six months after project operational completion and not more than three months prior? (Or, if a Mid Term Evaluation: Was the evaluation initiated within a six-month period prior to the project's mid-point?)		N
21. Was the inception report delivered and reviewed/approved prior to commencing any travel?	Y	
22. Were all submission and commenting deadlines met as set by the Evaluation Manager and as far as unforeseen circumstances allowed? If not, comment in the table below on exceptional delays.	Y	

Provide comments / explanations / mitigating circumstances below for any non-compliant process issues.

Evaluation Process Criterion Number	Evaluation Office Comments